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Preface
In March 2014 Bill Arms approached Ken King about publishing his memoir about the Early Years of Academic 
Computing in the Internet First University Press (IFUP). The IFUP had been created in 2003 by Bob Cooke 
and Ken King as part of a project to encourage open publication on the Internet as a first choice for scholarly 
publication. Bill had written his memoir as a result of his observation that todays students were unaware of the 
many contributions Universities had made to creating the current computing environment and some of those 
contributions needed to be documented. Ken King stated that he believed that Universities deserved far more 
credit for computing advances than they had received.
Ken suggested that Bill try to create an “incremental book” by persuading other pioneers to contribute their 
memoirs. The incremental book idea was developed by Bob Cooke as part of the IFUP effort to get scholarly 
information on the Internet. The idea was that the IFUP would publish chapters or sections in a book on the 
Internet as they are finished, rather than wait until the whole book had been completed. Bill suggested to Ken 
that he develop his own memoir and that he and Ken then jointly approach other pioneers as co-editors to 
create an incremental book composed of memoirs by people who labored at Universities and may recall events 
and contributions that helped change the world. Ken agreed and the second section in our book covers his 
observations about life in the trenches at Universities during the period between 1953 and 1993. The book that 
we hope to create is possibly an effort not unlike the story about an elephant touched by blind men. People 
that we hope will contribute will certainly have different slants on major events at the Universities that helped 
change the world.
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A. Memoir by William Y. Arms
Preface
The past fifty years have seen university computing move from a fringe activity to a central part of academic 
life. Today’s college seniors never knew a world without personal computers, networks, and the web. Some-
times I ask Cornell students, “When my wife and I were undergraduates at Oxford, there were separate men’s 
and women’s colleges. If we wanted to meet in the evening, how did we communicate?” They never knew a 
world without telephones and email, let alone smartphones, Google, and Facebook.
They are also unaware that much of modern computing was developed by universities. Universities were the pi-
oneers in end-user computing. The idea that everybody is a computer user is quite recent. Many organizations 
still do not allow their staff to choose their own computers, decide how to use them, and select the applications 
to run. But end-user computing has been established in universities since the 1960s. When the computer in-
dustry was slow in seeing the potential, universities took the initiative. This narrative describes a thirty-year 
period when academic computing diverged from the mainstream. Universities built their own state-of-the-art 
systems and ran them successfully. They led the development of timesharing and local area (campus) networks. 
They were major contributors to distributed computing, email, the national networks, and the web.
This is not a history. It is a memoir. As a student, faculty member, and administrator, I lived through many of 
these developments. From 1978 to 1995 I was in charge of computing at two of the leading universities, Dart-
mouth College and Carnegie Mellon. After 1995 I was no longer personally involved in the developments, but 
in the final section I describe how academic computing and the mainstream have now come together again, to 
the benefit of both.
There is a glaring gap that runs throughout this narrative. It says little about the impact of computing on aca-
demic life, on teaching, research, and libraries. The final section has a few thoughts about educational comput-
ing, but it is a huge topic that deserves a much fuller treatment.
Disruptive change is an underlying theme of this period. I have tried to give some indication of what it was 
like to be a computing director, the opportunities and the excitement, but also the pressures and uncertainties. 
I was fortunate in working for two remarkable presidents, John Kemeny at Dartmouth and Richard Cyert at 
Carnegie Mellon. Each was a visionary in seeing how computing could be used in higher education. When I 
remember my colleagues at other universities wrestling with less enlightened leaders, I know how lucky I was.
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Chapter 1
The Early Days
A second generation computer
This photograph is of a Ferranti Peg-
asus computer in the Science Muse-
um in London. The museum claims 
that it is the oldest computer in the 
world that is still operational.
Wikipedia
Background: The 1960s
The 1960s
The mid-1960s were a pivotal time for computing. In 1965, as semiconductors replaced vacuum tubes, Gordon 
Moore of Intel observed that the number of transistors on integrated circuits was doubling every two years. A 
year earlier, IBM had announced the 360 family of computers. Timesharing was born that same year, when two 
people at Dartmouth College using separate terminals typed “PRINT 2+2” and (after some bugs were fixed) 
both got the answer 4.
Moore’s Law is not a law of nature, but for fifty years hardware engineers have used it as a target. On aggregate 
they have actually done better than Moore predicted. This exponential growth has created enormous opportu-
nities, but it has also created intense challenges. Many years later, Allen Newell pointed out that collectively we 
do well in predicting the performance of components such as processors and disks; we do quite well in predict-
ing the next generation of hardware, such as networks and personal computers; but we have consistently failed 
to predict the breakthrough applications enabled by this hardware. He might have added that we also fail to 
anticipate the organizational and social impact.
A Pegasus computer
My early experience provides some typical examples of computing in the 1960s, before the emergence of time-
sharing. It was characteristic of the period that as a mathematics undergraduate at Oxford, graduating in 1966, 
I never went near a computer.
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I wrote one small program in 1962 while at school in England. A local engineering company had a Ferranti 
Pegasus computer and invited a group of us (all boys) to visit it. There is a Pegasus in the Science Museum in 
London. It is an imposing collection of shining boxes, which occupy a space the size of a small room, but the 
computer we saw had most of its covers removed exposing racks of vacuum tubes and electrical circuits. The 
covers were off because the components were highly unreliable. The processor was an array of modules, each 
about the size of a shoe box and containing several vacuum tubes. Individual modules could be slid out of the 
rack and replaced, even while the machine was powered up.
We each had one attempt to run a small program. The programming language was Pegasus Autocode, a dialect 
of the family that later became Algol. My program solved a simple mathematical puzzle. We wrote our pro-
gram instructions on paper. A clerk keyed them on to 5-track paper tape and an operator fed the tape into the 
computer. After a substantial pause, the results were printed out on a teletype terminal. My program gave the 
correct result. Other people were not so successful.
Fortran programming with punched cards
After my brief experience at school, I did not use a computer again until 1966 when I was a master’s student at 
the London School of Economics. The school had an IBM 1440 computer.
The programming language was Fortran II, which was easy to use for the mathematical programs that we 
wrote. Nobody gave us instructions. Programming was assumed to be a simple skill that any student could 
pick up from the manual.
Before class we left our coding sheets at the reception desk and an hour later we picked up the results. We got 
back a deck of cards, a listing of our program, its compilation, and results. If we wanted to make changes, we 
wrote them on a new coding sheet and handed back the deck of cards. Apparently the school had decided that 
it was less expensive to pay somebody to key our programs than to waste expensive computer time trying to 
run badly keyed programs that we had punched ourselves.
English Electric - Leo - Marconi
My first job after graduation was in the operational research group of English Electric - Leo - Marconi. As the 
name implied, this was a merger of three separate companies, each of which manufactured computers during 
the 1960s. By the time that I actually started work the company had 
changed its name to English Electric - Leo, and soon afterwards it 
merged with International Computers and Tabulators Ltd. to be-
come International Computers Limited (ICL).
A Leo computer from the early 1960s
Leo was one of the pioneers of computer-based data processing. It began 
as an in-house venture of J. Lyons, a bakery and food company. Lyons built 
the original machines for its own use. Leo was perhaps the first company 
to use multiprogramming successfully. The Leo III was able to run up to 
three programs simultaneously. The company also developed a high-level 
programming language, Cleo, similar to IBM’s Cobol.
LEO Computers Society 
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In 1967, English Electric - Leo introduced a new range of computers, known as System 4, which was a deriva-
tive of the RCA Spectra series. These machines used the same instruction set as the recently introduced IBM 
360 series. The company was proud of the semiconductor technology, claiming to be the first commercial com-
puter to have more than one gate on a silicon chip. Building on experience with the Leo 3, the central processor 
had hardware support for multiprogramming.
For the first three months on my new job, I was sent on an intensive training course to learn about these new 
machines. The course included assembly level programming and went into considerable detail about the hard-
ware. This was a fortunate time to learn about computing as I was trained in the computer architecture that 
was to dominate mainframe computers for many years.
The IBM 360 and its Clones
Third generation computers
The computers introduced in the mid-1960s, such as the IBM 360 family, were called “third generation” com-
puters. Third generation computers were important because each computer in a family had the same archi-
tecture. Previously, every new range of computers had had a different architecture and machines within a 
range were often incompatible. Whenever customers bought a new machine they had to convert all their old 
programs. The huge suites of software that we run today would not be possible without stable architectures and 
standardized programming languages. Over the fifty years since its first release, the IBM 360 architecture has 
been steadily enhanced, such as when virtual memory was added, but the enhancements have generally been 
backwards compatible.
An IBM 360
An IBM System/360 in use at 
Volkswagen.
German Federal Archives
A third generation computer consisted of a group of large metal boxes. The cabinets were laid out in an air-con-
ditioned machine room and connected with heavy-duty cables under a raised floor. Photographs show ma-
chine rooms that were models of tidiness, but in practice a machine room was a busy place, full of boxes of 
punched cards, magnetic tapes, and stacks of paper for the line printers. They were noisy, with card readers and 
line printers chattering away, and the continuous rush of air-conditioning.
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Solid-state components had replaced vacuum tubes, but the logic boards were still large and the central proces-
sor was several tall racks of circuit boards with interconnecting cables. Memory used magnetic cores, which 
were bulky and expensive. In 1968, the price of memory was about $1 per byte.
Most of the boxes in the machine room were peripherals and their controllers. Rotating disks were beginning 
to come on the market, but most backup storage was on open-reel magnetic tape. The tape held nine bits of data 
in a row across the tape, representing one byte plus a digital check. Early drives wrote 800 rows per inch, but 
higher densities followed steadily. To sort data that is on magnetic tape requires at least three tape units and 
most systems had many more. The controllers that connected the tape and disk units to the central processor 
were imposing pieces of expensive hardware.
The architecture of the IBM 360 supported both scientific computing and data processing. It firmly established 
the eight-bit byte as the unit of storage for a character and four bytes were organized as a word. Earlier comput-
ers had used a variety of word sizes and characters had often been stored as six bits. In the days before virtual 
memory, memory was organized into 4096-byte modules and I vividly remember the challenges of memory 
management when writing assembly code programs.
The instruction set was designed to support high-level languages, such as Cobol for data processing, and For-
tran for scientific work. Arithmetic could be decimal, operating on character strings, or binary, operating on 
words that could represent either integer or floating-point numbers. By using variable-length instruction for-
mats, complex operations could be carried out in a single instruction. For example, only one instruction was 
needed to move a string of characters to another location in memory. Apart from the memory management, I 
found the assembly code straightforward and easy to program in.
A Fortran coding sheet
Programmers wrote their code on 
coding sheets. A clerk keyed the pro-
gram onto punched cards, one card 
for each line of the program.
Wikipedia
In the days before terminals and interactive computing, a programmer wrote the instructions on coding sheets, 
with one 80-character line for each instruction. The instructions were punched onto cards, one card per in-
struction. A colored job control card was placed at the head of the card deck and another at the end, followed 
by data cards. The complete deck was placed in a tray and handed to the computer operators. Sometime later 
the programmer would receive a printout with the results of the compilation and the output of any test runs. 
Computer time was always scarce and one test run per day was considered good service. This placed a premium 
on checking programs thoroughly before submission, as even a simple syntax error could waste a day’s run.
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Commercial data processing on third generation computers such as the IBM 360 used batch processing to au-
tomate tasks such as billing, payroll, stock control, etc. The algorithms resembled the modern  “map/reduce” 
methods that are used to build indexes for Internet search engines.  These methods are used to process huge 
volumes of data, such as when building indexes for Internet search engines. These algorithms are used when 
the amount of data is so large relative to the memory of the computer that there is no possibility of holding 
comprehensive data structures in memory and random access processing would be impossibly slow. Therefore 
the processing methods use sequential processing. The basic processing steps are sorting and merging, and the 
computation is done on small groups of records that have the same key.
In earlier years, some data input had used paper tape, but by the late 1960s punched cards were standard. An 
advantage of punched cards was that an error could be corrected by replacing a card, though it was easy to 
make further mistakes in doing so. Every computer center had a data preparation staff of young women who 
punched the transactions onto punched cards in fixed format. The cards were verified by having a second per-
son key the same data. Data preparation was such a boring job that staff turnover was a perpetual problem. The 
British driving license system, which we developed at English Electric - Leo, was always understaffed in spring 
before the school year came to an end and the next wave of school leavers could be hired.
The first step in processing a batch of cards was to feed them into a card reader. A “data vet” program checked 
the cards for syntax errors and wrote the card images onto magnetic tape. This was then sorted so that the 
records were in the same sequence as the master file.
Records were stored in a master file on magnetic tape and sorted by an identifying number, such as a custom-
er number. Sorting records on magnetic tape by repeated merging was time consuming. The performance 
depended on the number of tape drives and the amount of memory available. Time was saved by having tape 
drives that could be read backwards, so that no time was wasted rewinding them.
The master file update program would typically be run at the end of the day. The previous version of the file 
would be merged with the incoming transactions and an updated version of the master file written on a new 
magnetic tape. The update programs generated copious output to be printed, including business transactions 
such as bills or checks, management reports, and data errors. This output was written to another tape, which 
was then sorted by the category of printing, so that the operators could load the various types of paper into the 
printers as required.
The standard printer was a line printer, usually uppercase only. The paper was fan-folded with sprocket holes 
on the side and was advanced one line at a time. Most manufacturers used drum printers, with a complete set 
of characters around the drum, but IBM used a chain printer in which the characters were on a moving chain. I 
never understood how it worked. With either type of printer the actual printing was caused by a flying hammer 
that pressed the paper against the metal character.
Every part of the operation was prone to failure. Most computer centers halted work for several hours every 
night for maintenance, but even so hardware and software failures were common. An advantage of batch pro-
cessing was that the system could write a checkpoint at the end of each batch. If the card reader jammed or a 
magnetic tape failed, the operators went back to the previous checkpoint, and reloaded the cards or the previ-
ous copy of the tape and restarted the job.
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University Computing before Timesharing
End-user computing
During the 1960s, academic computing diverged from the mainstream. Most commercial applications, wheth-
er data processing or scientific, were large production jobs that ran for several hours and used the entire com-
puter. Companies hired professionals to write the programs, punch the input, and run the jobs. In universities, 
the faculty, students, and researchers wrote their own programs and often ran them themselves. They would 
spend long periods developing programs, hoping for fast turnaround of compilations and small tests, followed 
by a few large computations. Since many of the programs were run only a few times, priority was given to con-
venient program development.
Computer hardware was improving rapidly, both in performance and reliability, but hardware was a scarce 
resource. Processor cycles could not be wasted. Because there were very great economies of scale, the best strat-
egy for a university was to buy a single large computer and find a way to share it among the users. This led to 
the growth of university computer centers.
The University of Sussex
When we were at the University of Sussex from 1969 to 1972, we had computing facilities that were typical of 
the better universities at the time. The university computer was an ICL 1904A. The ICL 1900 series was an ear-
ly third generation system that competed quite successfully with the IBM 360. The architecture used a 24-bit 
word. I think that the computer at the University of Sussex had 32K words, equivalent to less than 100K bytes.
ICL developed a sequence of operating systems called George. While waiting for ICL to deliver George III, 
the University of Sussex developed a simple monitor for running small Fortran jobs. It used a circular buffer 
on magnetic disk that held jobs waiting to be processed. The jobs were card decks of Fortran programs to be 
compiled and run. Since card reading was slow, the aim was always to have several jobs that had been read into 
the buffer, waiting to be run, so that the central processor was never idle. Output to the line printer was also 
buffered.
The Fortran compiler and the monitor used almost all the memory, but about 4K words were spare. My wife 
and I reached an agreement with the computing center that we could use this small amount of memory for our 
experiments with online catalogs. The computer had provision for a few terminals and we used one of them. 
This sounds an absurdly small amount of memory but we were able to use the Fortran IV overlay mechanism. 
This was a primitive form of paging by which the programmer specified that certain subroutines and data 
structures could overlay each other in memory. Since the basic Fortran I/O package itself used more than 4K, 
we wrote a physical I/O routine to control the terminal and never loaded the I/O package.
The university ran the computer for two shifts per day. The third shift, from midnight to 8 a.m., was available 
for researchers. Several of us went through the operator training course and for one night shift per week we had 
sole use of the machine. The procedure for rebooting the computer was typical of the era. Nowadays computers 
hold their boot program in some form of persistent storage, but the boot program for the 1904A was on paper 
tape. The first step in booting the machine was to set a few instructions using hand switches on the central 
processor. These instructions were executed when the computer was powered up. They instructed the paper 
tape reader to read the boot program into memory, and the boot program then read the operating system from 
magnetic tape.
Because the machine room was noisy, we would work on our programs in the reception area. We could tell 
what the machine was doing by listening to the audio monitor. This device, which was common on machines of 
that era, made a distinctive tone for each category of instruction that was being executed. Since each program 
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had a distinctive pattern of sounds we could tell when a job, such as a tape sort or the Fortran compiler, came 
to an end.
Punched card equipment
The central computer was used almost entirely for academic work. Administrative data processing used 
punched card equipment. For example, the library’s circulation system used nothing but punched cards and 
made no use of the computer. For one of my analyses I had more than seventy trays each containing 2,000 
cards.
The punched card machines were direct descendents of the Hollerith machines that were built in the early 
1900s to tabulate census data. IBM took over the Hollerith company and much of the company’s data process-
ing expertise came from its experience with punched card equipment.
Punched card equipment
In this IBM publicity photograph 
the operators are men, but in my 
experience most of them were wom-
en. The tidiness is also misleading. 
In practice, trays of cards and boxes 
of printer paper were stacked every-
where.
IBM Archives
The data processing room at the University of Sussex had about six large devices, each with its specialized func-
tion: a card sorter, copier, collator, tabulator, printer, etc. The collator was particularly important as it could 
merge data from two stacks of cards and punch out a new card, which combined the information from them. 
Each device was controlled by cables that were inserted into a plug board, thus creating a very simple program.
As an example, the card sorter had one input hopper and ten output hoppers. Sorting was one column at a 
time. The operator would use the plug board to specify a column of the card and other parameters. She would 
load the cards into the input hopper, one tray at a time, and the sorter would send each card to the output 
hopper that corresponded to the number punched in the appropriate column. To sort by a three-digit number, 
the cards would be passed through the sorter three times, sorting first by the least significant digit. Complex 
data processing operations, such as a master file update, were carried out by passing trays of cards repeatedly 
through the various devices.
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Chapter 2
Timesharing
Two pioneers of educational computing
Tom Kurtz (left) and John Kemeny were pioneers in 
using interactive computing for undergraduate edu-
cation. They developed the Basic programming lan-
guage and the Dartmouth Time Sharing System.
Dartmouth College Library
Early Timesharing
Multiprograming, multitasking, and timesharing
Mainframe computers were expensive. The central computer that Dartmouth bought in 1975 cost more than 
four million dollars, a great deal of money for a small university. Moreover, these computers had huge econo-
mies of scale. Several years later, when Cornell studied the options for replacing its mainframe computer, an 
IBM 370/65 cost twice as much as a smaller IBM 370/55, yet was four times as powerful. With such economies 
of scale, every organization followed the same strategy: buy the largest computer you could afford and find 
ways to maximize the amount of work done on it.
Computer hardware improved rapidly during the 1960s, both in performance and reliability, but processor 
cycles were a scarce resource not to be wasted. Computers of the previous generation had run one program at 
a time and the central processor might spend much of its time idling. For example, a program to process a tray 
of punched cards would spend most of its time waiting for the next card to be read.
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By the middle of the decade, computers were powerful enough to run more than one program at a time. The 
first technique that allowed several tasks to be run simultaneously was called multiprogramming. Each pro-
gram was given a priority. At any given moment the operating system would offer the central processor to 
the highest priority program. Suppose that the highest priority program copied punched cards onto tape. The 
program would start to read a card and then wait while the card was read. This caused an interrupt and the 
scheduler would start up the next program in priority. This might send data to a line printer. This program too 
would spend much of its time waiting and the central processor could be assigned to another program. Rather 
unintuitively, the highest priority was given to the program that used the central processor least. This primi-
tive form of multiprogramming required the operators to understand the characteristics of each program. It 
evolved into multitasking, where the user specifies the characteristics of a job, such as memory requirements, 
and the operating system schedules the execution. Modern operating systems use preemptive multitasking, 
where the operating system manages the entire scheduling, interrupting (or preempting) tasks after a prede-
termined time interval.
IBM’s OS/360, released in 1966, is often considered to be the first modern operating system. Its focus was on 
efficient batch processing for commercial data processing. The painful lessons learned during its development 
were the subject of the first book on software engineering, “The Mythical Man Month” by Fred Brooks.
The beginnings of timesharing
Batch processing operating systems, with their emphasis on long-running data processing jobs, were unsuit-
able for academic computing. Universities, therefore, developed timesharing to give their faculty and students 
direct access to a central computer. The early systems included Multics at MIT, Titan at Cambridge University, 
and the Dartmouth Time Sharing System (DTSS). MIT and Cambridge emphasized the needs of researchers, 
while Dartmouth’s focus was on undergraduate education. My first glimpse at timesharing was in the summer 
of 1965 when I visited Dartmouth and sat in on a lecture by John Kemeny on Basic programming. A year later, 
when my wife was a graduate student at MIT, Multics was in production and she was able to write Fortran 
programs for a research project.
Titan
This picture is of the operators’ area 
in the Titan machine room at Cam-
bridge University. Notice the hard-
copy terminal with paper coming 
out.
University of Cambridge
Timesharing allows a central computer to be shared by a large number of users sitting at terminals. Each pro-
gram in turn is given use of the central processor for a fixed period of time. When the time is up, the program 
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is interrupted and the next program resumes execution. This is called “time slicing.” A program can also be 
interrupted before the end of the time slice, for example it might have to wait for input. Timesharing is par-
ticularly effective when each user wants to use the computer intermittently, such as for program development, 
which has long periods of editing followed by short test runs. It is not suitable for the batch processing that is 
typical of commercial data processing
Dartmouth’s DTSS and MIT’s Multics had different objectives, and the systems reflected these differences, 
but the architectures had many features in common. Multics was closely linked to the emerging discipline of 
computer science. It is often described as the precursor to Unix. I recall a visit from Brian Kernigham of Bell 
Labs to Dartmouth in about 1982 when he was intrigued to discover that features of Unix, such as pipes, had 
equivalents in both architectures. Most of Multics was written in a high-level language, PL/1, unlike other op-
erating systems that were written in assembly code and tightly linked to the hardware architecture.
DTSS had a direct commercial impact. Since large computers were so expensive, commercial timesharing bu-
reaus sold computer time to remote customers. The market leader was General Electric’s GEIS, which was orig-
inally developed in a joint project at Dartmouth. Concepts from DTSS were adopted by the early minicomputer 
systems from companies such as Hewlett-Packard and Digital Equipment Corporation. Even the computer 
HAL in the film “2001: A Space Odyssey” had commands taken from DTSS.
Timesharing dominated academic computing until the late 1980s, when it was replaced by personal comput-
ers. Even then, the differences between academic and commercial computing remained and led universities 
to build the first large networks of personal computers. As a result academic computing and the computing 
mainstream followed separate paths for about thirty years, from the mid-1960s to the 1990s.
Basic programming
Basic was developed at Dartmouth as a straightforward programming language for students and faculty. It 
became the language of choice in educational computing. Basic was never suitable for large programs, and for 
this reason it is often dismissed by computer scientists, but it was ideally suited for its purpose. The simple syn-
tax meant that it was easy for beginners. For example, no distinction was made between integers and floating 
point; they were just numbers. As editing was always a problem on hardcopy terminals, each Basic statement 
had a line number; to make a change, the user retyped the line. Finally, the syntax was carefully designed for 
very fast compilation. Dartmouth specialized in fast compilers but almost every other version of Basic was 
interpreted.
Because of its efficient use of hardware, the first commercial timesharing systems were based on Basic. Later, for 
the same reasons, Basic was the dominant language on the early personal computers. Microsoft’s first product 
was a version of Basic. Unfortunately for Basic’s reputation, Microsoft Basic had numerous crude extensions to 
give the programmer control of the hardware.
As computers became more powerful, Dartmouth steadily extended the language. The final version was an ele-
gant structured language, with an effective choice of procedures, and good vector graphics. The design choices 
always emphasized simplicity. In the early 1980s we used Basic for the introductory computer science course 
at Dartmouth and PL/1 for the second. For the equivalent courses at Cornell today, we use Python and Java.
Commercial timesharing systems
Some of the first minicomputers ran small timesharing systems with a dedicated Basic interpreter. In 1972 
I moved to the British Open University, which was the pioneer in distance education providing degree pro-
grams for students across Britain. The university had a national timeshared network using Hewlett-Packard’s 
HP 2000 Time-Shared Basic. The university had teletype terminals in study centers around the country. They 
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were connected to the computer system by placing an ordinary telephone handset into an acoustic coupler. 
The transmission speed was 110 bits per second. The Hewlett-Packard computers could each support 32 simul-
taneous users. There was one computer at the Open University’s headquarters in Milton Keynes, and I think 
that there was a second system at a center in the north of England. The computer provided only one service, 
a Basic editor and interpreter. The version of Basic and the command language were essentially the same as 
Dartmouth’s first version.
The first two computing courses that we introduced at the Open University were based on this system, which 
was a great success. The main difficulty was not technical. Many of the university’s students lived long distanc-
es from the study centers and we had to design the courses so that the students did not have to visit the centers 
very often. My wife was one of the first people to have a terminal at home, in the kitchen. In those days, it was 
the ultimate status symbol of the working wife.
Digital Equipment Corporation (often known as Digital or DEC) created three very different timesharing sys-
tems, each of which was widely used in universities: RSTS for the PDP 11, TOPS-20 for the DEC-20, and VAX/
VMS. The original RSTS was another Basic system, rather like Hewlett-Packard’s, but the final version, for the 
PDP 11/70, was a general-purpose timesharing system. It supported up to 63 users and was used by smaller 
colleges into the 1990s. I never used RSTS, but both the Open University and Carnegie Mellon had DEC-20s. 
Carnegie Mellon had six of them in the central machine room and the computer science department had sev-
eral more. TOPS-20 had a flexible command language, with a good balance between simplicity and generality. 
Unfortunately the unreliability of the hardware often let down the excellence of the software. The DEC-20s had 
an extended version of Basic but Digital’s particular strength was its Fortran 77 language. The VAX built its 
reputation on the fast computation for science and engineering, but the VMS operating system was also good 
for timesharing. Many liberal arts colleges used VAX/VMS for their academic computing, and in the 1980s it 
was widely used for departmental computing centers.
Finally, Unix began as a timesharing system at Bell Labs, where it ran on a variety of Digital minicomputers. 
The version that became a central part of academic computing was the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD), 
from the University of California at Berkeley. The definitive version was BSD 4.2 for Digital VAX computers, 
released in 1983.
Timesharing at Dartmouth
The Dartmouth Time Sharing System
The founders of computing at Dartmouth were two mathematicians, Tom Kurtz and John Kemeny. With help 
from a team of undergraduates, they created the Basic programming language and the Dartmouth Time Shar-
ing System (DTSS). Kemeny later became President of Dartmouth and Kurtz was the first director of the Kiewit 
computing center. Under his leadership, Kiewit gained a reputation for outstanding service to the academic 
community.
I was on sabbatical at Dartmouth in 1976 to 77, and from 1978 to 1985 I was head of computing, with various 
job titles. When I came to Dartmouth, the Kiewit technical group was very strong. It is hard to single out indi-
viduals, but Stan Dunten (networking) and Phil Koch (operating systems and programming languages) were 
outstanding. I was fortunate to inherit a smooth-running computer center. The key people were Tom Byrne, 
who ran the business side, and Punch Taylor, who had overall responsibility for the technical work.
DTSS reached its maturity during these years and it is interesting to compare the services that it provided with 
the networks of personal computers that swept universities soon afterwards. From a modern viewpoint the 
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most surprising feature was that the entire software was developed at Dartmouth. From the device drivers to 
the applications programs everything was written locally, either at Dartmouth or by DTSS, Inc., the commer-
cial spin off. Most of the original system was written by undergraduates, and much of the maintenance was still 
done by student system programmers.
A teletype terminal
Early timesharing used hardcopy termi-
nals of the type that were used for sending 
telegrams. They are often called “teletype” 
terminals, the name of one popular model, 
but they actually came from several ven-
dors. They were replaced by the much su-
perior DECwriters in the mid-1970s. Ter-
minals cost between $1,000 and $1,500.
Wikipedia
DTSS began at a time when almost all academic computing used programs written by faculty and students for 
their own work. For this reason, the operating environment was tailored to compile and run small programs 
very quickly. Dartmouth provided excellent compilers for PL/1 and for Basic, which reached maturity during 
the late 1970s. To support up to 200 simultaneous users, the timesharing monitor enforced strict limits on each 
user’s CPU usage, memory, and disk storage, and the system used these resources very efficiently. For example, 
in the days before virtual memory, the runtime environment solved the problem of running large programs by 
automatically swapping procedures within a user’s memory allocation.
In 1978, DTSS was running on a Honeywell 66/40 computer, the successor to the GE 625 and 635 computers on 
which it was developed. The hardware was unusual for a third generation mainframe computer in that it had 
two processors, each consisting of the central processing unit, the memory, and a multiplexor. Each of these 
six units had a large cabinet, filled with racks of logic boards. Hardware engineers were in constant attendance. 
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The performance of each processor was about 1 million instructions per second, and the total memory was 2 
megabytes. There were about ten disk drives, each the size of a small washing machine. The total disk capacity 
eventually reached about one gigabyte, which served the entire university. The disk drives were unreliable and 
backup copies of the data were stored on magnetic tape. A full backup was made once a week with a daily in-
cremental backup.
The communications architecture was an important reason that DTSS was able to support so many users. All 
terminal traffic was handled by two Honeywell 716 minicomputers that acted as terminal concentrators. To 
minimize the number of interruptions, they collected keystrokes and sent them to the central computers in 
batches, usually one line at a time.
By 1978, the standard terminal was a DECwriter.  This was a hard copy device that ran at 300 bits per second 
over an ordinary telephone line. For graphics, we used the Tektronix 4010 family of terminals. These termi-
nals painted a sequence of vectors on the screen that could be deleted only by wiping the entire screen blank. 
During my sabbatical year I wrote a graphical extension to the Basic system to display vector graphics. A vari-
ant of the syntax was incorporated into later versions of the Basic compiler.
Editing is a problem on a hard-copy terminal. The Basic programming language originally solved this prob-
lem by giving a line number to each statement and encouraging users to simply retype a line if it needed to be 
changed. More advanced users were provided with context editors, which made substitutions based on pattern 
matching.
Video terminals such as Digital’s VT 52 and VT 100 came into widespread use about 1980, usually running at 
1,200 bits per second. They were dumb terminals with no internal processing.
When they were used for full screen editing, each keystroke had to be processed before writing on the screen. 
If this processing was on the central computer, as was done by most commercial companies, the transmis-
sion and processing times could lead to a frustrating delay after each keystroke. At Dartmouth, we solved 
the problem of screen editing by building our own terminal, the Avatar, by adding a Z80 microprocessor and 
cache memory to a standard video terminal. In combination with a special editor on the central computer, the 
Reactor, this provided an excellent screen editor. In typical Dartmouth style, the hardware and software were 
both developed locally with Jim Perry as the leader. After I left Dartmouth, the Avatar software was ported to 
Macintosh and IBM personal computers, and the Redactor was ported to Digital’s VAX/VMS.
As I write this description thirty-five years later, the system sounds primitive in the extreme, but many people 
considered that Dartmouth provided the best academic computing of any university in the world. The uni-
versity was justifiably proud of its achievements. The technical staff was outstanding and Dartmouth was the 
benchmark for supporting users who had no interest in technicalities.
Computers in education
DTSS and Basic were simple and easy to use. Basic was never intended as a language for large programs, but 
was excellent for writing programs of a few hundred lines. Long before I arrived, the mathematics department 
passed a resolution that every student who took any mathematics course must learn to write simple programs. 
The department explicitly excused the faculty from this requirement, but many faculty members enjoyed writ-
ing programs to support their teaching and research.
These programs were made available through public libraries. There were libraries for specific courses and 
for disciplines such as statistics. I used to teach a course in computer graphics and had a course library with 
demonstration programs on topics such as splines and perspective. Other libraries included utilities such as 
text formatting and Dartmouth had a fine collection of games. Kemeny wrote a popular baseball simulation 
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based on the 1955 World Series triumph of the Brooklyn Dodgers. In anticipation of the modern “open source” 
movement, these programs were always stored as source code and continually upgraded by colleagues. When-
ever we taught a course, it was a matter of pride to extend and improve the programs in the course library.
Dartmouth was unusual in that computing was seen primarily as a service to education and made no charges 
for the use of the computer. Funding followed what was called “the library model”. Faculty and students were 
encouraged to use the computer. The center had an annual budget from the university and supplied a range of 
services at no cost to the user. I spent seven years successfully postponing demands from the central adminis-
tration that we should introduce a charging scheme.
Kemeny and Kurtz’s great achievement was to allow everybody to be a programmer. Modern computers pro-
vide a magnificent set of features, but modern user interfaces and networked communication are much more 
difficult to program. Many of today’s faculty are skilled computer users, but it is much less usual to write a 
simple program the evening before a class.
The limitations of timesharing
Every computer system is a compromise. Flexibility and generality come at the price of simplicity. General 
purpose systems, such as IBM’s MVS and Microsoft’s Windows, are inevitably cumbersome. Timesharing’s 
aim was to give users the illusion that they each had sole use of a powerful computer and for most users DTSS 
did this well. It was responsive and easy to use. Even under heavy load it allocated resources so efficiently that 
we never had to ration computing resources or charge users. But these virtues came at a price. Two important 
groups of academic users were poorly served.
Firstly, there was little support for the number crunching that is so important in science and engineering. 
DTSS’s Fortran compiler was an afterthought, and there was no way to allocate large amounts of computer 
time to individual researchers, even if they had grant funds to pay for it. At a liberal arts university this was a 
serious problem and at a research university it would have been a fatal flaw. Many universities, where research-
ers and administrative computing shared an IBM mainframe, never adopted central timesharing.
Secondly, every program had to be written locally. Dartmouth built up an impressive public library, but aca-
demic computing was steadily moving away from program development to large commercial packages. The 
inability to run packages such as SPSS for statistics was one of the forces that led Dartmouth away from its own 
system.
For a while, Dartmouth addressed these two problems by augmenting the central timesharing system with 
minicomputers, which were used for number crunching and to run software packages, but minicomputers 
could not solve the fundamental weakness of timesharing, which was capacity. Timesharing was swamped 
by its own success. Every year more and more users wanted to run more complicated programs that required 
more terminals, more processor cycles, more memory, and more disk space. The central service could never 
keep up. Even the best systems slowed down when heavily loaded and made mockery of the illusion that the 
user had sole use of the computer.
When personal computers arrived there was no illusion and once powerful workstations became available 
timesharing was doomed. The capacity problems were solved by everybody buying their own computers. 
Timesharing systems, such as DTSS, became file servers and email hubs. Eventually they were replaced by 
server farms. But for twenty years timesharing was the leading edge of academic computing
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Chapter 3
The Organization of Computing in Universities
A dinosaur from IBM
As personal computers re-
placed mainframes, the main-
frames were colloquially re-
ferred to as “dinosaurs”. This 
dinosaur was a gift from IBM 
after an advisory board meet-
ing.
Photograph by William Arms
Departmental Computing Centers
Minicomputers
During the 1970s, the economies of scale in computer hardware were gradually reversed. I do not under-
stand the engineering reasons that caused this, but it coincided with the development of large-scale integrated 
(LSI) semiconductors for processors and the phasing out of magnetic core memory. A new type of computer 
emerged, known as minicomputers, and a new group of computer companies. The market leader was Digital 
Equipment Corporation. By the late 1970s, minicomputers such as Digital’s PDP 11/70, for timesharing, and 
VAX 11/780, for number crunching, were as cost-effective as the large central computers, and for some tasks 
were clearly superior
From the 1960s IBM had dominated mainframe computing in the United States, though other companies did 
well in certain markets, such as Burroughs in banking, and Univac and Control Data Corporation in scientific 
computing. The mainframe companies were popularly known as “IBM and the Seven Dwarfs” (Burroughs, 
Univac, NCR, Control Data Corporation, General Electric, RCA, and Honeywell). None of them foresaw the 
emergence of minicomputers and a new group of companies replaced them. For universities, Digital was the 
most important minicomputer company, but other companies such as Data General, Hewlett-Packard, Wang, 
and Prime were also successful. Data General’s Nova was popular for computer graphics, and Wang was the 
leader in word processing and office automation. Many of these companies were spin-offs from MIT and scat-
tered around Route 128 outside Boston.
For most of the 1970s the most widely used family of minicomputers was the Digital PDP 11. The smaller mem-
bers of the family were used to control laboratory equipment and the larger ones could run a substantial time-
shared system. At the end of the decade, 32-bit minicomputers such as Digital’s VAX 11/780, the Data General 
Eclipse, and the Prime 750 had completely reversed the economies of scale. At Dartmouth, we had a Prime 
750 for medium-scale number crunching and a variety of VAX and Prime computers for specific applications, 
such as the library’s online catalog and the alumni database. At larger universities, research groups set up their 
own departmental computing centers. The first book to popularize the high-paced culture of computing was 
The Soul of a New Machine by Tracy Kidder, which described the rush to bring the Eclipse to market in 1980.
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These minicomputers had excellent operating systems. While IBM’s MVS operating system grew bigger and 
bigger until it became a nightmare to install and upgrade, the Digital and Prime systems were comparatively 
straightforward to manage. At Dartmouth we chose Prime because they supported the PL/1 programming 
language and the X.25 networking protocol, both of which we used for DTSS, but Digital’s VAX with its VMS 
operating system proved more successful in the long term. Several members of the VMS group later moved to 
Microsoft where they were influential in developing the Windows operating systems.
Departmental computers
Minicomputers had a profound impact on the organization of university computing. For years, the manage-
ment of central computers had assumed that hardware was a critical resource, particularly central processing 
cycles. To waste a single cycle was a crime. Only gradually did we come to realize that the time of the faculty 
and students was much more valuable. When I was on sabbatical at Dartmouth, I watched a group of mathe-
matics professors who kept trying the same iteration, with ever-longer run times. Eventually they realized that 
they were iterating over a singular matrix and it would never converge. I was horrified at the waste of computer 
time until I realized that they had gained mathematical insights that were worth much more than the comput-
er time. Not many years later I myself ran an integer programming problem for an entire weekend on a Prime 
750. It would have been irresponsible to do so on a shared computer, but not on a machine that would have 
otherwise been idle.
When a university had a single central computer, the hardware determined the organization. A large central 
computer needed a team to manage it and to share its resources among departments and users. Almost ev-
ery university created a computing center with its director. Most of these centers served both academic and 
administrative users. The center would have a system programming staff to support the central machine and 
applications programmers for administrative computing.
The centers never fully solved the problem that different groups of users have different computing needs. Most 
academic users run large numbers of small jobs, but some people want to run big computations or process very 
large sets of data. Administrative computing has an entirely different set of needs. In aggregate the capacity 
of the central computer was never enough to satisfy everybody. With varying success, computing centers at-
tempted to balance priorities by technical, administrative, and financial mechanisms, but they could not make 
everybody happy. 
For researchers with research grants, this unhappiness was aggravated by a peculiarity of how many universi-
ties charged for computer time. Research universities wanted to recover the cost of research computing from 
funding agencies, such as the National Science Foundation. These universities charged all users for machine 
time. Researchers used their grants to cover the costs, while other departments paid from their own budgets. 
To recoup as much money as possible from grants, the universities set their computing charges at the highest 
rate that the government would allow, including full overhead recovery.
Frustrated by these high charges and the inflexibility of central computing, the richer departments used their 
research grants to buy minicomputers and set up their own computing centers. Staff costs were largely elimi-
nated by having graduate students look after the systems. When I arrived at Carnegie Mellon in 1985 the uni-
versity claimed to have more VAXes than classrooms. There were well-run centers in computer science, electri-
cal engineering, physics, statistics, and several other departments. Later, as personal computers became widely 
available, schools and colleges, such as fine arts and the business school, set up personal computing centers.
Many computer directors felt threatened by these developments. Some of these feelings were justified. The cost 
comparisons were often dubious, since departments did not include the indirect costs of running a comput-
er center, which are substantial. The typical departmental computer was run by an assistant professor and a 
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graduate student. Only too often the student never graduated and the assistant professor did not get tenure, but 
the researchers clearly saw departmental centers as an effective way to spend their resources. An engineering 
professor at Dartmouth explained to me the advantages of controlling his own computing, free from the jug-
gling act that is inevitable with a central computer that serves the entire university. Recently, for my research 
at Cornell, I was in a similar position. Our group had its own large computer cluster and we made all the deci-
sions about how to use it.
Computer centers were also worried about the costs of supporting large numbers of different types of com-
puters. Undoubtedly such proliferation did cause difficulties and universities tried various approaches to limit 
the variety. When I arrived at Carnegie Mellon there were 101 different makes of computer on campus. One 
of my first acts was to abolish an ineffective policy where I, as vice president for computing, had to approve all 
purchases of departmental computers. In later years we developed a short list of personal computers that we 
supported centrally. Most members of the university bought these types of computer, relying on us for support, 
but there were always a few mavericks who chose differently. These mavericks were invaluable in evaluating 
new options.
At the universities that I know best, Dartmouth, Carnegie Mellon, and Cornell, the various organizations 
eventually learned how to work together and support each other, but even today there remains an underlying 
tension between centralization and decentralization at almost every research university.
The Computer Industry
Motives and motivation
The interactions between universities and computing companies were beneficial for both. The universities’ ba-
sic motive was straightforward: money. As a politician once said to me, “I know why you are here. Universities 
always want something for nothing.” Over the years we bought computers at deep discount from Honeywell, 
Digital, Prime, IBM, Apple, Sun, Dell, and many more. We received gifts of millions of dollars of equipment, 
and cash grants of millions of dollars for specific projects.
What have the companies received in return? First there are sales. Universities are a major customer. IBM, 
Digital, and Apple were among the companies that cultivated this market with deep discounts and donations 
of equipment. In the early days of personal computers, IBM gave universities huge grants of equipment in the 
hope that the universities would standardize on the IBM PC and write leading-edge software for it. But sales 
were not the only motivation. Many people in the computing industry are genuinely interested in education 
and are strong believers in technology for education.
Universities were early adopters of many types of computers and the first organizations to take networking 
seriously. As such, we were important for companies trying to introduce novel products. When Sun was a 
start-up, Carnegie Mellon was its biggest customer. Today it is hard to remember that the Apple Macintosh 
was a commercial flop when introduced in 1984. Without orders from a small number of universities, it would 
probably have died within the first year.
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An apple from Apple
This Steuben Apple was given to the presi-
dent of Dartmouth in 1984. He passed it on 
to me. I think that he was embarrassed to be 
buying computers from Apple, which was 
seen as a slightly improper upstart company.
Photograph by William Arms
Companies valued our insights. By briefing us on new ideas before they became products, companies could 
get early feedback. They presented their plans and we were not shy in telling them what we needed. When Bell 
Atlantic (now Verizon) released their first cell phone service, it was a multi-million-dollar gamble. The vice 
president in charge told me that the only market research that he trusted was from an experimental installation 
at Carnegie Mellon. When NCR developed Wi-Fi networking, they came to us for an alpha test. When Steve 
Jobs showed his NeXT computer to a group of university leaders, we told him that universities would not buy 
a Unix workstation without the X window manager. He did not like it, but we needed it, and he believed us.
The companies also supported university research. Digital was particularly well organized in supporting exter-
nal research. Most of their support was equipment grants, but for the right project they were willing to provide 
large sums of money. Intellectual property can be a problem with corporate research, but Digital allowed uni-
versities to keep the rights. Their benefits came from exchanges of ideas with researchers, and from leading- 
edge software being developed on their systems. One of my major disappointments when at Carnegie Mellon 
was a large grant from Apple to port Unix and the entire Andrew environment to the Macintosh II, and to 
integrate it with the Macintosh user interface. This was brilliantly done, but when we came to deliver it, Apple 
had disbanded the engineering group that had sponsored us and the work was wasted.
Finally, companies are always looking for good recruits. Ph.D. and master students from the best universities 
are in enormous demand. Later in my career, at Cornell, I felt as though I was running a farm system for the 
Internet industry, teaching upper-level courses on information retrieval and software engineering, with teams 
of students doing independent research on an Hadoop cluster. Even in the depth of the recent recession com-
panies were hungry for these graduates. Many times each year a student will ask my advice on which job offer 
to accept. One Carnegie Mellon student had to choose between a faculty position at Stanford and a central 
position at a fascinating start-up. He chose the start-up.
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I think that the corporate people enjoyed visiting the universities. They would often ask to meet students, see 
demonstrations of research, or attend events on campus. A colleague at Penn State organized his requests for 
donations around the football season. Carnegie Mellon was at one time a part-owner of the Pittsburgh Pirates 
baseball team and we would entertain visitors in the owners’ box. A visitor from Stanford University even went 
back to California and persuaded Apple to take a box at Candlestick Park.
Exchanges of information
Visits to the corporations were enjoyable and productive. We would sign a non-disclosure agreement, the com-
pany’s engineers would brief us on their plans, and we would provide our feedback. Our local salesmen came 
with us and often learned facts about their companies’ plans that were not usually known to the sales force. 
Each year a group of us from Carnegie Mellon went to California for a week, spending a day each at Sun, Ap-
ple, Hewlett-Packard, NeXT, Adobe, and other companies. Other visits were to Digital’s research labs outside 
Boston and the various IBM locations.
Several companies had formal university groups. The first meeting of the Apple University Consortium was a 
very special occasion. It was in San Jose in December 1983, before the official announcement of the Macintosh. 
We were given early information about future products and shown the famous 1984 Super Bowl commercial. 
The consortium later grew too large and lost its effectiveness, but IBM’s university advisory group was always 
small. Each year it concentrated on a single topic. One year the topic was networking. IBM was throwing its 
main effort into OSI networking, while also contributing large sums to build the NSFnet, which became the 
backbone for the Internet. The IBM vice president for networking spent much of the day failing to convince us 
of the virtues of OSI and not understanding why we preferred the Internet.
Only a few universities had this privileged access to the companies. To reach a wider audience, the companies 
had booths at the EDUCOM conference and hospitality suites where we could talk informally. These grew in-
creasingly lavish until, after consulting with his lawyer, the IBM head of university marketing sent a letter to 
his competitors, “Let’s not have food fights. We should compete with our products and services, not with the 
lavishness of our hospitality.” In contrast to this sensible attitude, I attended a couple of corporate seminars and 
was appalled by the lack of serious content and the extravagant hospitality. The worst was a so-called seminar 
by Bell Atlantic. It was a disgrace: minimal content, but expensive food, drink, golf, and sea fishing.
Salesmen
While at English Electric - Leo I had a first-hand look at how computer systems are sold and learned some 
useful lessons. One lesson was never to trust demonstrations. Multiprogramming was a major selling point for 
the System 4 computers but the operating system was incomplete. The company regularly ran demonstrations 
that showed several programs running at the same time. Card readers chattered away, magnetic tapes whirled, 
and the line printers churned out paper, but these demonstrations were faked. Actually these three programs 
were the only ones that could be run together.
A second lesson was that salesmen offer the configuration that will get the order, not the one that will do the 
job. We were asked to bid on a system for a company that ran off-track betting. They had difficulty finding 
people to operate their telephone center on public holidays, when there are many horse races. Consultants had 
recommended a computer system and provided a price estimate. Our salesman configured a bid based on that 
price and I was asked to write a section about performance for the proposal. My calculations showed that the 
configuration was hopelessly too small, but the salesman submitted the bid anyhow. Fortunately the contract 
went to a competitor, Control Data Corporation, who ran into all sorts of problems. Years later, another consul-
tant solved the staffing problem by the simple expedient of moving the telephone center from central London 
to an area with high unemployment.
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Years later, as a potential customer, we received a bid from Hewlett-Packard that revolved around a suite of 
programs for business data processing. Not only was the memory in the configuration too little for the pro-
grams that were offered, the machine that was quoted could not be extended. All this information was carefully 
buried in the tender.
The most important lesson was always to know how the salesmen were rewarded. At Dartmouth we used Hon-
eywell mainframes. Honeywell may have had a price list, but they paid their salesmen by the dollar amount that 
they booked. To buy a computer we first agreed on the price and then negotiated on what would be delivered. 
On one occasion, a salesman booked an option to buy a second machine and Honeywell recorded it as an or-
der. Several years later a truck from Arkansas arrived at the Dartmouth computing center in New Hampshire 
with a large mainframe computer. Fortunately the operator on duty refused delivery. On another occasion 
Honeywell delivered the wrong central processor. On a happier note, we completed a complex negotiation with 
Honeywell just before Christmas one year. As soon as the contract was signed, but not before, the salesman 
delivered a Christmas present. It was a clock. Like many of Honeywell’s products, it was made in Japan.
The best time to buy equipment was the week before the company closed its books, as they were always trying 
to bolster their sales figures. As a computing director the most fundamental rule is that you stay within budget, 
but budgets are developed a long time before the funds are spent. Private universities have the flexibility to take 
advantage of opportunities. Twice at Dartmouth, when everybody else had left for the Christmas break, I sat in 
President Kemeny’s office asking for extra funds to take advantage of a year-end offer. At most state universities 
every line in the budget is fixed and the universities do not have this flexibility.
If the Digital salesmen met their sales target they received rewards. One year our salesman came to me with a 
hard luck story. He was one computer short of having met his target for five years in a row. Please would I or-
der a VAX system from him? I could cancel the order a week later. Naturally I refused, but he was an excellent 
salesman and I called his manager. He got his reward. As I remember it was a trip to Jamaica with his wife.
Aggressive marketing
The marketing strategy perfected by IBM for selling mainframe computers was highly centralized. The sales-
men cultivated relationships with the computing directors and the customers’ higher executives. In many 
organizations the purchasing of computers remained centralized, even for minicomputers and personal com-
puters, and the IBM method of selling directly to senior executives continued to be successful. In universities, 
however, as computing became decentralized, purchasing decisions were made by departments. The minicom-
puter salesmen understood this and developed relationships with the departments. As Barbara Morgan of the 
University of California at Berkeley quipped, “When the IBM salesman visits me he asks, ‘What is happening 
at Berkeley?’ When the Digital salesman visits me, I ask him, ‘What is happening at Berkeley?’ ”
IBM had a reputation for bypassing the computing professionals and selling directly to the president of an 
organization. This was called an “end run”. I could not understand why a chief executive would listen to some-
body on a golf course rather than to the experts in his own organization, but it was very effective. When I 
worked for a strong president, such as John Kemeny at Dartmouth or Dick Cyert at Carnegie Mellon, this was 
no problem, but their successors were weaker. Kemeny’s successor at Dartmouth had an IBM vice president as a 
buddy who caused enormous difficulties. He appeared to be ashamed that we did business with less prestigious 
companies such as Digital and Apple. Cyert’s successor cost Carnegie Mellon a large sum of money by throw-
ing out a carefully negotiated contract with NEC for a telephone switch because of an end run by the president 
of Bell Atlantic. He was a Carnegie Mellon alumnus who hinted that there might be grants to the university.
IBM and Digital were aggressive but they were good companies to do business with. The telecommunications 
companies were frequently dishonorable. The computing companies honored the spirit of an agreement, even 
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if it was only a manager’s letter, but the telecommunications companies were always trying to wriggle out of 
commitments.
Planning for Personal Computers
Sources, reliable and unreliable
Between 1980 and 1995, networks of personal computers replaced timesharing as the core of academic com-
puting. For much of this period, academic computing and the commercial mainstream continued to follow 
separate paths, but they eventually converged in the 1990s.
Sources of information about this transformation are scattered and unreliable. Much of what was written at 
the time described what was planned, which was often not what was achieved. Many of the newspaper articles 
were university publicity laden with euphoria. The New York Times had a correspondent who was well known 
for presenting his personal biases in the guise of factual reporting. Perhaps the most reliable source would be 
the notes of Judith Turner from the Chronicle of Higher Education, but she has wisely kept her notes private.
Much of what has been written subsequently is pure revisionist history. Individuals and organizations describe 
what they wish had happened. Wikipedia is frequently a good source of technical details, but the contextual 
information is often tendentious. In practice we went through a decade of hyperbole, resistance to change, 
blind alleys, failed plans, and spectacular achievements.
Three books published by EDUCOM are a good contemporary source. EDUCOM was the university com-
puting society. Its publications, annual conference, and corporate associates’ program were an important ex-
change of information. I was a member of the EDUCOM board for most of the 1980s and its chair for six years. 
Under two outstanding presidents, Jack McCredie and Ken King, EDUCOM was a major conduit for contacts 
with corporations and the government.
One day in fall 1980 Jack McCredie and I were walking across the Stanford campus. He mentioned that he was 
planning a monograph on university computing. Ten universities would each write a chapter about their stra-
tegic planning. I casually agreed to be one of the authors without admitting that at Dartmouth we were so busy 
building our computer system that we did not do any formal planning. This was the first of the three books. 
My wife edited the other two, which were about campus networking and libraries.
Two of Ken King’s creations were the Coalition for Networked Information, which brought librarians and 
computing center directors together, and a networking task force that lobbied for higher education in the de-
velopment of national networks. Al Gore is rightly ridiculed for his claim to have invented the Internet, but he 
was the first high-level politician to recognize its potential and a great supporter of these efforts.
Because I served on numerous committees, I often saw planning papers from other universities. About 1980, 
Stanford wrote a particularly insightful set of papers on topics such as networking, office automation, libraries, 
and so on, but, for me, the most illuminating was the Preliminary Report of the Task Force for the Future of 
Computing at Carnegie Mellon.
Managing the first personal computers
Personal computers posed a dilemma for universities and their computing centers. After years of struggle, we 
had learned how to manage timeshared computers. A few years earlier, some computing directors had resisted 
the purchase of minicomputers by departments, but eventually they accepted that minicomputers were fre-
quently cost-effective. Now they had to face a wave of incompatible personal computers that were often pur-
chased by people with little knowledge of computing. The total expenditure on computing was going up steadi-
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ly and it was not clear what the university was gaining. For a generation who believed that every computer cycle 
was precious, it was painful to see computers sitting on desks to be used for only a few hours every day. Some 
computing directors thought that their mission was to protect the university from this wasteful proliferation.
Gradually people began to realize that personal computers were more than a fad. Admittedly they could not 
do many of the tasks that the larger machines did well, but every year they became more powerful and the 
application programs grew better. For example, in summer 1982, a student and I developed a planning model 
for hardware purchases using Visicalc on an Apple II. The time and effort were a fraction of what we would 
have taken on a timeshared computer. Above all, people began to appreciate the benefits of having their own 
machines. I used to compare personal computers to private cars. It might be cheaper and safer for everybody 
to travel by bus, but individuals pay for the convenience of having their own cars.
The showpiece projects
At the beginning of the 1980s, the academic world was excited by the launching of ambitious computing proj-
ects at several universities. The most prominent was the Andrew project at Carnegie Mellon University, which 
included a massive grant from IBM. Never to be outdone, MIT soon afterwards announced the Athena project, 
jointly with IBM and Digital. In the same year, 1982, Drexel University announced that every freshman would 
be expected to have a personal computer, and some time later they put out a press release stating that they had 
chosen an unnamed computer from Apple (which they described as being supplied with a “house”, a typo for 
“mouse”). This computer was later known as the Macintosh.
Several other universities, notably Brown University and Franklin and Marshall College, had important initia-
tives, some universities passively accepted the arrival of personal computers on campus, and some universities 
actively discouraged the proliferation. Where there was no campus-wide project, departments or schools, such 
as engineering or business, often built their own local networks. Harvard is an example of a university that 
deliberately held back, waited to see what consensus emerged, and then purchased a very fine network, but 
Harvard is a rich university and could afford to wait. The pioneers endured a great deal of hassle, but received 
major grants of equipment and money. Brian Hawkins, a force behind the Drexel program, once observed that 
the universities that took the lead were usually the universities with strong academic leadership.
Whether students should be required to own personal computers formed a lively topic throughout the decade. 
At Dartmouth we standardized on the Macintosh in 1984 and at our urging, more than 75 percent of fresh-
men bought them, but not until years later were students required to have computers. Carnegie Mellon was 
more typical. Although the university had a huge project with IBM, no explicit requirements were made to buy 
computers. The campus store sold personal computers from both IBM and Apple, as well as workstations from 
several other manufacturers, with deep discounts for hardware and software.
Organization for distributed computing
The story of these large projects is incomplete without a discussion of the struggles that the universities went 
through to fit them into their organizations. Universities always have great difficulty in coming to a consensus, 
particularly when resources have to be reallocated, and these projects were no exception.
In a talk in 1985, Steven Lerman, one of the joint heads of the Athena project at MIT, described a problem which 
he called “the management of expectations.” Projects such as Andrew or Athena need great initial enthusiasm 
to marshal the resources that they require. Then follows a long gestation period before any signs of progress 
are seen, and the first results are a pale reflection of the dream with which the projects began. Carnegie Mellon 
is an extraordinarily entrepreneurial university in its willingness to tackle new ideas, but the university is not 
rich. The growth in computing demanded resources of money and space, which were tough to find, at exactly 
1.26
the same time that the Andrew project was struggling to live up to its expectations. Fortunately, President 
Cyert was personally committed to the project and the resources were found.
As the importance of computing grew, job titles were inflated. At the Open University in the 1970s, the head 
of academic computing was simply the manager of student computing. At Dartmouth my title changed from 
director of computing services to vice provost and at Carnegie Mellon it was vice president. These distinctions 
seemed important at the time.
Whatever their titles, computing directors were in a difficult situation during the transition to decentralized 
computing. Some saw their duty as protecting the central computing budget from the inefficiencies of depart-
mental and personal computing. Others allowed the central service to atrophy while they invested in networks 
and decentralized computing. No university had the resources to do both really well. During the transition 
almost every university changed its computing director. Sometimes the university forced them out. Others 
left for better opportunities or because of frustration with the university’s administration. I had been drawn 
to Dartmouth and Carnegie Mellon because of two outstanding presidents, John Kemeny and Richard Cyert. 
Working for their successors was no longer enjoyable and I moved on.
Until about 1980, most computers were purchased with central funds and a handful of people made all the 
decisions. Only in rare instances were computers seen as personal equipment. A decade later the position had 
been reversed. In 1990, the annual expenditures on computing equipment at Carnegie Mellon were about $12 
million, with only $2 million coming from central funds. Purchases made with personal funds through the 
computer store were over $3 million, and the rest came from departmental funds or research grants.
People who spend their own money naturally expect to choose their own equipment. Yet, everybody benefits 
from a certain level of campus-wide coordination. The organizational challenge was to reconcile independence 
in decision making with sufficient standardization to create a coherent campus environment. At Dartmouth, 
the campus was dominated by Macintoshes, but there were still large numbers of other computers. At Carnegie 
Mellon, although no formal commitment was made, the expectation had been that the Andrew project would 
lead to a largely homogeneous environment dominated by IBM. This did not happen. A tour of the campus in 
1990 would have found Apple Macintosh and IBM personal computers everywhere, with hundreds of work-
stations made by IBM, Sun, Digital, Hewlett-Packard, and NeXT. These computers had been selected by many 
different people at different times with differing needs and resources. Each selected the equipment which best 
fitted current needs. Yet, at every university, a certain level of standardization emerged because of the difficul-
ty of supporting too wide a range of equipment. The computing environment was so complex that only a few 
types of computer could be well integrated into it. Most people bought those types of computers.
Gradually universities came to realize that they needed somebody who would oversee the computing strategy 
for the entire university. This person was not necessarily the person who managed the central computers and 
did not have to be in charge of both academic and administrative computing. At Carnegie Mellon I had respon-
sibility for academic computing and infrastructure, such as networking, but not for administrative computing. 
This division between academic and administrative worked well. I am surprised that it is not more common.
At Dartmouth, the Kiewit Network and the Macintosh project were creations of the computer center and there 
was never any discussion of creating a new organization. Andrew at Carnegie Mellon and Athena at MIT both 
began as separate organizations outside the existing computer centers, but thereafter followed different paths. 
Athena remains a separate unit, but at Carnegie Mellon I transferred the responsibility for deploying Andrew 
to the old computer center. This required a painful reorganization, but the organizational framework has sur-
vived.
The institutional structures for academic computing that have emerged at most universities usually parallel the 
organization of the rest of the university. The organization that I see today at Cornell is typical of large research 
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universities, partly centralized and partly decentralized. It combines aspects of both extremes: entrepreneurial 
faculty with powerful and independent deans, and yet a fairly strong computing center that provides shared 
services such as networking and email to the whole university. This central organization is also responsible for 
the university’s administrative data processing
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Chapter 4
Networks
Installing a network
This photograph from the Universi-
ty of Michigan shows the unglam-
orous side of networking, running 
cables within and between build-
ings. In the 1980s, the labor costs of 
wiring old buildings was more than 
$200 per outlet.
Photograph by Geotech, Inc.
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Campus Networks
The starting point
In October 1977, while on my way to be interviewed at Dartmouth, I spent some time at Cornell and contacted 
the computer center to ask if somebody could discuss Cornell’s computing with me. By a spectacular piece of 
fortune my guide was Douglas Van Houweling, who later became one of the leaders of networked computing. 
As we walked around the campus on a beautiful fall day he described the need for computer networks in uni-
versities.
The concept of networking was not new. Universities already connected large numbers of terminals to central 
computers. A common architecture was to run groups of asynchronous lines to a terminal concentrator and a 
higher-speed, synchronous line from there to the central computer. The lines might be hard-wired or dial-up 
telephone lines. IBM had an architecture known as SNA, which provided hierarchical ways to connect termi-
nals and minicomputers to a central computer, and Digital had built its DECnet protocols into the VAX and 
DEC-20 operating systems. The ARPANET was well established among a privileged group of researchers, and 
Xerox had begun the experiments that eventually led to the dominance of Ethernet.
Doug’s insight was to realize that these activities were not isolated. At Cornell, departmental computing cen-
ters were springing up independently from the main computing center. Very soon they would have to be con-
nected together. Universities would need to have networks that covered the entire campus and connected every 
type of computing device. They had to use protocols that were not tied to any specific vendor.
Campus strategies
In the EDUCOM book on campus networking, ten universities, large and small, reported on their mixtures of termi-
nal concentrators, SNA, DECnet, Wangnet, X.25, AppleTalk and many more. In the larger universities, the mixture of
Campus networking strategies
The photograph shows the second of the three EDU-
COM books about campus strategies. The book about 
networking was particularly well-timed. 
Photograph by William Arms
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networks was proving a nightmare. Well-funded areas of the university might have several disjointed networks, while 
others had none. Providing gateways between networks sounded fine in theory but never seemed to work in practice. 
Network management was rudimentary and trouble-shooting was expensive. Yet when the chapters were assembled it 
emerged that, with one exception, the universities had independently decided on the same solution. The strategy was to 
create a homogenous campus network and to use the Internet protocols for the backbone.
I was responsible for two campus networks. The similarities and differences between them reflect the different 
priorities and resources of the two universities. At Dartmouth we built a campus network that emphasized 
moderate performance at a low cost. Because we started early, the problem of incompatible protocols was never 
as severe as at other universities, and the campus-wide adoption of Macintosh computers allowed us to use Ap-
pleTalk as a default protocol. Later, when I went to Carnegie Mellon we built a much more powerful network. 
The university recognized the strategic value of the campus network and provided a very substantial budget. 
With generous support from IBM, and with collaboration among many groups at the university, we built a 
TCP/IP network and connected a wide variety of computers to it. Both networks proved successful and their 
successors are still in operation today.
Topology and wiring
Networks are expensive. In many universities, although the computing directors and leading faculty members 
recognized the need for a network, it took years to persuade the financial administrators that universities need-
ed to build them. Even at Carnegie Mellon, part of the justification for wiring the campus was the promise of 
a much improved telephone system.
A crucial decision was the topology of the campus wiring, within buildings and between them. With several 
options to choose from, a university could easily build an expensive network that went out-of-date fast. Initial-
ly the leading candidates were variants of a bus. Early Ethernet ran on a 50-ohm coaxial cable. This would be 
snaked through a building and individual devices clamped onto it. IBM had a token ring architecture. Apple-
Talk used a variant of a bus in which devices were daisy chained together using special cables. An Ethernet bus 
or a token ring were possibilities for the backbone between buildings, but another candidate was to use 75-ohm 
video cable with broadband modems.
A bus appears appealing, but has some serious difficulties in practice, and the topology that emerged was a 
star shape. Within buildings, communication lines were run back to a building hub, and from there lines were 
led to a central hub. Ethernet and other protocols were modified so that they could run over these lines. The 
star-shaped configuration has many practical advantages. If part of the network becomes overloaded, extra 
capacity can be installed by upgrading the equipment in selected building hubs. Almost all trouble-shooting 
can be done at the hubs. On a bus, when there is a problem, it may be necessary to visit every device.
Eventually star-shaped Ethernet over copper wires became the standard at almost every university and the In-
ternet protocols squeezed out the vendor networks, but for many years we had to support a variety of interfaces 
and protocols. A later section describes the detailed choices made at Dartmouth and Carnegie Mellon.
Running wires within buildings was a major expense and the choices were not easy. At Dartmouth, we made a 
typically pragmatic decision. We decided to use cheap copper wire within buildings, which was easy to install, 
expecting that it would have a limited life. Fortunately, when the university became interested in our efforts, 
the trustee who was asked to look at the network was an engineer and he agreed with our approach. However, 
ten years later, when the time came to renew the wiring, I have heard that this rationale had been forgotten 
by the new administration. A few years later, Carnegie Mellon made a different decision. The network that we 
installed there used IBM’s cabling system. This was designed to provide a choice of high-quality networking 
options for many years into the future, for both data and voice communication. It was expensive to install but 
provided excellent service.
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National Networks
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model
By the early 1980s the benefits of networking had become generally recognized, but building the networks 
proved to be challenging. The developments fell into two categories: the campus networks and the networks 
between universities. Together they developed into the Internet that we know today. If you read the conven-
tional history of the Internet, you could easily believe that the Internet protocols were so superior that it was 
inevitable that they would be used for both a national network and for campus networking. At the time, how-
ever, it was far from inevitable.
Few people remember that the telecommunications companies and the computing industry fought for years to 
kill the Internet and its TCP/IP family of protocols. They recognized the potential market and the need for a 
shared set of protocols, but they wanted to control everything. They embarked on an intense lobbying effort to 
suppress any competition, using every political resource to stop alternatives, and were particularly outspoken 
about wasting government money on TCP/IP developments. The telecommunications companies, who have 
made such enormous profits from the Internet, were the most opposed to its development.
The OSI seven-layer protocol model
Diagram by William Arms
The diagram above shows a popular model that provided a framework for discussing networks. The model 
divides communication protocols into seven logical layers. Each layer serves the layer above it and is served by 
the layer below. In this model, Ethernet combines the physical and datalink layers, IP and X.25 are network 
protocols, TCP is a transport protocol, and FTP and Z39.50 are application protocols.
Rather than adopt the Internet protocols, the industry set out on an ambitious program known as the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI). OSI was supported by all the major companies. Technically it had two main 
parts: standardization and creating commercial products. IBM alone spent hundreds of millions of dollars. It 
seemed inevitable that the national and international networks would be built to these standards. Parts of OSI, 
such as X.25, were successful, but as a whole it suffered from over-complexity and eventually collapsed under 
its own weight.
Meanwhile universities had difficult decisions to make about what protocols to use on campus and for academ-
ic networks. For years, they wrote that their networking plan was to use TCP/IP “until OSI becomes available.” 
Eventually they dropped the final clause. How did this happen?
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The first national networks
When universities began to recognize the potential of a national network there were several possibilities. The 
dominant network between universities was Bitnet. This was a store-and-forward network that ran between 
IBM mainframes. It used software that IBM had developed for its own internal network. Bitnet provided the 
first widespread email service between universities and was used for most bulletin boards (called LISTSERVs) 
until the web became established in the 1990s. As late as 1986, there was no way to send an email message be-
tween Dartmouth and Carnegie Mellon except over Bitnet.
The first commercial network was Telenet, which offered X.25 services for a monthly fee. CSnet was an X.25 
network developed by those computer science departments who were excluded from the ARPANET. At Dart-
mouth, we used Telenet for remote terminal access and CSnet for email.
The ARPANET was a higher-speed network developed by the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research 
Project Agency (ARPA). The TCP/IP protocols were developed for the ARPANET. A select group of universi-
ties were members of ARPANET, but its use was restricted to people who were doing ARPA-related work. At 
Carnegie Mellon we were always careful to observe this restriction until I learned that MIT ignored it. They 
considered that everybody on their campus was doing ARPA-related work.
The success of TCP/IP
One reason that OSI failed was that it attempted to standardize everything. With little operational experience 
to guide them, the standardization groups added more and more features. The early Internet was much more 
pragmatic. Its motto was “rough consensus and running code.” TCP/IP specified the network and transport 
protocols, but made no attempt to define the underlying network technology, while protocols for applications 
such as email were not standardized until there was practical experience with running code.
A key to the success of TCP/IP was the decision to include the protocols in the Berkeley Software Distribution 
of Unix (BSD). This was also funded by ARPA. BSD 4.2, released in 1983, had an “open source” version of the 
full family of protocols. This code, which was soon ported to many other operating systems, was the basis for 
the first generation of the Internet.
In hindsight, the benefits to university computing are obvious. We could use the same protocols on campus 
and off-campus without the need for complex and inefficient gateways. Because all the versions were based on 
the same implementation, there were few compatibility problems. TCP/IP came from the computer science 
research community, which has a tradition of shared problem solving, and it was backed by a well-funded gov-
ernment agency with strong interests in its success.
The NSFnet
The crucial event was the 1985 decision by the National Science Foundation to establish five supercomputer 
centers for academic research, to connect them with a high-speed network, and to base it on the Internet proto-
cols. Again this was not inevitable. The NSF’s newly formed networking group had a hard fight to stop the tra-
ditional disciplines from taking their money, and to resist lobbying by commercial interests who were opposed 
to something that they did not control. It helped that the NSF’s effort was led by an Irishman who could charm 
anybody. The NSFnet backbone was built by a consortium put together by Doug Van Houweling at the Uni-
versity of Michigan with generous support from IBM and MCI. IBM provided the routers and MCI supplied 
the T-1 connections, which at 1.5 Mbits per second were far beyond the speed of any previous data networks.
The NSF also funded an enlightened program to extend the NSFnet by creating regional networks. Our expe-
rience at Carnegie Mellon was typical. The computing directors of the major Pennsylvania universities formed 
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a team led by Gary Auguston of Penn State. His design criteria were, “TCP/IP, T-1, free.” With support from 
Bell Atlantic, we met with a senior member of the governor’s staff. His first question was, “How will this get the 
governor re-elected?” His second was, “How can I help?” We then collectively applied to the NSF for a substan-
tial grant. This grant supported the Pennsylvania regional network for long enough to become self-sustaining.
Finally, the NSF successfully transferred management of the network to the commercial sector in 1995. This 
was a shock to the universities, as henceforward we had to pay for our networking.
Case Studies: Dartmouth and Carnegie Mellon
The Kiewit Network at Dartmouth
Dartmouth can claim to have had the first complete campus network, the Kiewit Network. The architect of 
the network was Stan Dunten, who had earlier been the developer of the communications for the Dartmouth 
Time Sharing System (DTSS) and before that a major contributor to MIT’s Multics. His concept was to create a 
network of minicomputers dedicated to communications, interconnected by high-speed links. He called them 
nodes. The nodes would be used as terminal concentrators, as routers to connect computers together, or as pro-
tocol converters. Earlier, when the university had been laying coaxial cable for television, he had arranged for 
a second cable to be pulled for networking. This cable was never actually used for its purpose but its existence 
was an important stimulus.
The first two nodes were the Honeywell 716 minicomputers that were the front ends for the central DTSS com-
puter. They acted as terminal concentrators and provided front-end services such as buffering lines of input 
before sending them to the central computer.
During the 1970s, Dartmouth sold time on the DTSS computer to colleges that were too small to have their 
own computers. The first extension of the network was to support these remote users. The front-end software 
was ported to Prime 200 minicomputers, which had the same instruction set as the 716s. They were deployed 
as terminal concentrators at several colleges, with the first being installed at the US Coast Guard Academy in 
1977. These nodes were linked to Dartmouth over leased telephone lines using HDLC, a synchronous data link 
protocol.
In fall 1978 the decision was made to build a new set of nodes, using 16-bit minicomputers from New En-
gland Digital. Eventually about 100 of the New England Digital minicomputers were deployed on and around 
campus. The original development team was Stan Dunten and David Pearson, who were later joined by Rich 
Brown. Each node could support 56 asynchronous terminal ports at 9,600 bits/second, or 12 HDLC synchro-
nous interface at speeds up to 56Kbits/sec. An important feature was a mechanism to reload a node automat-
ically from a master node. After a failure, a dump of the node’s memory was stored on DTSS and the master 
node sent out a new version of the network software. The master node also performed routine monitoring and 
individual nodes could be accessed remotely for trouble-shooting.
The first new service was to allow any terminal or personal computer emulating a terminal to connect to any 
computer on the network. In 1981 the university library connected its first experimental online catalog to the 
network, which was immediately accessible from every terminal at Dartmouth. The production version of the 
catalog ran on a Digital VAX computer. Other computers that were soon attached to the network included a 
variety of minicomputers, mainly from Prime and Digital. The first protocol gateway provided support for 
X.25, which was used for off-campus connections to the commercial Telenet service and later to the computer 
science network, CSnet.
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Wiring the buildings
Before the Kiewit Network was built, terminals were connected to DTSS over standard telephone lines using 
acoustic couplers. Dedicated hard-wires were run where the terminals were close to a front-end computer, such 
as in the computer center or at the Coast Guard Academy. As the New England Digital nodes were deployed, 
the number of hardwired terminals increased and as funds became available the campus buildings were wired. 
The funding model was simple. Hundreds of people around the university were accustomed to paying $16 
per month for a 300 bits/second acoustic coupler and a special telephone line. As the hardwired network was 
gradually installed, users paid $15 per month for a hardwired connection at 2,400 bits/second (later 9,600 bits/
second) and the funds were used for the next stage of expansion.
The Dartmouth campus is crisscrossed by roads and in those days the telephone company had a monopoly on 
transmission lines that crossed the roads. For many years the high prices charged by the telephone company 
forced the network to use low-speed links between the nodes. At a time when Carnegie Mellon, with no roads 
across its central campus, was laying its own fiber optics cables, many of Dartmouth’s links were only 19.2 
Kbits/second. Yet even with these constraints the performance was excellent for the primary purpose of link-
ing terminals and personal computers to central computers.
The Macintosh network
In 1983, Dartmouth decided to urge all freshmen to buy Macintosh computers. This required a rapid extension 
of the network to support Macintoshes and to wire the dormitories. Before this expansion, the university’s 
central administration had essentially ignored the development of the Kiewit Network. It began as an internal 
project of the computer center, appeared on no public plan, and never had a formal budget. Now, the university 
recognized its importance and asked the Pew Foundation for the funds to extend the network to the dormito-
ries. With a generous grant from the foundation, the network was fully deployed by fall 1984, with hardwired 
ports in every room including the dormitories. The nodes were configured so that each hardwired connection 
could be used for either AppleTalk or as an asynchronous terminal port. By default the dormitory ports were 
set to AppleTalk, one connection per student, but could be changed on request.
Originally communication between the nodes used the unique DTSS protocol, but it became clear that some-
thing more modern was needed. TCP/IP was rejected for a variety of reasons. The overhead was too high for 
the slower network links (some off-campus nodes were 2,400 bits/second) and there was no TCP/IP support 
for the major computers on campus. Before the Internet Domain Name Service was introduced in 1983, when-
ever a machine was added to a TCP/IP network, a system administrator had to update all the name tables. 
Dartmouth was considering a stripped down version of TCP/IP when, in spring 1984, Apple showed us the 
draft protocols for what became AppleTalk. These protocols were very similar to our own design, being packet 
switched but simpler than TCP/IP. The networking team decided to adopt Apple’s protocols and persuaded 
them to make some changes, notably in the size of the address field. These protocols were adopted for the in-
ternal links of the network and the Kiewit Network became a large AppleTalk network in 1984, with the nodes 
acting as gateways for other protocols.
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Using a Macintosh as a ter-
minal
This photograph shows five 
connections from a Macin-
tosh to timeshared comput-
ers. Terminal emulation was 
an important service during 
the transition from timeshar-
ing to personal computing.
Screen image by Rich Brown
There was perilously little time to complete the changeover before the freshmen arrived in fall 1984. It would 
not have been possible without special support from Apple. The company helped in two vital ways. The first 
began as a courtesy call by Martin Haeberli who had just completed MacTerminal, the terminal emulator for 
the Macintosh. For a vital few days he became a member of the Kiewit team. The second was a personal in-
tervention from Steve Jobs. The isolation transformers that protect AppleTalk devices from power surges were 
in very short supply. Jobs made sure that we were supplied, even before the Apple developers, rather than risk 
deploying a thousand machines without protection from lighting strikes. AppleTalk was officially released in 
1985, six months after it was in production at Dartmouth.
The adoption of AppleTalk for the campus network had a benefit that nobody fully anticipated. Apple rapid-
ly developed a fine array of network services, such as file servers and shared printers. As these were released 
they immediately became available to the entire campus. Thus the Macintosh computers came to have three 
functions: free-standing personal computers, terminals to timeshared computers including the library, and 
members of a rich distributed environment.
Later developments
By building its own nodes, Dartmouth was able to offer the campus a convenient, low-cost network before 
commercial components became available. It served its purpose well and was able to expand incrementally as 
the demand grew for extensions.
Even as the AppleTalk network was being deployed, other systems were growing in importance. Scientists and 
engineers acquired Unix workstations. The business school was using IBM Personal Computers. Ethernet and 
TCP/IP became established as the universal networking standards and eventually both Dartmouth and Apple 
moved away from AppleTalk. During the 1990s Dartmouth steadily replaced and upgraded all the original 
components. 1n 1991 the connections between the building were upgraded to 10 Mbits/second and today they 
are fiber optic links at 10 Gbits/second. The building wiring was steadily replaced and by 1998 all the network 
outlets had been converted to Ethernet. In 2001, Dartmouth was the first campus to install a comprehensive 
wireless network. The last New England Digital nodes were retired many years ago, but the basic architecture 
that Stan Dunten designed in 1978 has stood the test of time.
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The Andrew Network at Carnegie Mellon
As part of the Andrew project at Carnegie Mellon, a state-of-the-art campus network was deployed between 
1985 and 1988. By designing this network somewhat later than Dartmouth, Carnegie Mellon was able to build 
a higher-performance network, but had to accommodate the independent networks that had been installed on 
campus. The most important of these were a large terminal network using commercial switches, several net-
works running DECnet over Ethernet, and the Computer Science department’s large TCP/IP network. Early 
in the decade, a working group convened by Howard Wactlar persuaded the university to accept the TCP/IP 
protocols for interdepartmental communications, but the departmental networks were much too important to 
be abandoned.
Early Ethernet posed problems for a campus network. The network management tools were primitive and 
large Ethernets had a reputation for failing unpredictably when components from different manufacturers 
were used together. To manage the load, the typical configuration was to divide a large Ethernet into subnets 
with bridges between them which transmitted only those packets that were addressed to another subnet. The 
bridges operated at the datalink protocol layer so that higher-level protocols such as DECnet and TCP/IP could 
use the same physical network. This worked well if most traffic was within a subnet, but the Andrew project 
chose a system architecture that relied on very high performance connections between workstations anywhere 
on campus and a large central file system, the Andrew File System.
IBM created Token Ring as an alternative to Ethernet. Technically it had several advantages, including better 
network management and being designed from the start to run over a shielded twisted pair, rather than the 
coaxial cable in the original Ethernet specification. With the benefit of hindsight we now know that Ethernet 
was able to overcome its limitations and soon became the dominant standard for campus networks, but at the 
time IBM Token Ring looked very promising. Since IBM money was paying for much of the Andrew project, 
the network needed to support Token Ring.
The Andrew Network therefore had to support both Ethernet and Token Ring at the datalink level. Although 
TCP/IP was the standard, it was also necessary to support the higher-level DECnet protocols over Ethernet. For 
example, scientific users needed DECnet to connect their VAX computers to the Pittsburgh Supercomputing 
Center.
Building the network
The network was built by a team led by John Leong. Major contributions came from Computer Science, Elec-
trical and Computer Engineering, and the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. Don Smith led the IBM group.
The Carnegie Mellon campus network
This greatly oversimplified diagram shows 
how the campus was wired. Copper wiring 
was used within the buildings and fiber op-
tics between them.
Diagram by William Arms
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Wiring the campus was seen as a long-term investment with the flexibility to adapt to different networking 
technologies. As the diagram shows, the wiring has a star-shaped topology. The IBM Cabling System was used 
within buildings, providing high-quality shielded pairs of copper wire. They could be used for either Token 
Ring or Ethernet protocols. The cables also included telephone circuits. IBM donated the equipment and con-
tributed half a million dollars towards the costs of installation. The wires in each building came together in a 
wiring closet where there were network interfaces for Token Ring and Ethernet. This provided a Token Ring 
subnet and an Ethernet subnet in each building. AppleTalk connections were added later. By 1990, there were 
1,900 Ethernet, 1,500 Token Ring, and 1,600 AppleTalk ports active.
Leong often described the network as having “an inverted backbone”. One spur of each subnet was to the 
computer center, where they were all connected to a short backbone Ethernet. Routers were used to direct the 
TCP/IP traffic between the subnets. They were originally developed by the Computer Science and Electrical 
and Computer Engineering Departments and then the software was ported to IBM PC/ATs. Compared with 
the nodes on the Dartmouth network, these routers had to handle much higher data rates, but they did not act 
as terminal concentrators. Separate servers were used as gateways to higher-level protocols, such as AppleTalk.
In practice, there was one major departure from this architecture. Ethernets that carried DECnet traffic were 
connected to the backbone via bridges, not routers. At the cost of extra load on the backbone, the bridges con-
nected these Ethernets with no constraints on the higher-level protocols.
Connections
To make full use of the network it was desirable that every computer at Carnegie Mellon use the Internet pro-
tocols. Support for Unix already existed. The version of Unix that was widely used on campus was the Berkeley 
Software Distribution (BSD), which included an open source implementation of TCP/IP. BSD was developed 
on Digital VAX computers. It was standard on Sun workstations and a variant was used by IBM on their Unix 
workstations.
For the VAX computers, a member of the Computer Science department ported the Internet protocols to run 
on the VMS operating system. It was distributed for a nominal fee and widely used around the world. This was 
an early example of the benefits of an open source distribution. Numerous users reported bug fixes that were 
incorporated into subsequent releases.
The first port of TCP/IP to the IBM PC came from MIT. When we came to deploy it at Carnegie Mellon we en-
countered a problem. With the Internet protocols, each IP address was allocated to a specific computer. When 
many copies of the communications software were distributed on floppy disk, we needed a dynamic way to 
assign addresses. The solution was to extend BootP, a protocol that enabled computers to obtain an IP address 
from a server. The modern version of BootP is known as DHCP.
In this way, TCP/IP was available for all the most common types of computers at Carnegie Mellon except the 
Macintosh. The development of TCP/IP for Macintoshes over twisted-pair wiring was a splendid example of 
cooperation among universities. Carnegie Mellon was one of about eight contributors and at least two start-up 
companies sold products that came out of this work. TCP/IP service for Macintoshes over the Andrew network 
was released at the beginning of 1987.
The initial connection of the Andrew network to the external Internet was through the Pittsburgh Super-
computing Center. Since the center was one of the hubs on the NSFnet, the campus network was immediately 
connected to the national network. Later, a direct connection was made that did not go through the supercom-
puting center.
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Later developments
In the past thirty years, the network has been continually upgraded. The major developments have been higher 
speed and greatly increased capacity, beginning with the replacement of the routers and the inverted backbone 
by high-performance Cisco routers. As the Internet and the TCP/IP family of protocols became widely accept-
ed the need to support alternative protocols diminished. Digital and DECnet no longer exist. Apple uses Ether-
net and TCP/IP. Token Ring never succeeded in the market place and was replaced by higher-speed Ethernets. 
Wired networks are steadily being replaced by wireless networks.
Most of John Leong’s team followed the gold rush to Silicon Valley. With their practical experience in engi-
neering a state-of-the-art network, several of them became successful entrepreneurs.
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Chapter 5
Networks of Personal Computers
An early microprocessor
Personal computers were made possible by mod-
erately priced microprocessors and memory. This 
is an Intel 8088 processor, which was used for the 
IBM Personal Computer in 1981. It has a 16-bit 
processor but its performance was slowed by an 
8-bit external bus.
Photograph by William Arms
Personal Computers and Workstations
Early personal computers
Minicomputers were followed by microcomputers, which soon became known as personal computers. They 
were made by a new group of companies, such as Tandy, Commodore, Apple, and Acorn, which build the very 
popular BBC Micro.
The first personal computer that I owned was a Terak. It was a graphics workstation with an elegant Pascal 
interpreter. The Terak had a 16-bit processor based on Digital’s LSI/11 chip set, but most of the early computers 
used lower cost 8-bit microprocessors. A typical computer of this generation had 4K to 32K of memory, a key-
board, a simple monitor, and two 5-inch floppy disk drives for backup storage. The early monitors were black 
and white only, but low resolution color monitors followed rapidly. Dot matrix printers from companies such 
as Paper Tiger and Epson completed the configuration. Tandy’s TSR-80 was an early success with hobbyists, 
but the Apple II was the machine that captured the imagination of schools and universities.
The standard programming language was a simple version of Basic. They were easy machines to program but 
their success came from the rapid development of a market for software applications. This included gener-
al purpose applications, such as word processing, databases, etc. An enormous number of simple programs 
became available for every level of education. Computer games such as Pacman were a great success, but the 
application that made the commercial marketplace accept personal computers was the first ever spreadsheet, 
Visicalc for the Apple II.
Most of the established computer companies missed out on the personal computer and many of them went out 
of business. IBM was late but when they entered the market they did so with a bang. The original IBM Personal 
Computer (PC) was only an incremental advance technically, but IBM put its full marketing power behind it. 
Organizations that had been reluctant to buy personal computers from upstart companies were comfortable 
buying from IBM. Software developers made the safe choice of developing their products for IBM.
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An Apple II+ computer
Most Apple IIs had two floppy disk 
drives but no hard disk. Floppy disks 
could be used to distribute software 
and a software market developed. The 
computer is running a popular flight 
simulator.
Photograph by John Miranda
The IBM salesmen had been trained to throw scorn on personal computers and had a hard struggle adapting. 
At the first Dartmouth presentation, one of our staff took pity on them and fielded questions from the floor 
while the salesmen took notes. In contrast, the Apple representative was always welcome because she was con-
tinually showing us neat things that she did on her own computer.
An IBM personal com-
puter
This is a typical config-
uration of an early IBM 
Personal Computer. It has 
two floppy drives and a 
dot-matrix printer. The ad-
dition of a hard disk with 
the later model XT trans-
formed the usability and 
performance. Notice the 
very basic user interface.
German Federal Archives
Most of the early makers of personal computers could not compete with this onslaught, but a new group of 
manufacturers emerged selling IBM-compatible computers, popularly known as “clones.” In their hurry to 
bring out the PC, IBM used components that they bought from other companies, such as the Intel 8088 proces-
sor and a primitive operating system from Microsoft, a small company that was previously known for its Basic 
interpreter. I think that Compaq was the first company to build an exact IBM clone. Any software that would 
run on an IBM PC would run on a Compaq. For example, the dominant spreadsheet for many years was Lotus 
1-2-3. The very first release stated on the box that it would run on IBM PCs and Compaqs. Although IBM dom-
inated the personal computer market for many years, they never controlled it. When, in 1987, they introduced 
an incompatible replacement, the PS/2, it was too late. Microsoft, Intel, and the clones controlled the market.
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Lotus 1-2-3 is often credited as being the killer application that made the success of the IBM PC. I think that 
is an overstatement, but it was very important in forcing the clones to be completely compatible. Previously, 
every manufacturer had its own operating environment, and software vendors were forced to create separate 
versions for each of them. I recall visiting Informix, who had a relational database system that ran on all types 
of computers. In the warehouse they had dozens if not hundreds of different versions packed up ready to ship. 
It must have been a nightmare. When Bill Gates announced that Microsoft would release a product only if they 
expected to sell at least 100,000 identical binary copies, the standardization was complete.
An Apple Lisa
This is a Lisa II. It has a built-in hard 
disk and a single floppy. It was a com-
mercial failure, and deserved to be, 
but compare its modern windowing 
interface with the text-based inter-
face on the IBM PC.
Photograph courtesy of Apple Com-
puter
The user interface for these early personal computers were much worse than the good timesharing systems. 
Some applications, such as Lotus 1-2-3, were well designed but they were controlled by a crude command 
language. The first personal computer with a modern interface was the Apple Lisa, introduced in 1983. The 
Lisa was over-priced, unreliable, and woefully slow, but it had a few superb applications, such as the LisaDraw 
graphics program. Four models were built and I had them all.
Workstations
In the mid-1980s there was a rush to build large personal workstations. They were jokingly called “3M” ma-
chines, because they had a megapixel display, a megabyte of memory, and a processor that executed one million 
instructions per second. The early models also had a 10 or 20 Mbyte hard disk and cost about $10,000, which 
is a million pennies.
The first sales were to engineers and scientists, but prices fell rapidly and sales grew fast. New companies 
emerged such as Apollo, Silicon Graphics, and Three Rivers Corporation, but they often floundered because of 
overly ambitious software plans. For instance, the Three Rivers Perq had a beautiful bit-mapped interface but 
no applications.
Digital had a fast microprocessor, the microVAX, but the company hesitated. Their profits came from mini-
computers and they were reluctant to undermine sales of the VAX minicomputers with much cheaper worksta-
tions. Unix was developed on Digital computers, but VAX/VMS was Digital’s pride and joy, and their support 
for Unix was always lukewarm. Their later workstations were well engineered, fast, and reasonably priced, but 
they misjudged the market. Digital, which had been the second largest computer company in the world, never 
recovered and went out of business a few years later.
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The company that came to dominate the workstation market was Sun Microsystems. One of the founders, 
Bill Joy, was also a principal developer of BSD Unix. Since BSD included the definitive implementation of the 
Internet protocols, the Sun workstations ran well on the emerging networks. In the early days Sun’s business 
model was to be first to market with advanced hardware and innovative software, often at the expense of reli-
ability. When I joined Carnegie Mellon in 1985 my office computer was a Sun 2. It crashed frequently. This was 
a mystery until a colleague pointed out that it failed when the sun fell on it in the early afternoon. Later Sun 
workstations were much more reliable. They were powered by Sun’s own SPARC processors.
The Andrew project at Carnegie Mellon, funded by IBM, was built on BSD. Every program that ran on Andrew 
had to run on standard BSD. When the project began, IBM was not yet ready to ship its own Unix workstation. 
To everybody’s surprise, IBM allowed Carnegie Mellon to buy more than 100 Sun computers for the project.
A Carnegie Mellon student at an IBM RS 6000 
workstation in 1986 
This computer is running the Andrew interface.  The 
display in the photograph was an experimental dis-
play and not available commercially. 
Photograph by Kenneth Andreyo
IBM made a marketing mistake in delaying the announcement of their Unix workstation until their engineers 
were comfortable with the reliability of the hardware and had reworked parts of Unix. As a result they were late 
to market and the operating system was not quite compatible with BSD. A further mistake was not to offer a 
high-resolution display with the first release.  While IBM was resolving these problems, Sun was consolidating 
its position as the market leader.
NeXT
Steve Jobs’s NeXT computer was a glorious failure. When he was forced out of Apple in 1985 he set out to 
build a computer with the power of a workstation but the usability of a Macintosh. His target market 
was education and the business model did not depend on the economies of scale of mass manufacturing. 
A NeXT Computer
This photograph is from http://www.johnmirandaphoto.
com/next.htm, which has an excellent description of the 
NeXT computer.
Photograph by John Miranda 
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Many of the technical concepts were influenced by the several visits that he paid to Carnegie Mellon in 1985 
and 1986. When my family and I moved to Pittsburgh we lived for a few weeks in a large house that belonged 
to Carnegie Mellon. For some of that time, Jobs was also living there. Later I was the first member of the NeXT 
advisory board, but his main contacts were with members of the Computer Science Department. By them he 
was persuaded to use Carnegie Mellon’s new Unix kernel (known as Mach), and to include a digital signal 
processor, which made the NeXT computer particularly suitable for applications such as speech recognition.
Technically the NeXT computer was a powerful Unix workstation with a large bit-mapped screen, but it was 
full of features that were characteristic of Jobs’s creativity. It was packaged as an elegant black cube, with few 
cables visible. When I first visited NeXT in Palo Alto, much of the time was spent in showing off the audio 
quality and color animations, which were far beyond other machines of the time. Unfortunately, the NeXT 
machine suffered from another of Jobs’s characteristics: it was very late. He would tell you, “It’s worth waiting 
for”, but the market did not agree.
Many features of the NeXT computer are now standard but its importance lies in the software. Jobs eventually 
returned to Apple and the software came with him. Today’s Mac OS X is a direct successor to the NeXT oper-
ating system. The Interface Builder used to program iPhones and iPads is a descendant of tools built at NeXT 
to overcome the difficulties that developers had faced in writing programs for the early Macintosh.
The Macintosh at Dartmouth
The dilemma
In the early 1980s, Dartmouth faced a dilemma in deciding how to use personal computers. The success of the 
timesharing system could have been a barrier to change. It was much more user-friendly than the primitive 
environments provided by the Apple II or IBM PC; it was much faster for scientific computation; and it was 
cheaper per user than personal computers. The Kiewit Network already provided a campus email service and 
access to the library catalog. Yet when we looked at the trends, we saw such rapid improvements in personal 
computers that they were clearly the path of the future. The Apple II already had a large pool of educational 
applications and the IBM PC had applications such as word processing and spreadsheets that were far superior 
to anything that we could produce locally.
Dartmouth had a number of advantages. Dartmouth is large enough to have substantial resources but small 
enough to be more nimble than larger universities. We had a strong technical staff with close relationships to 
the faculty. The emphasis on timesharing had made us experts in campus networking. Most importantly, Dart-
mouth was accustomed to being a leader in academic computing and wanted to remain so.
The solution to this dilemma was to envisage a dual role for a personal computer. A small computer could be 
used by itself for the tasks that it did well, such as spreadsheets and word processing, but it would also be a 
terminal to the timesharing system, library catalog, and other network services. Recollections are notoriously 
unreliable, and I have no records of the process by which this concept emerged, but I remember two key events.
We were all concerned that people at Dartmouth would reject personal computers because of their crude user 
interfaces, but in late 1982, I heard a leak about a secret Apple project called the Macintosh, and learned ex-
tensive technical information about it. When our first Apple sales representative visited us she was horrified to 
hear of the leak, but after I suggested that we might buy a thousand she arranged for me to visit the Macintosh 
group in California. I came home convinced that the Macintosh had the potential to succeed at Dartmouth and 
that Apple was a good company to do business with.
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The next event was in spring 1983. The provost, Agnar Pytte, attended a meeting of provosts from other uni-
versities where computing strategies were discussed. I provided him with a set of planning slides. One morn-
ing soon afterwards he called me to say that he was meeting with the president that afternoon and planned 
to propose universal ownership of personal computers for Dartmouth freshmen. I hastily put together a short 
briefing paper. I do not have a copy of that paper, but the main points were to use a personal computer as a ter-
minal to the timeshared computers and the library catalog, to extend the network into every dormitory room, 
and to use our existing organization to support the initiative. I included an outline budget, which he wisely did 
not show to the president, but otherwise this paper became the basis for our personal computing plan. Pytte’s 
idea was to begin with the class that entered in fall 1985, but because of a miscommunication when we talked 
over the telephone I gave him a plan for 1984. He noticed the mistake just before his meeting, gave me a quick 
call, and kept the 1984 date when he presented the plan to the president.
This paper did not specify which type of computer we would select. I was personally enthusiastic about the 
Macintosh and lukewarm about the alternatives, but the president came from a commercial background and 
his ideas about computing were fixated on IBM. IBM wanted us to adopt a stripped computer known as the 
PC Junior, and Digital made a strong effort to persuade us to adopt their Rainbow computer. The Macintosh 
project was top secret and I was the only person at Dartmouth who had seen one, but eventually Apple was per-
suaded to demonstrate the prototype to a group of a dozen people. At the end of the demonstration, Pytte said, 
“I think that the humanities faculty would like that,” and the decision was made. It was typical of Dartmouth 
that the user interface was the decisive factor in the decision.
An early Macintosh
This picture shows the distinctive 
shape of the first Macintoshes. It had 
128 Kbytes of memory and a single 3½" 
diskette with a capacity of 400 Kbytes. 
The small size helped when using the 
computers in dormitory rooms.
Photograph by Stuart Bratesman, © 
1984 Stuart Bratesman - All rights re-
served
It is hard to recall just how primitive the Macintosh was when it was released in winter 1984. It was slow, with 
very limited memory, and had only a single diskette, so that copying files was nearly impossible. There were 
only two applications: MacWrite, a word processor that crashed when it ran out of memory, and a pixel editor 
called MacPaint. A decent spreadsheet, Microsoft Multiplan, followed soon afterwards, but the terminal emu-
lator, MacTerminal, was not released until late summer.
Yet the Macintosh had some features that appealed enormously to a segment of the academic community. First, 
it appealed to the eye. The machine itself was cute, the screen display was attractive, and accessories such as the 
traveling case were well designed and well made. For the first time we had a computer that was intuitive to use. 
When he first showed me the machine, Dan’l Lewin of Apple dumped the prototype on the table in its traveling 
case and went to fetch coffee. By the time that he returned I had set up the machine and was moving windows 
about on the desktop. I still have the coffee mug.
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From the day that it was launched, the Macintosh was a joy to use. It was a complete transformation from the 
command line interfaces used by other computers. Microsoft took ten years to produce a similar interface with 
Windows 95. Text is central to academic life and the Macintosh was the first moderately priced computer to 
support full character sets, including diacritics, and to use bitmapped fonts for both the screen and the printer.
Without acceptance by a few universities the Macintosh might well have died as so many other personal com-
puters did during that period. When commercial companies saw the early Macintosh they saw a toy with very 
little software that was a brute to program. Their price was more than twice the deeply discounted price that 
we paid. Companies looked at the Macintosh and did what they had always done: they bought from IBM. As 
the saying went, “Nobody ever lost their job by buying from IBM.”
Dan’l Lewin, the head of university marketing, was the person who saved the Macintosh. When I first met him 
he showed me the draft of an agreement for what became the Apple University Consortium. The basic idea 
was to offer Macintoshes to selected universities for a very low price, $1,000. At that time, we were wrestling 
with contracts from IBM’s lawyers who wanted to use mainframe concepts for the sale of personal computers. 
It was a joy to read Lewin’s straightforward draft and be invited to suggest changes that would make it more 
acceptable to universities. Unlike IBM, Apple made no attempt to state what our community would do with the 
machines or to guarantee how many we would sell, both of which are impossible commitments for universities.
About a dozen leading universities joined the Apple University Consortium before the formal release of the 
Macintosh, and Apple supported us well over the years. Dartmouth was unusual in that most of the other uni-
versities offered Macintoshes as one of several brands of computer that they supported, but we were determined 
to select one brand and to put all our effort into it. Drexel was the first university to select the Macintosh for all 
its students, but Apple particularly valued Dartmouth’s reputation in educational computing. While IBM and 
Digital were prepared to make major gifts to gain our business, Apple was more restrained except for the deep 
discounting. However, they gave us a grant of several machines, which we used as seed machines for faculty to 
use in education.
The Macintosh at Dartmouth
When Dartmouth decided to adopt the Macintosh, the provost presented the plan to every single committee 
of which he was a member, but that does not mean that everybody welcomed the initiative. He and I had to 
endure a fairly rough session at a meeting of the university faculty, and the president never really accepted that 
we had rejected his friends at IBM.
The first year, 1984, was hectic. The resources of the computing center were focused on the arrival of the fresh-
men in September, but all the usual services had to be kept running. Converting the network to AppleTalk was 
a major engineering feat. At the same time, the telecommunications team had to wire the dormitories, install 
new nodes, and make the cables to connect Macintoshes to the wall outlets. The communications package of 
MacTerminal and the special cable were slightly late, but were delivered to the students a few weeks after the 
beginning of the term. Logistics were a challenge. The computing center had a small store selling manuals and 
supplies. This was transformed into a computer store supplying Macintoshes and IBM PCs, with their software 
and supplies. Technicians had to be trained in repair work. The handout of the computers to the freshmen was 
turned into an event, with a convoy of trucks delivering them from the warehouse.
For those of us who were advocates of the Macintosh, the challenge was to balance the long-term potential 
against the deficiencies, which we hoped were short term. The enthusiasm of a few core faculty helped solve the 
shortage of good applications. Although the early Macintosh was an awkward machine to program, the qual ity 
of the QuickDraw tools enabled determined individuals to create good programs quite quickly. We were able to 
support them with the machines that we had received from Apple and grants from several private foundations
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Dartmouth freshmen collect their Macin-
toshes
In 1984, the standard package was a Macin-
tosh with MacWrite, and MacPaint; a com-
munications package was delivered later. 
Many students also chose a carrying case and 
a printer. Students were urged to buy comput-
ers, and between 75 percent and 80 percent 
of the freshmen did so. Owning a computer 
was made a requirement in 1991, but it did not 
have to be a Macintosh.
Photograph by Stuart Bratesman, © 1984 Stu-
art Bratesman - All rights reserved
Apple worked effectively to overcome many of the limitations without compromising the overall design. At the 
first meeting of the Apple University Consortium, Jobs spoke of several developments, notably the plans for 
a small laser printer, which was the first for any personal computer. Extending the memory to four times its 
original size and adding a hard disk solved two crucial problems.
DarTerminal
This is a DarTerminal screen dump. It 
shows how Apple’s Chooser could be used 
to connect to computers and services on 
the Kiewit Network.
Screen image by Rich Brown
Over the next few years Dartmouth used its technical resources to provide networked services that augmented 
those provided by Apple. The original MacTerminal was replaced by a more flexible program, DarTerminal, 
and the Avatar distributed editor was ported to the Macintosh. Dartmouth’s Fetch program, an FTP client, is 
still going strong as a file transfer program for Macintoshes. A new mail system, BlitzMail, was so well received 
that there was dismay when it was withdrawn in 2011. A group of universities collaborated in providing Ap-
pleTalk service over dial-up telephone lines. Many of these developments took place after I moved to Carnegie 
Mellon in summer 1985.
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The decision to select one type of computer and support it well proved a great success, but Dartmouth was 
never exclusively a Macintosh campus. IBM PCs were always preferred by the business school. Other individ-
uals chose them or later the Windows clones. From the earliest days, the computer store sold IBM PCs and 
the computing center steadily extended the distributed environment to support them. Networked ports in the 
dormitories could be configured for asynchronous connections and later for Ethernet. BlitzMail and the Avatar 
were ported to the IBM PC. A report in 1991 estimated that there were about 10,000 computers on campus of 
which 90 percent were Macintoshes.
Carnegie Mellon and the Andrew Project
Planning
At Carnegie Mellon, the initiative came from the top. The president, Richard Cyert, summarized the univer-
sity’s strategy as “a campus saturated with computing.” He saw that state-of-the-art computing could benefit 
every aspect of the university, including all academic departments, the library, and the administration. He saw 
research opportunities in every field and the potential to transform education. As a canny businessman he 
rightly anticipated that an aggressive computing strategy would receive financial support from corporations, 
government agencies, and private foundations. In his keynote address to the 1986 EDUCOM Conference, 
Herbert Simon aptly described the strategy as “computing by immersion.” Provide faculty and students with a 
great array of computing and they will use it creatively.
The timing of the plan was based on a deep understanding of trends in computing. In 1979, Allen Newell pub-
lished a report known as the Spice Report. This report extrapolated hardware trends to predict the spectacular 
advances in large personal computers that took place during the 1980s. It would soon be possible to build a 
computer on a single chip that would be as powerful as the super-minicomputers. These large personal com-
puters were often called “workstations”.
The Preliminary Report on the Future of Computing at Carne-
gie Mellon University
Photograph by William Arms
Newell later chaired the Task Force for the Future of Computing, which articulated how Carnegie Mellon 
could use these advances. The Xerox Palo Alto Research Center had already demonstrated how workstations 
could be linked by a high-speed network to form a new model of computing, but this was used by only a small 
1.49
number of well-funded computer scientists. The vision was to recognize that this style of computing was ap-
propriate for an entire university and that declining hardware costs would make it affordable. Carnegie Mellon 
set out to build such a system.
To achieve the ambition, Carnegie Mellon needed an industrial sponsor and they found it in Lewis Branscomb, 
the chief scientist of IBM. With his support IBM gave the university a five-year grant, later renewed, to build an 
advanced campus computing environment known as Andrew. The grant was huge. It included an R&D center, 
the Information Technology Center (ITC) with thirty computer scientists and engineers, very large donations 
of equipment, support for educational computing initiatives, and social science studies of the impact. A sepa-
rate grant helped build the campus network.
People
In writing about the Andrew project it is important to stress that this was a university-wide initiative. The 
various groups that contributed are too numerous to list, but two were so important that their leaders had uni-
versity titles. Howard Wactlar, Vice Provost for Research Computing, was responsible for the extensive com-
puting facilities in the Computer Science Department. He had exceptional insight into the boundary between 
research and practice, and how to create partnerships with industry. Michael Levine, a physicist, was one of the 
founding directors of the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. He had the title Associate Provost for Scientific 
Computing and was a vigorous advocate for those researchers who needed computing facilities beyond those 
that a Unix-based project could provide.
My predecessor, Doug Van Houweling, was a key person in creating the strong relationship with IBM and 
recruited Jim Morris to be the first director of the ITC. They were ably supported by John Howard, the senior 
IBMer on campus. While the ITC created the prototype system and was a catalyst for the rest of the university, 
components were contributed by many departments, by other universities, and by several manufacturers.
In conjunction with the Andrew project, Carnegie Mellon created the Center for the Design of Educational 
Computing, under the leadership first of Jill Larkin and later Preston Covey. Year after year, the center received 
at least one of the annual EDUCOM awards for excellence in educational software.
As the project moved past the prototype stage, responsibility moved to the university computing center. Two 
people transferred from the ITC to lead this effort: Bob Cosgrove who had responsibility for the servers and the 
centrally run systems, and John Leong who built the campus network. Without their efforts we would never 
have overcome the myriad of technical challenges that lie between a research project and a stable production 
environment. Later, when Cosgrove left and the IBM funding expired, Leong became the overall technical 
director.
The Andrew project
In 1982 Carnegie Mellon was already a leader in computer science and campus computing. At the time of 
the Newell report, 7,800 faculty, students, and staff had 1,090 terminals connected to a variety of timeshared 
computers. The computing center ran six large DEC-20 computers and Computer Science had several more. 
Numerous departmental centers ran VAXes. Several departments and the computing center operated a large 
Ethernet using DECnet protocols. The business school became the domain of the IBM PC. The nucleus of a 
modern workstation environment existed in Computer Science, where 18 Xerox Altos, 44 Perqs, and a Dover 
laser printer were connected over an experimental 3 Mbit/sec Ethernet. The challenge was to transform this 
nucleus, so that it would have a major impact on research, on the administration of the university, and espe-
cially on students.
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When the ITC began work, none of the components that are now considered fundamental to distributed com-
puting existed, except in research laboratories, yet the ITC’s aim was to support thousands of personal com-
puters. Ethernet was still experimental; workstations such as the Sun 1 were expensive, slow, and unreliable; 
Unix was considered impossible to support without an army of system programmers; and the Apple Lisa and 
Macintosh computers had not yet shown the advantages of a graphical user interface. Nobody had experience 
with large-scale distributed computing.
The members of the ITC had to work in all these fields and more. They developed a campus-wide file system, a 
window manager and applications toolkit, and did much of the work in creating the campus network. Morris 
and his colleagues also recognized that building the technical framework was only part of their task. They had 
to help people to use it. For this purpose, they supported a number of faculty initiatives, and wrote an excellent 
mail and messaging system.
The ITC was funded by IBM, but its work was not restricted to IBM equipment and software. The Andrew 
software was based on BSD Unix and ran on IBM, Sun, and Digital workstations. The port to the Sun 3 had 
an interesting bug. The Sun 3 was generally very reliable, but it crashed when running the Andrew window 
manager. A member of the ITC traced the problem to a memory boundary problem with a specific sequence of 
instructions that Sun’s software never used. He reverse engineered the paging firmware, made a minor hard-
ware modification, and fixed the problem. Unfortunately, while doing this he was being paid from the IBM 
grant; IBM was not amused.
Network services
By themselves, personal computers could not replace timesharing. Timeshared computers shared much more 
than the central processor. Their central file systems allowed users to store programs and data, to share printers 
and other peripherals, and to communicate with each other. One of the tasks of the Andrew project was to pro-
vide this sharing through network services. The Andrew File System consisted of a number of server comput-
ers, each with several large disks. A Unix workstation on the network saw one large file system in which there 
was no distinction amongst the servers, nor between files stored locally on the workstation and files stored 
The Andrew File System
The photograph shows the Andrew 
File System in 1987. The servers are 
Sun 2s. Each server has three Fujitsu 
Eagle disk drives, each with a capacity 
of more than 400 Mbytes.
Photograph by William Arms
on the file system. In fall 1989, the main campus file system had 15 server computers and more than 30 gi-
gabytes of storage. It was used by 5,000 users every month. In addition to the central file system, which was 
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available to the entire campus, there were several operated by departments.
The Andrew message system supported electronic mail and bulletin boards. It was created by the ITC and 
extended by the computing center. The mail delivery used small post office computers and the user interface 
ran on personal computers. Mail between users of the Andrew File System was deposited directly into per-
sonal mailboxes. Mail to other mail services, including the Internet and Bitnet, was handled by the post office 
computers. The software had good algorithms for resolving ambiguous or duplicate names, and for handling 
difficulties. There were separate user interfaces for different types of personal computer. The interface for Unix 
workstations supported structured text, bit-mapped images, and other formats. Other interfaces were tailored 
for IBM PCs, Macintoshes, and simple ASCII terminals. Carnegie Mellon was an early advocate of the IMAP 
mail protocol.
The applications gap
These were tremendous achievements, but there was a gap. It was the same gap that eventually doomed time-
sharing at Dartmouth. Unix was undoubtedly the right choice for the system’s infrastructure that the Andrew 
project built, but Unix has always been weak on applications.
Many academic units were opposed to the emphasis on Unix workstations and many who supported the over-
all vision held back from using the new software until it had proved itself. People refused to commit to An-
drew-Unix because the best applications in their areas ran on other computers. Macintoshes and IBM PCs were 
everywhere; the School of Industrial Administration, and the School of Urban and Public Affairs selected PCs; 
the new School of Computer Science and the department of Electrical and Computer Engineering used Unix 
but not the Andrew window manger and tool kit; humanities and social sciences chose Macintoshes; engineer-
ing and science departments had a combination of Unix and VMS workstations.
My major contribution to the Andrew project was to recognize this gap and refocus the resources of the com-
puting center to tackle it. To their credit, the IBMers on campus also recognized the situation and were sup-
portive. If today you search the web for Andrew, you will find a narrow description of the Unix software that 
the ITC developed, but a 1986 brochure from IBM’s Academic Information Systems is much broader. Naturally 
it emphasizes what IBM contributed, but its focus is on networking, and the importance of interoperating with 
many types of computers and with other universities. In the brochure, I am quoted as saying, “...the plans as-
sumed that there would be nothing else on campus except Andrew. [The concept] was comparable to building 
an expressway across Wyoming, working with virgin territory, when in fact we were talking about running one 
through something like Chicago. The unavoidable interrelationship with other computer systems on campus 
was not foreseen.”
Andrew Plus
This is a diagram that I used to describe 
Carnegie Mellon computing in the late 
1980s. The top row shows the supported 
types of personal computers and work-
stations. The bottom row shows some of 
the services that these personal comput-
ers could connect to over the network. 
It does not show the departmental com-
puting centers. Unix computers could 
connect directly to the networked ser-
vices. IBM PCs and Macintoshes con-
nected via proxy servers.
Diagram by William Arms
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When personal computers were first developed, most people expected that they would supplement timeshar-
ing, not replace it. A common question was “what balance would emerge?”, but when the central DEC-20 com-
puters were withdrawn in 1988, they were not replaced.
Although personal computers and networked servers dominated the environment, several large computers re-
mained. The largest was the Cray computer at the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, operated jointly with the 
University of Pittsburgh. The library, under the leadership of Thomas Michalak, was a leader in building online 
information systems. Taking advantage of a lightly used IBM mainframe, the library provided a single user 
interface to the library’s catalog, secondary information services, reference materials, and university informa-
tion such as the staff directory. Most administrative data processing continued to be done on VAX computers.
Deployment
To build this environment we had to create a new type of organization. Originally, the Andrew initiative had 
by-passed the computing center and the staff were naturally dispirited. One of my first actions was to reverse 
the decision to build a separate team to deploy the new environment and to give the responsibility to the com-
puting center.
The transition from timesharing to personal computing was an enormous wrench. The mature and well-loved 
DEC-20 systems received little attention while the new environment was developed. In 1988, when they were 
withdrawn, the distributed environment was far from complete. Many components were rough and ready, 
some were incomplete or temporary, performance was erratic, and many skilled people were needed to carry 
out tasks that later were routine. In a 1989 survey, students ranked computing well ahead of all other student 
services at the university, yet several faculty reports were disappointed at the impact on education. Carnegie 
Mellon was probably the most computer-intensive university in the world, yet shortage of resources was a con-
stant complaint.
The planning papers rightly forecast the enormous demand for personal computers and gave high priority to 
ensuring that everybody had access to one. In 1981 there was one terminal on campus for every eight people. In 
1990 there were as many computers as faculty, students, and staff combined. Amongst faculty, computer usage 
was almost universal.
As the Andrew project gathered momentum, many of us wanted to require all students to own a computer. The 
idea was discussed on several occasions, but the university was never prepared to add the cost of a personal 
computer to the high cost of tuition. Many students, however, had their own computers and the percentage 
grew year by year. A survey of freshmen in fall 1989 found that 55 percent either owned a computer or were 
planning to buy one. In addition, the university operated public computing laboratories with almost 700 per-
sonal computers for the students. Half were maintained centrally and half by departments. The 1989 survey 
found 210 Unix workstations, 269 Macintoshes (including 46 large Mac IIs), and 210 IBM personal computers 
in public laboroties. For personal ownership, the most popular computer was the Macintosh, and every year 
the university sold about 1,200 Macintosh computers through the campus store. People turned to the Mac-
intosh and the IBM PC as a straightforward way to get their work done, and were delighted by the stream of 
innovative software developed by the commercial market.
Reflections
The announcement of the Andrew project generated a wave of publicity in both the press and television. In the 
hyperbole, Carnegie Mellon forgot to manage expectations. Impossible predictions were made about the trans-
formation of education that would come out of this project and how the technology would sweep the market. 
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Years later a colleague at Cornell asked me if Andrew was a success. I was too close to the project to give an 
impartial answer but here is an attempt.
The 1980s were a good decade for Carnegie Mellon by almost every measure: quality of students, research 
volume, financial strength, and so on. They all improved dramatically and the emphasis on computing was a 
major contributor. This strength is seen today everywhere on campus.
If the early planning papers are contrasted with what was achieved, the picture which emerges is that the over-
all strategy advocated in 1982 was remarkably accurate. The forecasts of the tactical steps which would be taken 
were less accurate. The biggest area not anticipated was the impact of commercial software running on small 
personal computers. The Andrew Network, the Andrew File System, the message system, and other servers 
were technical triumphs. For the first time, a major organization ran its computing services without a large 
central computer. There were also disappointments. The Andrew tool kit and user interface were never widely 
used, though they had impacts on other projects, and IBM never developed the commercial products that we 
hoped would emerge from our joint efforts.
At the time we were often swamped by the challenges, both technical and organizational. Now, with the dis-
tance of time, it is clear that the strategy of saturating the campus with computing worked brilliantly. Every-
body involved can be proud of the outcome.
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Chapter 6
Modern Times
A server farm
Personal computers, networked ser-
vices, the web, cloud computing, and 
server farms have replaced central 
computers as the heart of academic 
computing. This photograph shows a 
server farm at the Internet Archive in 
2009. The Internet Archive is a not-
for-profit organization with close ties 
to academia. Its founder is Brewster 
Kahle.
Photograph by Felix Weigel
Academic Computing Today
The changing landscape
My role in academic computing changed when I left Carnegie Mellon in 1995. After seventeen years as a com-
puting director I became a user again. With the major exception of digital libraries, I was no longer an insider. 
This section describes some of the trends that I see as an outsider. Undoubtedly my different viewpoint has ob-
scured important developments, but there seems to have been a fundamental change in academic computing.
The underlying theme of the early years of academic computing was that universities were different. Because 
the computing industry was not providing the systems that they needed, they built their own. More recently, 
however, end-user computing has become universal and academic computing has merged back into the com-
mercial mainstream. The projects of the 1980s brought an end to the period in which universities created their 
own computing environments. The excellent computing that Cornell now provides for its faculty and students 
is built almost entirely upon standard components. The computer on my lap, the networks it connects to, the 
programs that I run, the email and web servers are commercial products that are available to everybody.
In 1990, in a review of the Andrew project, I wrote:
“As we begin the next decade, nothing on the horizon suggests any change as dramatic as the move from 
timesharing. The Andrew environment, with personal computers and shared information, appears to be 
the right model for the years ahead. Many skilled people are needed to refine and improve this environ-
ment, but assuredly the next few years will see ever improving computing, which will be based around 
cheaper and more powerful hardware, better system software, more elegant applications, more dependable 
service, and a higher level of sophistication amongst users. The university will continue to wrestle with the 
organizational and financial issues, and will eventually find a balance between decentralized control and 
university-wide coordination.
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“However, the next decade will see much more than an elegant completion to the Andrew project. If we 
simply extend hardware trends for ten years, we can see that personal computers will execute more than 
100 million instructions per second and have screens so good that reading from them will be as pleasant 
as a printed book, that much of the campus network will be operating at speeds measured in gigabits per 
second, that it will be cheaper to store almost everything on computer disks than on paper, and that the 
distinction between video technology and computing will be blurred. These are more than quantitative 
changes; they are opportunities to open up new areas. The university has vigorous programs in many 
areas which are poised to take advantage of more powerful computing. These include electronic libraries, 
speech recognition, natural language processing, chess playing, image processing, and extensive areas of 
scientific computation. The next decade will see many of these move into the every day life of the campus. 
Surely, also, the next decade will see developments in new areas that nobody yet foresees.”
The final sentence of the quotation has proved abundantly correct. Nobody predicted the uses that would be 
made of this new world of computing. Less than five years after this sentence was written, the web began its 
breakneck expansion. Soon afterwards mobile computing began its equally dizzy growth. Both were predicted 
in general terms, but nobody could imagine their impact. Fifty years ago computing was for highly skilled spe-
cialists; twenty-five years ago it was available to the members of well-funded organizations such as universities; 
today it is universal.
The web
Universities did not create the web, though they were significant contributors. In the early 1990s there were 
several competing systems for distributing information on the Internet. They included Gopher from the Uni-
versity of Minnesota, the World Wide Web from CERN in Geneva, Z39.50 from the library community, and 
WAIS by Brewster Kahle, which used a modified version of Z39.50. In retrospect, the greatest strength of the 
web was its simplicity. Z39.50 failed because it tried to do too much. It assumed that nobody would place valu-
able information online unless it was protected by an authorization system. The early web was particularly easy 
to use. I personally created Carnegie Mellon’s first home page in about an hour.
An early browser
This is a screen dump from the Netscape 
browser in 1995. This was the first time 
that I saw a well-known publication place 
some of its content on a web site.
Screen image by William Arms 
1.56
The browser that established the popularity of the web was Mosaic from the University of Illinois, released in 
1993. It brought proper fonts, color, and images to the Internet and people loved it. Mosaic was initially devel-
oped for Unix workstations but it was rapidly ported to all standard personal computers. The same group at the 
University of Illinois also developed the web server that is now called Apache.
Most of the web search services, except Altavista, began as university projects or used university search en-
gines, including Infoseek, Lycos, Yahoo (which began as a catalog), and Google, but they all rapidly became 
start-up companies. More recently, Facebook began at a university but it quickly became a start-up company. 
MIT was the founder of the World Wide Web Consortium, which has played a major role in standardizing and 
enhancing the web technology, but overall, universities have been users of the web rather than the creators of 
the technology.
Open source software
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of open source software in academic computing. Many articles have 
stressed the benefits of collaboration and the excellence of the best open source software, such as the Linux 
operating system, Eclipse development environment, Apache web server, Python programming language, Lu-
cene search engine, and the Hadoop-distributed file system and map/reduce engine. The zero cost is of course 
important, but the availability is even more so.
In my software course at Cornell, I never worry that the students do not have access to the software that they 
need. Students can download the open source packages onto their own computers and be up and running im-
mediately. Many of the best students never buy any software. They rely on what comes with their computer and 
what they can download for free. We are educating a generation of students who are experts in the open source 
packages, but have little knowledge of the commercial alternatives.
Rather surprisingly, universities are not very active in creating open source software. All of the packages listed 
above are maintained by not-for-profit organizations. Individuals from universities may be contributors, but 
they get no academic reward for such activities, whereas many corporations contribute staff time as a substitute 
for building their own software. For instance, Hadoop provides companies that lack Google’s expertise with 
an alternative platform on which to build very large Internet services. Facebook could never have grown so fast 
without it.
University research and spin-off companies
This is a remarkable time for technology transfer from computing research to the outside world. Ideas devel-
oped in universities are making their way into the marketplace very rapidly. Computer science and electrical 
engineering are in a particularly productive period, where many long-standing research areas have matured 
into practical products, but people in all disciplines are finding high-powered computing to be a never-ending 
source of innovation and entrepreneurship.
A dominant theme is the spin-off, a start-up company that individuals create based on their university re-
search. Spin-offs are not new. As early as the 1950s, Stanford University was encouraging the growth of Silicon 
Valley, while Route 128 around Boston was synonymous with spin-offs from MIT and Harvard. In recent 
years, the pace has changed as venture capitalists became ever more willing to fund start-ups early in their life 
cycle. Sun Microsystems, which combined expertise from Stanford and Berkeley, was a good example. Mosaic 
was developed at the University of Illinois, but a year later, moved to a start-up, Netscape. Search engines such 
as Lycos (Carnegie Mellon) and Google (Stanford) began as research projects but rapidly formed spin-offs.
Over-exuberance about the potential of the Internet led to a speculative bubble, the dot.com boom, and its 
stock-market crash in 2000; but the success of companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Facebook 
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are an inspiration for individuals to turn their ideas into products and bring them to market. Each of these 
four companies continued to be led by its technical founders. In the past there was an attitude that companies 
should be led by people with business and financial backgrounds, but today’s students have realized that found-
ers who come from a technical background can be successful entrepreneurs.
Computing in Education
The advocates of every project described in this narrative hoped to have a major impact on education. Dart-
mouth Basic was designed for students; Athena at MIT and Andrew at Carnegie Mellon were inspired by the 
goals of better education; when companies such as IBM and Apple gave personal computers to universities they 
expected to create educational breakthroughs. Meanwhile, every university has its own programs to support 
innovative courses, and organizations such as the National Science Foundation and the Howard Hughes Med-
ical Institute have well-funded initiatives. During the dot.com boom several universities created web start-up 
companies. I was a director of eCornell at Cornell.
The talent and energy behind these efforts has been remarkable, but overall the impact has been disappointing. 
A Carnegie Mellon survey in 1989 found that 44 percent of the faculty used computing in their courses but 
only 9 percent used programs that had been written for instruction. The real success of computing in higher 
education comes from faculty offering students the same computing tools that they use for their own research. 
In addition, we must not ignore the increased productivity provided by simple tools such as word processing, 
graphics, email, course web sites, and bulletin boards, and the value of online access to the library and other 
sources of information.
With all the disappointments it is rash to be too optimistic, but there are signs that times are changing. The first 
sign is financial. Our universities are becoming unaffordable. Partly this is because of inefficiencies, but the un-
derlying cause is more fundamental. Economists call it the cost disease of service industries. An organization 
that depends on large numbers of well-paid professionals cannot increase its productivity unless it changes its 
mode of work. As a result it becomes steadily more expensive relative to the overall cost of living. Higher edu-
cation in the United States is under relentless financial pressure and people are becoming increasingly willing 
to look for alternatives.
A second sign is that web-based distance education courses are being offered by a wide variety of organiza-
tions. Some are of dubious academic merit, but some are excellent. Cornell gives full academic credit for cours-
es offered through the summer school program, and there is increasing willingness to consider other courses 
that are partially or fully online. We are slowly building an understanding of what works in our culture.
The past few years have seen the introduction of massive open online courses (MOOCs). As usual the hyperbo-
le and enthusiasm have run ahead of the actual achievements, but these courses have some impressive features. 
Most importantly their advocates are leading faculty from some of our top universities. They include experts 
in those branches of artificial intelligence that are used to construct courses that need minimal human inter-
vention.
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An Open University course unit from 
about 1975
Photograph by William Arms
My own thinking is strongly influenced by the years that I spent at the British Open University in the 1970s. 
The Open University does not follow the traditional format of residential education. It was founded to serve 
adult students, living at home, usually with regular jobs. In the United States this huge group of students is 
served by a mixed bag of community colleges and for-profit schools, but only too often the result is little edu-
cation and large debts.
Although the Open University always has had the latest technology available, it is cautious in its use of technol-
ogy. When I was there, forty years ago, we had a dedicated BBC television studio, but the most effective tech-
nology that we had was printed course materials, backed up by human tutors. Nowadays, distance education 
has few technical barriers. We can assume that our students and faculty have good computers and network 
connections, and that they are skilled users of them. The technical tools that faculty need to create educational 
materials are at our fingertips.
Sometime in the future these threads are going to come together and we will see high-quality degree programs 
based on educational technology. Nobody can tell whether they will be developed by existing universities or by 
new organizations. The most obvious opportunity is to provide high-quality education for part-time, non-res-
idential students. The developments of academic computing have been led by the elite residential universities, 
but the greatest benefits may be to people who have never been able to attend those universities.
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Sources
In writing this memoir, I began by putting down what I can remember. I then searched for contemporary 
documents to check my memory of facts and dates. The information that I have been able to find is often in-
complete and unbalanced. For example, there is a great deal of information about Multics at MIT, but very little 
about the Dartmouth Time Sharing System.
Two of the three EDUCOM books cover topics that are covered in this narrative. They are:
Campus computing strategies, edited by John W. McCredie. Bedford MA: Digital Press. 1983
Campus networking strategies, edited by Caroline R. Arms. Bedford MA: Digital Press. 1988
Many of the details about computing at Dartmouth come from the reports and brochures that the Kiewit 
Computation Center produced intermittently. I have the publications from 1969-71, 1973-76, 1985, and 1986.
IBM’s Academic Information Systems division produced a well-balanced brochure on the Andrew project:
Carnegie Mellon University Reaching for World Leadership in Educational Computing and Communica-
tions, IBM. 1986
Many of the facts and figures about Carnegie Mellon are drawn from a 1986 brochure and a paper that I wrote 
when Richard Cyert resigned after nineteen years as president:
Arms, William Y., Reflections on Andrew, EDUCOM Review 25(3):33-43. 1990
Wikipedia has technical articles on many of the computer systems. Some are excellent, e.g., the article on PDP-
11 minicomputers, but there are some notable gaps. Wikipedia says very little about how the computers were 
used and next to nothing on their impact.
Errors and mistakes
Much of this material is my memory of events that happened many years ago. I am sure that there are mistakes. 
Please send me corrections whether of facts, misunderstandings, or failures to give credit to the right people.
William Y. Arms 
Cornell University 
wya@cs.cornell.edu
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B. Memoir by Kenneth M. King
Preface
The two most serious oriental curses are reputed to be: “May you live in interesting times and may your spouse 
understand you”. People involved in University Computing in the early years certainly lived in interesting 
times. I have long believed that Universities have not gotten enough credit for the many things that they did 
to advance technology and its applications. I believe that Bill Arm’s memoir, providing an inside view of the 
development of time-sharing and distributed computing, two huge advances in the development of operating 
systems and improving the human interface to computers, is a great start at chronicling some of those contri-
butions. When Bill Arms approached Bob Cooke and me about publishing his memoir in the Internet-First 
University Press (IFUP), I suggested that he try to create an “incremental book” by persuading other pioneers 
to contribute their memoirs. The incremental book idea was developed by Bob Cooke as part of our joint ef-
fort to get scholarly information on the Internet. The idea was that we would publish chapters or sections in a 
book on the Internet as they are finished, rather than wait until the whole book is completed. Bill suggested 
that I develop my own memoir and that we then jointly approach other pioneers to create an incremental book 
composed of memoirs by people who labored at Universities and may recall events and contributions that 
helped change the world. This second section in our book covers my observations about life in the trenches at 
Universities during the period between 1953 and 1993. The book that we hope to create is possibly an effort not 
unlike the story about an elephant touched by blind men. People that we hope will contribute will certainly 
have different slants on major events at the Universities that helped change the world. 
2.1
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1
1. Computing at the Watson Laboratory at Columbia University 
in the 1950s  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3
  Program Languages are Developed
2. Computing at Columbia University in the 1960s. . . . . . . . 2.7
  Computer Literacy
  Impact of Computing Technology Changes
3. Computing at City University of New York in the 1970s .2.15
  The City of New York Goes Broke
4. Computing at Cornell University from 1980 to 1987 . . . 2.21
  Major Computing Events at Cornell
  Cornell Becomes a National Supercomputer Center
  Creating NSFnet
5. EDUCOM Activities from 1987 until 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.35
  The EDUCOM/NCRIPTAL Outstanding Software Awards
  The NREN Becomes the Internet
6. Looking Back. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.41
7. The Future Lies Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.45
2.2
Chapter 1
Computing at the Watson Laboratory at Columbia University in 
the 1950s
My involvement with computing at Universities spanned the years from 1953 to 1993. During that period 
Universities were responsible for many major advances in computing technology, and University Computer 
Center staff and University Faculty played a big role in many of those advances. There were four major thrusts 
in the effort to advance computer technology: efforts to improve hardware performance; efforts to improve 
computer throughput (primarily directed toward improving operating systems); efforts to provide network 
access to computers; and efforts to improve the productivity, ease of use, and tools available for people who 
were programming computers. In the early years, hardware performance and throughput trumped efforts to 
improve the human interface, if those improvements came at the expense of throughput.
During the 1950s, there were debates on the issue of whether or not Universities should be involved in building 
their own computer hardware. The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton built the IAS computer following 
a design by John Von Neumann from 1945 to 1951, the University of Pennsylvania built the Eniac computer 
in 1947, and the University of Chicago was building Maniac computers until the early 1960s. By the end of the 
50s it became clear that it was impossible to compete with commercial vendors of hardware, and Universities 
stopped building their own computers. However, people who started a number of commercial hardware com-
panies had deep connections to University Engineering Schools. Over the years that spanned my career, Uni-
versity contributions to the advance of technology were primarily in the areas of computer operating systems, 
application packages, languages, networking, and the computer human interface.
I became involved with computing as a graduate student in the Physics Department at Columbia University. 
The IBM Company maintained and funded The Watson Scientific Computing Laboratory at Columbia Univer-
sity, and up until the early 50s the laboratory was stocked with IBM’s latest and greatest commercial hardware, 
primarily tabulating machines. It was at the time one of a few premier University Computer Centers in the 
world, and IBM provided instruction in programming to its scientific customers at the Laboratory. In 1953 I 
wanted to solve some interesting problems in Quantum Mechanics, and IBM was building a new computer 
at the Laboratory for the Navy, called the NORC (Naval Ordinance Research Calculator). From 1954 to 1958 
it was the world’s fastest computer. It had a whopping 2000 words of cathode ray tube storage with a memory 
access time of 8 microseconds, an online card reader, card punch, line printer, and some magnetic tape drives. 
On a good day it could execute about 20,000 arithmetic operations per second. It was programmed in decimal 
machine language and during its construction I and another graduate student had access to it at odd hours. 
For its dedication in December 1954 I computed a table of logarithms in a few minutes that circa 1600, Napier 
had spent many years computing. Unfortunately for Napier, his logarithm tables were necessary to support 
navigation across the seas, and the age of exploration could not be postponed 400 years waiting for the NORC. 
I also computed pi and e, the base of the natural logarithm system to a million places, in something like 20 
minutes, because John Von Neumann, who was attending the dedication, was interested in testing the digits 
for randomness. As predicted by theory they were indeed random. In the 50s and 60s, using the most advanced 
computing technology available at the time, Wallace Eckert and Harry Smith spent years at Columbia Univer-
sity computing the orbit of the moon to enough precision to support the Apollo space program. For comput-
ers with small memories backed by tape drives, any program whose data didn’t fit into the available memory 
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proceeded at close to tape access speed. Today this calculation could be done on a laptop in minutes with our 
gigabyte memories. Unfortunately for them the age of space exploration couldn’t wait.
When the NORC left at the end of 1954, the equipment remaining at the Watson Laboratory supported my 
computing activities, along with a slide rule that every physics student carried at that time. The principle-com-
puting engine in 1954 was an IBM Card Programmed Calculator (CPC), which consisted of an IBM 402 tabu-
lating machine connected to an IBM 604 electronic computer and a card punch. The tabulating machine was 
controlled by a large removable wired program board, and the 604 was capable of executing 40 program steps 
on the data on each card fed into it by the 402, and punching the result onto another card. It was altogether 
a fun machine to work with and capable of executing about 25 arithmetic operations per second. In 1955 the 
CPC was augmented by a pair of IBM 650s. The 650 was a drum machine containing 2000 words of storage, 
and each instruction specified an operation to be performed on data at some address on the drum, followed 
by the address of the next instruction in the program. A drum was a rotating cylinder coated with a magnetic 
material. The drum rotated at 2500 revolutions per minute. The challenge was to locate the program steps and 
data on the drum so you didn’t have to wait for the drum to rotate all the way around to find the data for the 
current instruction, or for the next instruction to be executed. Carefully programmed, it was capable of exe-
cuting a few hundred arithmetic operations per second.
Program Languages are Developed
In 1955 Stan Poley at the Watson Laboratory wrote the first program I had encountered that improved the 
machine-user interface. We later came to call these programs “killer apps”. The program, called SOAP for 
“Symbolic Optimizing Assembly Program”, allowed you to use symbolic names for computer operations and 
data, and the assembler optimized the location of instructions and data on the drum to improve throughput. 
At the time I thought, “It can’t get any better than this”! SOAP ended machine language programming forever. 
A couple of years later, when I became the manager of the Laboratory, we entertained students from the Bronx 
High School of Science for a couple of hours twice a month. A 13-year-old student in the group undertook the 
challenge of writing an improved version of SOAP. He enthusiastically described his program to me. He had 
named his program “CLAP” for “Computer Language for Assembly Programming”. It was my awkward duty 
to suggest to his teacher that his program possibly could benefit from a different name. This name was used at 
the time to describe an inharmonious medical problem and perhaps still is. Those students were wonders and 
proved to me that people at a very young age could become skilled programmers.
In about the middle 50s, John Backus from IBM came up with the idea of creating a computer language that al-
lowed programmers to enter formulas into their code and have a compiler translate the formulas into machine 
language code. He needed $200,000 to produce the compiler, and an IBM Vice President thought it prudent to 
have John Von Neumann review the idea. On a hot summer afternoon Von Neumann appeared at the Watson 
Laboratory to listen to Backus. An IBMer present at the meeting reported to me that Backus gave an inspired 
presentation with particular emphasis on the fact that the compiler would have an optimizer that allowed it to 
produce code comparable in efficiency to assembly language code. It would also reduce program size and save 
programming time. Code efficiency was a critical issue in those days and trumped improving the program-
mer interface. The room was hot and conference rooms and offices were not air-conditioned in those days. My 
informant said that during the presentation Von Neumann struggled to keep awake. After the presentation he 
voiced concern that introducing floating-point arithmetic capabilities into scientific calculations could cause 
people to lose control of error propagation, resulting in the possibility that buildings and bridges designed 
with the aid of computer analysis might collapse. But he concluded that it was probably worth trying. His tepid 
approval caused great anxiety in the Backus team, but the project was approved and, as they say, the rest is 
history. Fortran resulted in a huge increase in the computer market and it was clearly a “killer app”.
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Replacing fixed-point arithmetic with floating-point arithmetic was also a “killer app”. In writing a program 
with fixed word size and boundaries, the necessity to figure out where to put the decimal point in every piece 
of data, to get maximum precision, took enormous amounts of time. But he was right to worry about a poten-
tial problem. If in your program you subtracted two numbers of approximately equal size and either or both 
of these numbers contained a small error (experimental or round off), you would be left with a floating-point 
number that was all or almost all error. It was not uncommon for people to treat computer output as if it had 
been written by lightning on granite. When the IBM 704 computer was available in the late 50s at an IBM 
Service Bureau in Manhattan, IBM provided a small amount of free time to Columbia people. When you com-
piled a Fortran program on the machine, the signal that the compiler had successfully compiled your program, 
and that execution had begun, was the appearance of a “word overflow” error light on the console of the 704. 
Perhaps this was an accident or someone on the Backus team remembered that afternoon at the Watson Lab.
In those halcyon days there were several hundred users of the equipment at the Laboratory; you signed up for 
time a week in advance and, if you were lucky, you were allocated an hour or more each week of exclusive ac-
cess to a machine. People would hang around the Laboratory hoping that someone might not show up to use 
their time, and if someone ran over their time, cutting into your time, the verbal exchanges could get X-rated.
On one occasion, a mathematics professor was using his hour and seemed to experience serious anxiety that 
the card punch on the 650 would run out of blank cards. He nervously hopped up and down, and in the interval 
between cards being punched he would periodically quickly raise the hopper lid and flip a few new blank cards 
into the punch hopper. At the end of his allotted time he pulled his output from the card punch and observed 
that the decaled edge of the cards seemed to be randomly distributed in every corner of the deck. He had failed 
to feed all the cards face down, 12s-edge-first into the punch. It was an easy mistake to make. Every tabulating 
machine had a different rule for inserting cards; some face up, some face down, some 12s edge first, some 9s 
edge first. That’s why college graduates were hired to put cards into those machines. A card had a printed face 
with the decaled edge on the top left. The top of the card was called the 12s edge and the bottom was called the 
9s edge. I thought that the Professor was going to cry. He said, “I’ve wasted a whole week”! I told him that his 
output could still be rescued because the printer didn’t really care whether the cards were face up or face down 
and he could still print his output if he inserted the cards properly into the printer. He seemed very puzzled 
and held the thick deck of cards over his head turning and twisting the deck as he looked at it. He suddenly 
exclaimed, “That’s right, the holes go all the way through”! As he had this aha moment he flipped his hand 
and his output flew into the air and was distributed across the computer room floor. It was now my sad duty 
to inform him that he had indeed wasted a week. At the time I pondered whether his observation on the holes 
might serve as a starting point for a new computer-based academic discipline, but then dismissed the idea.
In 1960 IBM established a Systems Research Institute in Manhattan in a building across from the United Na-
tions for graduate-level training of its System Engineers. The first faculty, all part-time, included Fred Brooks 
who managed the development of the IBM 360 family of computers and its software, Ken Iverson who was the 
developer of the computer language APL, and me. I taught Numerical Analysis. This experience convinced 
me that there was an academic niche for studying computer-related issues in higher education that went well 
beyond the design of hardware. The first Computer Science Department established at a U.S. University was at 
Purdue in 1962.
So how important were computers to Columbia University in support of Research and Education in the 50s? 
There were a fair number of projects in the Social Sciences and a few at the Medical School that involved sta-
tistical calculations. There were a small number of projects in Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Engineering, 
Economics, and Geology, and a handful of projects from all the other disciplines at the University. Computers 
and computing tools were primitive and trying to analyze systems of any complexity was almost impossible. 
Problems involving ordinary differential equations or systems of linear equations began to come into range. 
Numerically solving partial differential equations except in a few rare cases was not possible. But with the ad-
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vent of electronic computers at the end of the decade, there were people who were beginning to dream about 
understanding things like the weather, and the structure of molecules. There was a programming course at 
the Watson Lab taught by the legendary Eric Hankam for IBM’s scientific customers that Columbia students 
could enroll in, and I taught a course in Numerical Analysis for the Mathematics Department. But computing 
instruction involved only a small number of students. This situation changed dramatically in the next decade.
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Chapter 2
Computing at Columbia University in the 1960s
About 1961 IBM decided to move its education program located at the Watson Lab to upstate New York and 
to close the Computing Laboratory at the Watson Laboratory. It negotiated with Columbia University a plan 
for Columbia to build its own Computing Center. I began exploring various job opportunities at a number of 
places. One day I received a call from an architectural firm asserting that they were designing an underground 
computer center building for Columbia and they had been told that they needed to consult with me if they 
had any design questions. I had heard nothing about this from Columbia but told them that I would be glad to 
help. About a month later I received a call from a Columbia Dean saying that he would like to talk to me. At 
the meeting he said that after consulting with a number of people, Columbia wanted to hire me as the Director 
of the new Columbia Center. I agreed to serve as Acting Director for a year while I continued to explore other 
opportunities, some of which were very interesting. 
As construction of the underground building that would house the Center started, I needed to hire a staff and 
prepare for the delivery of an IBM 7090 and IBM 1401. The 7090 was a computer designed for scientific calcu-
lations and in it transistors had replaced vacuum tubes. The role of the 1401 was to prepare batch input tapes 
for the 7090 and to print output from tapes produced by the 7090. In looking for staff there were not a lot of 
experienced people around. I hired a few people from the Watson Lab staff, some very bright Columbia and 
Barnard graduates with no computing experience, and an operator with IBM 704 experience. We studied the 
manuals describing the Fortran Monitor system and had help from some very good IBM system engineers. 
Over time we developed a world-class staff. When I became manager of the Watson Lab Computing Center in 
1957, I asked Wallace Eckert, the Director of the Watson Laboratory, for advice on managing people. He said: 
“Just hire good people and keep out of their way”. His office was in a building one block from the Computing 
Lab and he would appear at the Computer Lab about once a year and mumble something to the staff about our 
doing a good job, and disappear for another year. I tried to follow his advice on management during my entire 
career.
I was The Director of Computing at Columbia from 1962 to 1971. During that period equipment was upgraded 
about every two years. The 7090 became a 7094; a 7040 was added and connected to the 7094; a 360/50 and a 
360/75 replaced the 7094-7040 system to form a 360/75 and 360/50 coupled system; and a 360/91 was added 
and attached to the 360/75, displacing the 360/50. Operating systems changed apace.
The 7090 was capable of executing 100,000 floating-point operations per second and had a list cost of $2.9 mil-
lion. Universities, however, enjoyed a 60% IBM educational discount. The 360/91 was about 50 times faster and 
the list cost of a complete system ranged between $15 and $20 million. In 1965 Herb Grosch stated Grosch’s 
law: Computer performance increases by the square of the cost. This became the basic argument for Univer-
sities to operate a large central computer. You got more bang for the buck with a faster computer. With the 
development of computers on a chip and microcomputers, Grosch’s law was superseded about 1980 by Moore’s 
law. Moore’s law stated that the number of transistors on silicon chips doubles approximately every two years. 
Gordon Moore also stated this law in 1965.
During the transition from the Fortran Monitor System to IBSYS on the IBM 7094, a hacker helped us. One 
night a message was printed out on the console of the 7094 that said, “The phantom strikes”, and all of the tape 
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drives were rewound past their load point and the tape ends were left unattached to their rewind reels and dan-
gling in their columns. There was no way the hardware was supposed to let that happen. 
The tape drives were attached to a channel control box, which had a wired-in program controlling the drives, 
and the 7094 sent instructions to the channel program directing its tape control actions. Ken Iverson had writ-
ten an APL description of the channel program and apparently some student had read it. In this case a student 
had discovered that if a tape was at its load-point marker, and a set of cleverly designed 7094 instructions were 
sent to the channel-control program with precisely timed delays between those instructions, the channel pro-
gram began looking for the load mark on the tape after the tape had already coasted past it. A rewind instruc-
tion then brought the tape off its rewind reel.
At the time we were running Fortran monitor batches and IBSYS batches with the operators dismounting 
and mounting the system’s tapes between running each batch. IBSYS enabled running a number of additional 
applications not available under the Fortran Monitor System. With the discovery of this bug, which had now 
become a “feature”, we were able to put both operating systems on the same tape—separated by load and end 
tape markers—and include IBSYS and Fortran jobs in one batch, with the system spacing over the load and 
end of tape marks to the system called for by a program without changing any of the instructions in either 
operating system. Over the years, a number of computer bugs were reclassified as features. A few years later I 
taught a course in operating systems for the Electrical Engineering Department and there were students in my 
class who were smart enough to become world-class hackers. Operating systems contained hundreds of thou-
sands of instructions with the number increasing rapidly. Removing all vulnerabilities was impossible. There 
were always a few students who wanted to “make their bones”, to use a Mafia term, by bringing the system 
down and I was teaching them what they needed to know to do it. A University Computing Center Director at 
a meeting once advised his fellow Directors that if they caught a good hacker, hire him or her. I found this to 
be very sound advice. 
Computers at that time had very small main memories with access times measured in microseconds supported 
by secondary storage like disks, drums, and tapes with access times measured in milliseconds to seconds. In 
order to increase throughput, evolving operating systems tried to hold multiple programs in main memory so 
that when one program was retrieving data on a secondary storage device, the computer could switch to run 
another program in memory that was ready to run. This strategy greatly complicated operating systems.
When the IBM system 360 was introduced, its operating system OS/360 provided multiple options for 
multi-tasking. Unfortunately, it took a long time to get most of the bugs out of the system and University en-
vironments being very diverse, experienced many more system crashes than commercial sites. A system crash 
meant taking and printing a memory dump, identifying the program causing the crash in order to remove it, 
and restarting the batch. This process took many minutes of time. The systems group was then tasked with 
finding the bug and removing it. Users of the Computer Center measured service quality by turnaround time, 
the time between job submission and receipt of program output, and crashes were very bad for turnaround 
time. This was a miserable time to be managing a University Computer Center. 
Users of large-scale IBM scientific computers had a user group called SHARE. In the 60s I chaired the univer-
sity’s SHARE group. Universities were always willing to share useful software and SHARE meetings were a 
place to learn about interesting applications being developed at other Universities. Technical attendees shared 
information on operating system bugs and the problems associated with installing updates to the operating 
system. These updates were frequent and sometimes affected many users, which did not make them happy. At 
Universities, major system upgrades were almost always scheduled for August when most faculty members 
were away. This had the consequence that some faculty would return in September, tanned and eager to resume 
their research and instruction, only to discover that, as President Nixon once said, “the information you have 
been given is no longer operational”. 
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Every evening most of the SHARE attendees would convene in a large space to attend an informal event called 
SKIDS. At the center of the meeting space were tables full of booze and ice. Information exchanges at that event 
were often very useful. I quickly learned that the stress associated with the conversion to OS/360 in Industry 
was almost equal to that at Universities. We had less control over our users and a lot more crashes. You could 
approximately measure a person’s stress level by how long they stayed at SKIDS. Late one evening at SKIDS, 
a person who managed computing at an insurance company told me that the Vice President for Marketing 
had a year earlier proposed to the Board that they augment the customer account number by a digit to record 
policy-holder characteristics that would aid marketing. When a board member asked if that would screw up 
data processing, the Marketing Vice President replied, “Hell, its just another hole in a card”. There was also the 
annual Ivy League Chowder and Marching Society’s meeting of Ivy League Computer Center Directors. The 
rate of change in membership in that Society was also a good measure of the stress. At the meetings, members 
of the Society would estimate how many steps ahead of the hangman they were at their institution. This gener-
ally averaged to about half a step.
In the 60s it became possible to connect printing typewriter terminals to computers, and later CRT (Cathode 
Ray Tube) terminals. Those terminals enabled programmers to bypass keypunches and produce, edit, and sub-
mit their programs directly to the batch and retrieve output to a terminal. These terminals could be hardwired 
to a computer by connecting twisted-pair wire from the terminal to the computer, or they could be connected 
over telephone lines using modems. The modems were acoustic couplers that you inserted your telephone re-
ceiver into and they converted an analog signal into a digital signal. It was easy enough to connect terminals at 
the computer center, and a terminal room was created, but challenging to hardwire terminals in remote build-
ings to the center. Columbia had heating tunnels bringing steam to buildings on the main campus and they 
contained steam pipes wrapped with an insulator that I hope was not asbestos. In any event it was reported to 
me that in the dead of night, armed with a flashlight, a staple gun, and a wheel of twisted-pair, unidentified 
people would staple twisted-pair to the back of the pipes out of sight and bring the wire to the basement of 
buildings where unindicted co-conspirators from a Department were waiting. This was probably a violation of 
some code but evidently there were people on campus who believed that if the end doesn’t justify the means, 
what the hell does, or something like that. Several decades later it became necessary for many Universities to 
rewire their entire campus to accommodate computers, but the 60s were the dawn of the remote computing 
revolution.
Computer terminals enabled the next major advance in computer operating systems, this one called time-shar-
ing. MIT had developed a time-sharing system in the early 1960s called CTSS that ran on a 7090 that was 
not capable of supporting a large number of users. Much more ambitious undertakings were started at MIT 
(MULTICS) and at Dartmouth (DTSS) in the middle 60s on hardware more amenable to the task. The goal 
was to provide a large number of users with shared terminal access to a computer with real time interaction. 
These systems, installed at a number of Universities, were very successful in environments where most users 
ran small programs. This was a characteristic of most instructional computing. But alas, in environments 
where research, administrative, and educational users shared a large central computer, some running very 
large programs, a time-shared computer could spend most of its time rolling these big programs in and out of 
memory from secondary storage and throughput was hurt. Throughput still trumped user ease of use almost 
everywhere. Columbia did not adopt time-sharing because very large research and administrative programs 
were a big part of the load. Computer courses used fast Fortran and PL1 compilers developed at Waterloo, Pur-
due, and Cornell to support instructional computing. Terminal support programs like Wilbur from Stanford 
enabled users that had access to terminals to enter, edit, and submit jobs and to retrieve output from a terminal, 
which provided some of the convenience of time-sharing without its inefficiencies. 
Terminal access enabled the dawn of the age of social computing. Users were assigned a small amount of online 
space to store the programs that they were editing and some data. An encryption capability was provided so 
that sensitive information, like medical data containing patient names, could be protected. I was told that the 
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gay community at Columbia was using this capability to support a dating service. You “friended” someone by 
giving him or her the password and encryption key to the file. The encryption key was called the magic word. I 
was also told that the students involved in the 1969 insurrection at Columbia used this capability to coordinate 
their activities.
Computer Literacy
As the 60s advanced Universities began to recognize that computers and computing were an important area of 
instruction and research. At Columbia, a programming course that I taught in the Electrical Engineering De-
partment attracted hundreds of students each semester. The term “Computer Literacy” became an important 
issue for discussion, although a lot of people didn’t understand what it meant and some regarded the phrase 
as a linguistic barbarism. An attempt at a simple explanation of the term follows. If you look at the content of 
papers in academic journals, you will find that there is a hierarchy of languages used to describe the system be-
ing studied. For relatively simple systems there may be a lot of mathematics in the paper, because mathematics 
permits the description of systems without ambiguity. If you are mathematically illiterate, however, there are 
papers containing mathematics that you will not be able to understand. Papers describing systems too complex 
for mathematical description usually employed technical English and ordinary English to convey the points 
trying to be made, but ambiguity is embedded in both. Linguists point to as simple a sentence as “Mary had 
a little lamb”. This could mean: Mary owned a little lamb, Mary ate a little lamb, or Mary had sex with a little 
lamb. People whose native language is English, but who are illiterate, are unable to read and understand the 
knowledge contained in papers written in English. The new languages in the language hierarchy enabled by 
computers are formal or computer languages. By combining mathematics and logic, these languages make it 
possible to describe complex systems without ambiguity, and they enable analyzing systems too complex for 
mathematical description. They also enable the capturing of intelligence that can be applied to a broad range of 
problems. Thus, understanding how to model systems employing a computer language is a literacy issue and an 
invaluable capability for any well-educated person. Farther down the language hierarchy are papers employing 
metaphors and poetry to describe systems as complex as humans. Maybe the hierarchy should be inverted with 
poetry at the top and mathematics at the bottom.
In the late 60s a faculty colleague in Electrical Engineering and I wrote a letter to the Provost at Columbia tell-
ing him why we thought it was important for Columbia to consider creating a Computer Science Department. 
He sent us a two-sentence response: “How can you create a science around a device? If computer science, why 
not X-ray science?” Columbia did not get around to creating a Computer Science Department until 1979. When 
I was very young, I asked my grandfather at the depth of the Great Depression if he had had a tough life. He 
replied: “During my life I’ve learned that you lose some and you lose some. You have to learn to take the bitter 
with the unpleasant”. 
Columbia University had started a Seminar Program some years earlier that involved inviting people outside 
of Columbia to meet with Columbia people to get a varied perspective on some subject. The seminars were re-
corded and the discussions transcribed with the notion that at some point a book could be created. There was 
one at that time dealing with criminal justice. Outside members included former criminals as well as members 
of the criminal justice system to get a varied perspective.
In the late 60s Ted Bashkow from Electrical Engineering and I created a Seminar on the Impact of Computers 
on Society. Outside members came from as far away as Brookhaven, Yorktown, and the Bell Labs. The Seminar 
members would meet at the bar in the Faculty Club about 6 PM and would shortly adjourn to a conference 
room to hear a speaker. The Faculty club had a bartender who asked me what I would like to drink the first time 
I showed up at the bar. The second time he simply asked: “The usual Dr. King?” After that he would prepare 
my drink and hand it to me as I reached the bar saying simply “Good evening Dr. King”. He set a standard for 
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service that I have never seen equaled. About 1970, we invited the Provost to speak at the Seminar. To our great 
surprise, he said that he was willing to participate in a discussion on the impact of computers on Society with 
the members of our Seminar. He turned out to be a very charming person full of amusing anecdotes. We talked 
about Computers and Society but not about the subject of the earlier letter. It was the first and only time I ever 
met him. I came away wondering if, instead of reporting at the level of buildings and grounds, I reported at a 
level where I had more frequent access to him, if I could have changed his views. About 25 years after I left Co-
lumbia I was invited to speak at the Seminar. I was astonished to hear that it had survived all of the intervening 
years and accepted the invitation. As I approached the bar at the Faculty club at 6 PM the Bartender said: “The 
usual, Dr. King?” This exchange erased all of the bad memories I had of some of the events that had occurred 
during my Columbia years.
Speaking of bad memories, I will now turn to the subject of how computers were financed at Columbia. When 
the center was started, Princeton and Columbia argued that access to computers was as important to research-
ers as access to the library and, like the library, computer costs should be put in the indirect cost pool and not 
charged directly to Federal grants. They secured agreement to this practice and users of the Center were not 
be charged for computer time while this agreement was in effect. Once a year a Federal Auditor would show 
up at the center to look at time records to determine if the University was correctly including time used by 
researchers with research grants in its indirect cost pool. We maintained a closet with monthly computer time 
use records by project and jobs run. In a year’s time the stack of printer output paper was about 6 feet high. 
When the auditor arrived we would offer to transport the stack to the conference room if that would be more 
convenient for his analysis. He always responded, “I don’t think that that will be necessary”, and left after look-
ing at the stack for a few minutes. In fact Columbia was always totally honest in allocating computer time to 
the indirect cost pool. 
In 1967 the Government decided that it would no longer accept inclusion of computer costs in the indirect cost 
pool. Research grants had to be charged directly for computer time. This change lead to the end of “civilization” 
as we knew it. Many researchers had small grants that could not be augmented to include their computer costs. 
For others it was easier to get one time money to buy a mini-computer than to get recurring funds for computer 
time. When computer time seemed free, other researchers did not consider the issue of whether or not a dedi-
cated computer that they controlled would make them more productive than standing in line at the computer 
center. They now considered that question and frequently the answer was “yes”, owning their own computer 
would make them more productive. Thus the “computer wars” began. The University decided that buying a 
departmental or project computer was forbidden unless a petitioner could prove to me that there was no way to 
solve their problem at the Center. This put me squarely between former faculty friends and the administration. 
Computer wars were common at a number of Universities. Their Computing Directors were often among the 
SKIDS attendees that closed the bar.
I recall a few other inharmonious events during my years at Columbia. In the first winter in the new under-
ground computer center we discovered that the string of offices down a hallway were all in the same heating 
zone. At one end of the hallway was my office, which was over a loading dock. At the other end of the hallway 
was a conference room over a University heating plant. In order to keep the temperature in the conference 
room at 85 degrees, the temperature in my office had to be about 55 degrees. The staff with offices close to mine 
wore coats. The staff with an office close to the conference room wore tee shirts. I wrote a letter to the firm that 
had designed and built the center demanding that they fix this problem. I received a response telling me that 
they were no longer responsible for building problems. 
I responded with a letter telling them that I was, at my own expense, commissioning the Long Island Casket 
Company to create a bronze plaque to be hung in the computer reception room. The plaque would simply state: 
To commemorate the nobility of their firm, and below that the date on their letter denying responsibility. I 
stated in the letter that when visitors, humble and distinguished, visited the center and asked what the firm 
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had done to merit this distinction, we would tell them. I ended the letter by stating that it was my hope that 
in the years ahead, when Columbia men gathered in the evening over cigars and brandy, and the conversation 
turned to great feats of engineering, their firm would be remembered. Shortly later I received a call from the 
firm telling me that they would, at their expense, fix the problem in about 3 months time. The caller then said 
that he hoped that I would still be there when the fix was completed. I told him that if freed from my Univer-
sity responsibilities, I would have plenty of time to explore whether or not the anecdotal value of this episode 
merited inclusion in the Talk of the Town section of the New Yorker magazine. He hung up. A short time later 
I received a communication from the Trustees telling me that they had sole approval authority over all com-
memorative plaques hung in University buildings. This was the only contact that I ever had with the Trustees 
of Columbia University.
One day the computer receptionist threw open my office door and shouted, “There is a nut in the computer 
room with a knife threatening the operators”! I immediately tried to reach security but their line was busy. As 
I kept trying, the lights on two other lines on my phone started flashing. My secretary had run to the computer 
room to witness what was happening. In those days there were lights for each incoming telephone line on your 
phone. The lights told you whether the line was free, busy, or if it was flashing someone was trying to reach you 
on that line. Compulsively I hit the button on one of the flashing lines and recognized the voice of the faculty 
member calling me. I said: “I can’t talk to you now Bill, there is a nut in the computer room with a knife and 
I’m trying to reach security but their line is busy”. His response was: “this will only take a minute”. 
On another occasion, the IBM 360/91 began crashing with a mean time to failure of about 30 minutes. The IBM 
Customer Engineers that were resident at the center claimed that it must be the software. The Columbia sys-
tems programmers claimed it must be the hardware, because they had not changed the software. This kind of 
finger pointing was not uncommon. After a few hours the Customer Engineers agreed that it must be the hard-
ware. After working and watching crashes the rest of the day, the Customer Engineers escalated the problem 
to the Region, and a new set of Engineers arrived the following day. After these Engineers worked for a time 
they escalated the problem to a higher level and another new set of Engineers arrived. This set concluded that 
the problem was in a specific box but running their hardware diagnostics they couldn’t find any problem with 
the box. On the third day a chauffeur driven limousine arrived carrying the designer of the box. He entered the 
computer room smoking a cigar and asked to see the log that the Customer Engineers kept of every hardware 
maintenance change. After looking at the log for a minute he pointed to a line in the log, uttered a couple of 
sentences to an engineer and started to leave. I shouted: “You can’t leave until you’re sure it’s fixed”! He ignored 
me and departed. Five minutes later the computer was back up and running and a Customer Engineer handed 
me a one-inch wire. Removing the wire had solved the problem.
About 30 years later I got a call from a lady who was studying some recently declassified documents. In a doc-
ument, Isador Rabi, a Nobel Prize winning physicist at Columbia, had warned the Government that computer 
hardware could be very unreliable and pointed to an event at Columbia in which a computer had been down 
for three days. She asked: “What was that all about?”
In 1969 there was a student insurrection on campus demonstrating against the Vietnam War. Students took 
over some buildings and the President called in the New York City police. The police wielded their batons on 
student heads and the consequence was that many uninvolved students, shocked by the sight of students stag-
gering out of buildings with blood streaming out of their heads joined the insurrection and more buildings 
were taken over. At this point the President evidently decided that calling in the police was not a good idea and 
a stalemate resulted with students hanging out the windows of occupied buildings shouting defiance. I recall 
seeing a student standing on the lawn outside one of the buildings holding a sign that said: “Sarah, don’t forget 
to take your pill”. The Computer Center was largely locked down but I, standing at the entrance with an armed 
campus policeman, let in trusted users. 
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The FBI evidently had a wire on one of the members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and it was 
reported to me that at an SDS meeting a member proposed pouring iron filings into the core memory of our 
machines on the grounds that we were doing classified research. Fortunately for us, another high-level SDS 
member was a chemistry graduate student whom I permitted to spend the night in the center with a small 
number of other students who were trying to solve “very big problems”. I was told that he vehemently asserted 
that he lived at the Center and we were not doing classified research. Some days earlier he had asked me why 
a cover had been put over a printer by a user who stood at the printer to secure his output as it was printed. 
I explained that the man standing at the printer was a psychiatrist from the Medical School and the output 
he was protecting contained transcripts of patient sessions. The psychiatrist resembled Sigmund Freud. I was 
informed that the student persuaded the SDS to drop the iron-filing plan. 
One of the pleasures of managing computing at a University was that it provided a window into a broad range 
of research on very interesting things. Lunch at the Faculty Club with other faculty was often particularly 
interesting. On one occasion there had been a headline that day in the student newspaper that said: “Barnard 
girls not worth losing sleep over”. That precipitated a discussion at lunch over whether or not undergraduate in-
struction at a men’s college needed to include training on how to deal with women. One of the faculty members 
present said that men were untrained in issues that went well beyond how to deal with women and proposed 
developing a curriculum in Life Science. We agreed to meet periodically to discuss what might go into such 
a curriculum. One of the members, Professor Levine from Mathematical Statistics, developed an algorithm 
for optimally selecting a spouse. The prescription in the algorithm was that you begin by choosing a number 
n, which was the number of women you were prepared to court. Then you divided that number by e (one of 
my favorite numbers) the base of the natural logarithm system and rounded up to the next integer. You then 
courted n/e. However, you didn’t marry any of them, but you remembered the best one. Now you continued to 
court until you found a better one and married her. I found that this was an excellent algorithm for selecting 
a new apartment to rent in New York City or for finding a building in which to put a Computer Center. It was 
the sole output of the effort to create a curriculum in life science.
Impact of computing technology changes
So what impact did computing technology changes have on Columbia University in the decade between the 
end of the 50s and the end of the 60s? The percent of faculty involved with computing grew from perhaps 2% 
to I would guess about 20%. All of the science departments now had some faculty whose research depended on 
computing. The Biology Department, relatively new to computing use, had faculty undertaking big computer 
projects. The use of computers in the Business School and at the Medical College had grown substantially. 
The availability of statistical packages caused a dramatic growth in Social Science computing. There was an 
occasional project in the Humanities enabled by a new programming language called Lisp. Problems that 
were a dream at the end of the 50s were now being tackled. They included modeling the structure of the earth 
using seismographic data, trying to understand climate and weather, and programs designed to understand 
the forces holding molecules together. Two Columbia faculty members involved with computing at that time, 
Martin Karplus and William Vickrey, went on to win Nobel Prizes, and if there had been a Nobel Prize in 
Geology, it almost certainly would have been won by Jack Oliver, who proved that the Pacific volcanic ring of 
fire was caused by one tectonic plate sliding under another. Computer courses had large and rapidly growing 
enrollments.
These changes were enabled by substantial improvement in hardware performance made possible by the tran-
sition from vacuum tubes to transistors. Computers were now capable of executing up to 10 million instruc-
tions per second. A hardware designer at this time told me that instead of resting at the end of the 6th day, he 
wished that God had worked on a better velocity of light. Physicists later determined that a slight change in the 
velocity of light would have caused the big bang to terminate in a black hole. The velocity of light created an 
upper limit on the speed of a computer circuit. Main memories were still small relative to the requirements of 
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many problems and secondary, random-access storage devices were slow and lacked capacity. Magnetic tapes 
were still the primary bulk storage medium. Improvements in operating systems significantly improved job 
throughput. The availability of terminals connected to computers enabled the eventual elimination of punched 
cards as the program input medium and substantially improved the human-computer interface. Institutions 
that could use time-sharing systems experienced significantly improved programmer productivity and quickly 
were able to get a majority of faculty and students involved with computing. It had begun to be clear to me that 
Universities running batch processing systems would have a tough time moving the percentage of faculty using 
computers above 20%.
There was a proliferation of new computer languages, some like Lisp directed toward a class of applications. A 
burning question became “would third-generation languages like Algol or PL1 replace Fortran as the work-
horse language at Universities?” That question persisted as new third generation languages like Pascal appeared 
and the answer was always “no”. A joke current at the time had a computer scientist climbing to the top of a 
mountain and shouting heavenward, “Will any computer language ever replace Fortran?” A voice came down 
from the heavens and said: “Yes, but not in your lifetime”. And then the scientist asked: “Will Universities ever 
appreciate the importance of computing to the University?” And the voice came down from the heavens and 
said: “Yes, but not in my lifetime”. General purpose packages such as SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) and database management software became available that significantly improved programmer pro-
ductivity in some application areas. Keeping up with new program acronyms became a real challenge. At one 
meeting I raised my hand and told the speaker that I did not understand his 3la’s. He asked: “What’s a 3la?” I 
replied, “a 3-letter acronym”. 
In 1970 the Federal Government seriously reduced funding to agencies supporting research at Universities. 
This produced a serious problem at Columbia because the salaries of many faculty members with Research 
Grants were partially funded by their Grants and many of these faculty members had tenure. One proposed 
solution to the resulting budget deficit was to cut the budget of administrative services at the University across 
the board by 10%. Another proposal from some faculty members in Arts and Sciences was to eliminate the 
School of Engineering. The University Board of Trustees opted for the 10% solution. One consequence of the 
dispute was that some members of the faculty in the School of Engineering vowed to never again speak to fac-
ulty members supporting the elimination of the School. At the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Com-
puter Center, I met a former colleague in the Electrical Engineering Department who informed me that he had 
remained true to his vow. The Computer Center was an administrative service and the only way to reduce the 
budget was to fire staff. The staff at this time was not large and many members worked many more than the 40 
hours a week that they were paid for. Woe is me!
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Chapter 3
Computing at City University of New York in the 1970s
At that time City University of New York (CUNY) had just committed to open admissions and the student 
population in its 19 colleges was in the process of doubling to more than 250,000 students. Any New York 
City student who graduated from high school was guaranteed a seat in one of its Community Colleges or its 
Senior Colleges. One day I received a call from a CUNY Vice Chancellor telling me that he would appreciate 
the opportunity to talk to me. When I arrived he announced that the computing situation at the University 
was desperate and they needed me to fix it. He offered me an appointment as a University Dean. Once again I 
was offered a job without an interview. In the discussion that followed, he told me that there were no computer 
wars. Faculty members were free to buy any computer that their grants would fund. Second, that the highest 
priority at the University was instructional support, followed by enough administrative computing to keep the 
University afloat. Almost all of the Colleges had small computers supporting administrative computing, but a 
couple of new colleges would need help. There was no immediate crisis but there were clouds on the horizon. 
Administrative Computing reported to me at Columbia and I knew that some of those clouds could be pretty 
black for a rapidly expanding University. 
The most attractive feature of the job offer to me was that it rescued me from my Columbia dilemma. If I took 
the job I could bring with me all the Columbia people that I was faced with firing. But before accepting the job 
offer I said that I would develop a plan and if the plan were funded I would accept his offer. I knew the comput-
er time used by a Columbia student in a computer course, and multiplied that by a generous estimate of how 
many CUNY students would be computing if CUNY had a robust computer literacy program. That load alone 
required two large mainframes. With that capacity we could also support research and administrative comput-
ing with no problem. I prepared a budget and the Vice Chancellor explained that the funds needed would not 
be a problem, because the City had increased the Universities’ budget substantially to support open admissions. 
He walked me in to talk to the Chancellor, Robert Kibbee, who assured me that he would support my plan. I 
agreed to accept the job. I thought about how I would tell the Vice President that I reported to at Columbia that 
I was leaving Columbia. One idea that crossed my mind was that I would start by telling him that I had some 
good news and some very good news. The good news was that he would have no problem in achieving a 10% 
reduction in the Computer Center budget. The very good news was that I was resigning. But I couldn’t do that. 
I had many great memories of my time at Columbia and I was sad to leave.
I quickly learned that there was one more hurdle at CUNY. All computer acquisitions needed to be approved 
by someone in the Mayor’s Office of the Budget, who ran a data processing operation on a small IBM 1410 
computer. Above the door to an office he shared with his deputy was a sign that read: “Abandon all hope ye 
who enter here” (my memory may be a little vague on this point). The Vice Chancellor arranged for him and 
me to meet with the Mayor’s Director of the Office of the Budget. The Director was a graduate of City College 
and a jovial fun person to deal with. He agreed that I would have no problems getting any needed acquisition 
approvals from the city.
My immediate problem was to hire some key staff members and to find a site for the computer equipment 
that I ordered a few days after I started working at CUNY. After looking at n/e possible sites for the Computer 
Center, I found a new building on 57th St and 11th Avenue that had vacant upper floors that were for rent. The 
building had large windows with a magnificent view up and down the Hudson and of Hoboken, New Jersey. 
After living in a cave during my Columbia years I was determined that the new Center would have windows. 
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We rented space on the 16th floor and the landlord took responsibility for renovating it to our specifications 
with the cost being included in the rent. I could not in good conscience hire senior members of the Columbia 
staff. That could lead to chaos at Columbia. Among the junior staff, Ira Fuchs was a big picture person who was 
innovative, creative, and very technologically informed. He had been the person responsible for bringing Wil-
bur and Orville from Stanford to Columbia. He was the most informed person at Columbia about networking 
problems. Connecting computers at 19 colleges, and to a huge number of terminals distributed across the 5 
Boroughs of New York City, to the new CUNY Center was going to be challenging. I was confident that if any-
one could solve that problem it would be Ira. He had had no management experience but that was a problem 
easy to solve. I could tell him to just hire good people and keep out of their way. I hired Ira as Director of the 
new Center. Ira recruited a number of other junior Columbia employees who were highly talented. To reach 
the 10% budget cut goal, Columbia did not need to fire any Computer Center employees. They did not replace 
me for two years. I began to believe that I had not left a vacancy. A decade later, Ira undertook the challenge of 
connecting terminals and computers all over the world when he started Bitnet.
I had now embarked on a new career as a University bureaucrat. As a University Dean I was a member of the 
Chancellor’s cabinet. My office at CUNY headquarters on 80th Street in Manhattan was several doors down 
from the Chancellor’s. At his cabinet meetings I learned about the important things happening at the Universi-
ty. Most of the time the Chancellor just wanted to talk about the educational issues associated with welcoming 
thousands of new students to the University, many of them needing remedial instruction. At the midpoint in 
my career at CUNY I was promoted to Vice Chancellor, and Institutional Research and Television were added 
to my responsibilities. The Institutional Research Office was staffed with social scientists who evaluated ed-
ucational experiments and programs across the University. The Television Office provided television services 
across the University and supported an experiment enabling students at four Colleges to take courses offered 
at another college connected by television links. Now a conglomerate, I recalled a Bob Newhart line about the 
confidence he felt when he flew on an airline run by the Thompkins Airline and Storm Door Manufacturing 
Company.
The social scientists discovered, among other things, that teaching via television worked as well as teaching 
with all the students in one classroom. The remote classrooms had a telephone link to the instructor, and the 
instructor could see the student asking the question on his or her television screen. However, the cost of tele-
vision links was too high to support extending this experiment. An attempt to teach students a subject with 
computer terminals also produced interesting results. In a mathematics course it was learned that about 75% of 
the students succeeded in passing the course, but about 25% hated it and did not do well. In another analysis, it 
was learned that female students from deeply impoverished neighborhoods did much better than males from 
the same neighborhood. In particular, a single parent mother on welfare did much better than her male peers 
with a similar high school record. By controlling for as many variables as they could think of, they concluded 
that this result could only be explained by motivation.
When I arrived at CUNY I recruited a very talented group of people to modernize the Universities’ adminis-
trative systems. Some of the systems they created survived for more than 30 years after I left CUNY. I spent a 
lot of time traveling to the Colleges to talk to administrators at all levels, faculty, and occasionally to students. 
This meant that I spent a lot of time in New York City traffic. As a perk, I had exclusive use of a City-owned car 
with City license plates. Those plates enabled me to park anywhere in the city without fear of getting towed for 
illegal parking. On one occasion my car broke down on the Long Island Expressway. I abandoned it and an-
other car was delivered to me. Occasionally I would visit the Computer Center, which was an oasis away from 
the many problems dealt with by the people at 80th Street. I discovered that the overhead associated with being 
a bureaucrat was very high and not a lot of fun. In particular, trying to move hundreds of faculty that didn’t 
report to me was like trying to herd cats. 
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New York City Goes Broke
As the old saw goes: “Cheer up, things could be worse! So I cheered up and sure enough things got worse”! In 
the summer of 1975 it was discovered that the City was on the brink of defaulting on its bonds. The Federal 
Government and the State stepped in and imposed stiff conditions for guaranteeing the City loans to avoid de-
fault. An Emergency Financial Control Board was created by the State Legislature to review and approve every 
financial decision by the City. Employees of CUNY were not paid for several weeks until the State relieved the 
City of responsibility for funding the Senior Colleges and assumed control. CUNY had been tuition free since 
its creation. The State and City decided to end that practice.
In the fall of 1975 the Chancellor informed me that Abe Beame, the Mayor, had called him and that the Mayor 
would like to talk to me that afternoon. I traveled down to City Hall and the Mayor told me that consultants 
had reviewed the City’s computing infrastructure and concluded that it needed a lot of fixing. In particular 
the computers in the City did not talk to each other, and worst of all the Budget Office computer didn’t talk to 
the Controller’s computer. The Mayor controlled the city budget and the Controller paid the bills and did the 
accounting. The Mayor and Controller were independently elected officials. The inability of the Budget com-
puters to talk to the Controllers’ computers was a major source of the City’s financial problems. They recom-
mended the City create an Office of Computer Plans and Controls to fix these problems. He said that the Chan-
cellor had agreed to loan me to the City if I were willing to head this office. I assumed that I had been selected 
because I would be free, and of course everyone knows that you get what you pay for. After a moment or two 
of contemplation I decided to accept this task because it might have high anecdotal value, and it certainly did. 
While Abe Beame was Mayor I reported to him. When Ed Koch succeeded him on January 1, 1976, he creat-
ed an Office of Operations, reporting to him, which consisted of 30 high-level executives on loan from major 
New York City corporations. The lending corporation paid their salary just as CUNY paid mine. The task of 
this group was to look at every operation in the City for opportunities to find cost savings through improved 
efficiency and reorganization. Lee Oberst from AT&T was appointed as the Director of the Office. I became 
attached to the Office as Deputy Director. Lee was an efficiency expert. He believed that in analyzing an op-
eration you started with the people at the bottom of the organization who were doing the work. You watched 
them work and measured their output and compared it to that of commercial company employees doing the 
same work. You also looked for ways to increase their productivity. You then worked your way up the organi-
zation toward its top management with the goal of streamlining it. The last person you talked to was the person 
managing the whole operation. Needless to say, this created great anxiety among City Managers at every level. 
The first assignment for two members of our group was to follow garbage trucks on their collection routes. 
They discovered that there were some trucks that deposited almost as much garbage on the city streets as they 
collected. The result of their work was the reduction of staff on each truck by one, and instead of enjoying a 
couple of weeks off following a heavy snow storm because the streets were impassable, garbage trucks were 
fitted with plows and when it snowed they were out plowing their routes. A few years earlier, after a heavy snow 
storm, the New York Times interviewed a person in Queens two weeks after the storm, who said: “The only 
thing moving out here are the children”. With 4000 garbage trucks equipped with plows that never happened 
again. However, for some inexplicable reason, the image of high-level executives in expensive black suits, white 
shirts, and expensive ties following garbage trucks and lurking in halls at night to watch janitors still causes me 
to chuckle. But amazing things were learned and lots of things changed. 
I did not have to watch civil service programmers to know that they were not up to the task of rewriting the 
City’s administrative systems. At CUNY I had succeeded in getting all the programmers that I hired classified 
as academic support staff to avoid the necessity of hiring people bound by civil service rules. During my two 
years at the City, all system design and programming work for the City was contracted to commercial com-
panies. Armies of programmers across the country were hired to rewrite all the key systems and a number of 
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new programs that emerged from the work of the Office of Operations. We worked long days. Lee convened 
meetings of our group at 6 AM or 7 PM so that no one could claim a competing commitment. 
After my appointment as czar of computing I began working on a plan to fix computing in New York City. 
Consulting the best minds at CUNY, Ira Fuchs and Mel Ferentz, a computer scientist from Brooklyn College, 
we worked on a plan for supporting a transaction-intensive environment. Mel and Ira and I had earlier worked 
together to bring Unix to CUNY. I signed the first contract exporting Unix from Bell Labs to a University. At 
that time the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) was developing an operating system that could support 
an extend-able bunch of Vax computers on a ring network. The system was specifically designed to support 
transaction-intensive environments. It looked like a winner. I developed a Vaxen plan and asked Lee to check 
it out with the people at Bell Labs. He reported that they loved it. I asked Lee to join me in visiting DEC to see 
what state the system was in. At DEC headquarters their systems and sales people told us how awesome it was. 
Remembering the first two years of OS/360, I then asked if the company would be prepared to guarantee that 
it would work reliably from day one. After some discussion the sales people decided to bring Ken Olsen, DEC 
CEO, into the discussion to close the deal. They huddled with Ken outside the door to our conference room and 
explained the deal to him. After about 5 minutes Ken opened the door, looked at us, and uttered a single word: 
“No”! It was back to the drawing board.
I then designed a system built around large IBM mainframes. I had no problem getting the Mayor, Controller, 
and City Council to approve the plan. I then did my n/e thing and found a great site for a new NYC Computer 
Center. The site on 10th Street had formerly been a bus terminal. It had elevators designed to transport buses 
from floor to floor. The city rented a floor and the Controller rented the floor above to house their computer. 
It was now easy for the two computers to talk to each other and they were able to share communication con-
nections to City Departments. You could drive your car into the building and into an elevator, and the elevator 
could drop you and your car off at the door to your office. How’s that for a world-class perk? I recruited Joe 
Giannotti from the CUNY Computer Center to direct the new City Center, which supported the agencies 
reporting to the Mayor. Joe had great political as well as technical skills. Joe hired some extraordinarily good 
people from Columbia and CUNY to staff the new City Center.
Two years after the City was on the verge of default it was relieved of most of the restrictions imposed by the 
Emergency Financial Control Board, and everything again became immersed in politics. Lee went back to 
AT&T and I recruited a successor czar and went back to CUNY. A few years later, as a measure of how suc-
cessful and important the new Center had become to the City, Joe Giannotti was promoted to the level of a 
Commissioner. At that level he enjoyed a car that had a flashing red light on its roof and a siren. It was always 
a pleasure to travel around the city with Joe. My experience over my two years as Czar was exhausting but rich 
in anecdotal value. I learned that some things are only accomplish-able during a period of financial crisis.
The imposition of tuition caused a dramatic drop in enrollment at the CUNY Colleges. Budgets across the 
University were slashed. Even tenured professors were fired. When I returned if I asked people how things were 
going the response ranged from: “don’t ask”! to “terrible”! to “oy vey ist mir”! The budgets of the offices report-
ing to me were not cut. It was good to be at the front of the trough when the slop was poured in. Everyone in the 
Central Office was engaged in damage control. Gradually the situation improved but those were not fun times. 
At the Computer Center we managed to sell an IBM mainframe and from the proceeds of the sale replace it 
with an Amdahl (an IBM clone) that was 30% faster. This taught me that it was wise to sell and replace com-
puter equipment while it still had value, if you could manage that. When IBM announced the 3000 series in the 
late 70s we managed to replace the small very aged computers at the Colleges with 3000-series computers that 
were 10 times faster. As the decade of the 70s ended we began to populate the Colleges with a small number of 
Apple II’s as the wave of the future. 
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It is difficult for me to assess the advances in computing during the 70s because I no longer worked in the 
trenches. Computers got faster and operating systems improved and computer-related instruction grew dra-
matically. Even Columbia had established a Computer Science Department and many Universities had com-
puter literacy requirements. On the hardware front, the number of transistors in integrated circuits on a chip 
had been doubling every two years, as predicted by Gordon Moore in 1965. This was known as “Moore’s law”. 
It was now possible to put a computer on a chip. Advances in chip density would soon dramatically change 
computing everywhere. Three new “killer apps”, email, spread sheets and word processing began to become 
important. Many Universities had local email systems starting in the 60s. They were important in eliminating 
telephone tag. But not many faculty members had terminals on their desks. In the 1970s, ARPANET proved 
that people would like to talk to people at other Universities, but this was not widely feasible at Universities 
until the emergence of Bitnet in 1981. The VisiCalc spreadsheet program for the Apple II was a clear winner at 
Business Schools. Wang word processors began to appear in departmental offices, but word processing became 
important to faculty members and students in the 1980s, when microcomputers attached to networks appeared 
everywhere on campuses. It was clear to me that the 1980s would be a lot more exciting than the 1970s at Uni-
versities.
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Chapter 4
Computing at Cornell University from 1980 to 1987
In 1980 I received a call from Cornell University inviting me to visit the campus because they were recruiting 
a Director of Computing and several people had recommended me to them. CUNY had a relationship with 
the Mt. Sinai Medical School and there were close connections between Mt. Sinai people and Cornell Medical 
School people. Both Schools were in Manhattan. Through this grapevine I had earlier learned that, to use the 
technical term, the Cornell Medical School had been “screwed” by the Cornell Computer Center. The Cornell 
Medical School had been forced to move its computing off a local machine to the campus computer because the 
campus center was in financial trouble. It turned out that the campus computer had been unable to accommo-
date their load and the whole deal needed to be undone after the Medical School had sold their computer. Thus 
I considered Cornell as a place for which the 40-foot pole was invented, a place that you wouldn’t touch with a 
10-foot pole. However, it was always pleasant to visit a campus and I agreed to talk to them.
Bob Cooke, who was the head of the search committee, picked me up at the Ithaca airport. As we headed to-
ward campus Bob explained to me that Cornell was a very complicated place with nine Schools, each with a 
large amount of autonomy. I told him that I had had some experience with complicated places. He then told me 
that the University Computing Board had persuaded the Provost to create a Decentralized Computer Support 
group in Computer Services to encourage and support faculty acquiring their own computer. The computer 
wars were over at Cornell. As we crossed a one-lane bridge entering the campus, my view of Cornell changed 
180 degrees. I told Bob that I thought that microcomputers were the wave of the future, and that minicom-
puters and microcomputers were the only hope of greatly increasing the involvement of faculty members in 
computing. 
During the visit I learned that high-level Cornell executives on the financial side had back loaded the amorti-
zation of the campus mainframe in the expectation that sponsored research would significantly increase as the 
years passed. When this didn’t happen they had a problem. The campus mainframe was about 10 times faster 
than the Medical School computer. Someone decided that selling the Medical School computer and moving 
Medical School computing to the campus could solve the financing problems of the Ithaca mainframe. The 
campus computer had enough spare capacity to easily support a 10% increase in its load. The campus main-
frame was at the airport, five miles from the campus, so the computer center staff had experience in supporting 
remote computing. 
This solution looked as easy as shooting a pheasant that was walking toward you through a rain barrel with 
a rum raisin in its mouth. The move went forward without any benchmarking. Then, as they say, something 
funny happened. It turned out that administrative systems at the Medical Center had been written in APL 
square code. In APL it was possible to write dense logical code on a single line that would compile into many 
instructions. A special typewriter with its own unique keyboard and characters produced APL code. Bright 
programmers sought to get as much logic on a single line as possible, stretching the code to as close to 80 char-
acters as possible. The challenge was to write a program with lots of long expressions. This was called “square 
code”. Evidently the Medical Center’s programs had been written by a genius. Some years earlier I had visited 
the IBM Yorktown Research lab and decided to drop in to chat with Ken Iverson, the author of APL, and a 
colleague of mine when we were both on the faculty of the IBM System Research Institute. While we chatted, 
someone approached Ken and asked if he could interrupt our conversation for a minute. He had a long length 
line of APL code that had a logic error and he needed a minute of Ken’s time to figure out where. After about 
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10 minutes of staring at the line, Ken figured out where the problem was. The Medical Center had acquired a 
computer that had microcode that increased the speed of APL programs by a factor of 10. The campus main-
frame was not a model that supported this microcode. The campus mainframe was brought to its knees trying 
to run Medical School APL programs. Apparently this episode did not make the Cornell Trustees happy and 
the campus was in search of new computing leadership.
I had a very pleasant day on the campus. Everyone had good words to say about the technical competence of the 
computer staff and several faculty members said that Douglas Van Houweling had been particularly helpful 
to them. Everyone thought that computing needed more financial support from the University. At the end of 
the day I was taken to meet Keith Kennedy, the Provost, and he indicated that he thought that the quality of 
computing at Cornell was very important. He walked me across the hall to meet Frank Rhodes, the President. 
About a week later I received a call from Keith telling me that having completed the search process, the search 
committee had recommended that Cornell hire me. I told him that I would think about it. 
The overhead associated with being a bureaucrat had become higher at CUNY when the State took over fund-
ing the Senior Colleges. I now had to travel to Albany to clear computer acquisitions and funding that related 
to them. As I weighed the delight of again being able to lunch with faculty members trying to change the world 
and the great view of a lake from the Cornell campus against the prospect of endless drives to Albany, I decided 
to accept the Cornell offer if they agreed to accept a plan that I would develop. I called the Provost and told him 
that I needed to spend a couple of weeks on campus to develop a plan and that I would come to Cornell if my 
plan was accepted. I warned him that I would be unwilling to come to Cornell unless they aspired to having 
a first-rate computing environment and that would not be cheap. He told me that he thought that Cornell was 
ready to spend more money on computing and looked forward to getting my plan. He arranged to put me up 
in a house on campus once occupied by Cornell Presidents. It seems that the President’s house had moved off 
campus too. During my time on campus I talked to all of the Deans and found that some were more enthusias-
tic about computing than others, but none were resistive. Following the wisdom of Lee Oberst’s great teachings, 
I had hoped to talk to them last but scheduling difficulties prevented that. 
In talking to the faculty I learned that Cornell had a great Computer Science Department established in 1965. 
Better still, the person teaching the Introductory Computer Science course was Tim Teitelbaum. Tim had been 
one of the people living at night in the back of the Columbia computer room. At Columbia Tim was working on 
a Hough Powell device that was channel connected to the center computer. The device scanned film of particle 
collision events in Cloud and Bubble Chambers and digitized particle tracks. I subsequently discovered that 
Tim deserved a great teacher award. Tim was the dynamo at Cornell behind the computer literacy efforts in the 
Computer Science Department. He had written a PL1 program synthesizer for a Terak microcomputer and was 
in the process of converting instructional computing in the department to microcomputers. 
As I talked to faculty doing research I discovered that faculty running their own computers were happy with 
the support provided by the Decentralized Support group led by Doug Gale. A small group of faculty in the 
sciences led by Ken Wilson, who soon thereafter won a Nobel Prize in Physics, had cooperatively purchased 
a Floating Point Systems (FPS) 190L array-processing computer that was attached to a channel of the campus 
mainframe. The mainframe provided input and output services for this computer that was designed to support 
computationally intense programs. Its computational engine was as fast as the mainframe’s and could sit in 
the Computer Center running 24/7 under the exclusive control of a few scientists. Better still, the charges to 
their grants for mainframe time were small because the mainframe did not need to provide a lot of cycles to 
keep the array processor humming along. When asked about their future computer requirements, they told 
me that they could use a number of Cray Supercomputers. Doug Gale remembers that the number was five. 
The faculty members using the campus mainframe were not happy with turnaround time, and there were 
communications problems exacerbated by the fact that the computer and most of the Computer Center staff 
were five miles from campus. Faculty members I talked with vividly remembered the attempt to run Medical 
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School computing at Cornell. By this time in my career I had learned that faculty were far happier and more 
productive if they controlled the computer resources they required. Putting them in an environment where 
their research was constantly interrupted by hardware, and system changes, and other inharmonious events 
made them less productive and unhappy. Often, a brief bit of experience in an environment they shared would 
teach them to avoid computing in their research and instruction if they could. There was some support for 
faculty not enjoying grants containing funds for computing time that was arranged in some mysterious way by 
Doug Van Houweling, who managed Academic Computing Support in Computer Services. 
The Administrative Computing staff lived in a basement and the staff was small. There was a room with a 
bunch of keypunches in it at the entrance to their space. That told me almost all that I needed to know about 
the state of administrative computing at Cornell. Staff morale was low. A few years earlier, Cornell had experi-
enced a budget crisis and a committee was appointed to search for savings. According to administrative com-
puting staff members, they recommended the elimination of administrative computing. When they discovered 
that this would make it impossible for Cornell to pay its faculty and staff, they recommended exempting the 
payroll staff from their recommendation. I suspected that this story might have been a bit exaggerated but the 
result of the committee report was downsizing the staff by 40%. The staff that survived could tell me the names 
of everyone on that committee, and some of the people who joined the staff after this event had learned their 
names too. Thus their legacy was preserved. 
Computer Services probably had the best Virtual Machine (VM) systems’ programming staff in the country. 
There were two major IBM operating systems at that time and the one with the most interactive features was 
VM. Bob Cowles, who led this group, was a product of the Cornell Computer Science Department as were a 
number of other people in Computer Services. He had written a VM scheduler program that was widely used 
and in my view clearly superior to the IBM-provided VM scheduler. Dick Cogger, who was innovative and 
creative in supporting the campus connections to a computer five miles away, led the networking group. Over-
all, the staff was small but contained some very talented people. Its morale was low because many people on 
campus blamed them for the Medical School fiasco. However, with proper support they were clearly up to the 
task of rapidly improving the quality of computing at Cornell. 
In assessing the computer problems at Cornell, I concluded that Cornell was a “poster child” for the short-
sightedness of Federal Funding Agencies in not allowing the inclusion of computing charges to sponsored 
research projects in the indirect cost pool. As a consequence of that decision, many Universities had organized 
Computer Centers as enterprises, which were expected to earn enough revenue to cover their expenses, except 
for as small a contribution as possible from general revenues. All computer time was billed. At Cornell, the 
vicissitudes of depending on the sale of time to sponsored research caused the Computer Center to scramble 
to sell time to outside groups. When this failed and a budget deficit resulted, often heads rolled. Across the 
country uncountable amounts of computer time were wasted because sponsored research projects, unable to 
get sufficient funding in their grants to pay for computer time, were denied access to the campus computer. In 
addition, in determining the hourly rate for time, all Computer Center costs were bundled into a cost pool to 
be divided by the time available. This included every employee of the Center. Service Bureaus were selling time 
for a lower rate because the only staff they needed to support their enterprise consisted of a few operators and a 
few sales and technical support people. In my view, not using the Library Model to finance Computer Centers 
was a national tragedy. 
I prepared a plan for improving computing at Cornell. First of all, computer equipment would have to be amor-
tized at a rate that reflected its resale value. Ideally the University would get first in line as a new generation of 
computers was introduced and the equipment it replaced would be sold while it still had value. The goal was to 
insure that the University maintained state-of-the-art computers. Secondly, the University would have to cre-
ate a number of computing support rooms containing networked terminals and microcomputers distributed 
across the campus and into the dormitories. The number of these computer-access rooms would have to be 
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increased as an aggressive effort to infuse computing throughout the University curriculum increased support 
requirements. The third goal of the plan was to insure that every Cornell graduate had received training that 
enabled them to understand the role of computing in their discipline. Thus the notion of “computer literacy” 
went well beyond teaching them how to program and supporting the requirements of the Computer Science 
Department. 
To infuse computing broadly into the curriculum, the University had to get as many faculty members as possi-
ble computer literate. This could not happen if the primary computer resource on campus was a batch process-
ing system. The University would have to find a way to support faculty access to computing in every discipline, 
including disciplines that did not enjoy grants enabling them to buy computer time. An important goal was to 
find ways in which computing could be used to improve faculty research productivity. Fourth, the University 
needed to rewrite most of its administrative computing systems to provide online access to data to every office 
requiring that access. This would require significant expansion of the administrative computing staff. Finally, 
I had two nonnegotiable demands. The first was that I report to the Provost and the second was that the Com-
puter Center would be moved back to the campus from the airport as soon as suitable space could be found. 
Ideally this space would be close to the center of the campus.
I presented my plan to the Provost and he said that the University would review my plan and that I would hear 
from him shortly. A few days later I received a call from the Provost at 8 AM telling me that the University 
would accept my plan and I agreed to accept their job offer. I felt a lot of loyalty to CUNY and I was sad to leave. 
When I resigned, I recommended that Ira Fuchs replace me as Vice Chancellor. The Chancellor agreed and it 
was a wise decision. A year later Ira started Bitnet, one of the transformative events in the evolution of technol-
ogy. Bitnet proved that networking was important to Universities and laid the groundwork for the creation of 
NSFnet, which laid the groundwork for creating the Internet. 
I was the Vice Provost for Computer Services at Cornell from 1980 until 1987. When I left Cornell, the Com-
puter Services budget had grown by a factor of three during that period. Cornell had over 600 microcomputers 
in rooms across the campus and in the dormitories. Many students were buying their own microcomputers at 
a store run by Computer Services. An important goal was to make available microcomputers costing no more 
than $1000. We fell slightly short of reaching that goal due to a high New York State sales tax. Cornell had be-
come one of five National Supercomputer Centers. All the buildings on campus including the dormitories had 
been rewired. The wiring plant included fiber, coaxial cables, and twisted pair. The cable supported access to 
television in student rooms via a connection to the local cable company. The computer center had moved from 
the airport to a renovated building near the center of the campus fulfilling a promise made to me by the Pro-
vost when I accepted his job offer. A building had been constructed adjoining the Computer Center to house a 
University-owned telephone system. With the University, rather than the telephone company, owning the wire 
that reached every faculty and staff member’s desk, a large number of faculty and staff had a microcomputer on 
their desk connected to the University network.
The University mainframe had been replaced with the latest large IBM mainframe. When it was acquired we 
spoke of it as the last University mainframe. It was augmented with several medium-size computers that served 
the computing needs of a subset of computer users. One of them was shared with The Cornell Institute for 
Social and Economic Research (CISER). This significantly improved the productivity of the CISER members. 
The administrative systems of the University had largely been rewritten to support online access to a central 
database and the University had an online Library catalog system.
As an historical note, in a speech at Cornell a number of years later, Bill Gates said that a Microsoft employee, 
who was a Cornell graduate, returned from a campus visit in 1986 and announced “Cornell is wired”. This 
caused the company to start developing a networking capability in its operating system. As another historical 
note, the last campus mainframe was retired in the summer of 2013. When I left Cornell, I judged its comput-
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ing environment to be first-rate. This was enabled by unwavering support from Provost Keith Kennedy and 
his successor Bob Barker; support at critical times from a faculty advisory committee initially chaired by the 
Dean of the School of Engineering Tom Everhart, followed by Bob Cooke; and an extraordinarily talented and 
creative staff. 
Major Computing Events at Cornell
John Rudan has written a History of Computing at Cornell, which is in the Internet-First University Press 
(IFUP) section of the Cornell eCommons. You can find his history at: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/82 . As a side 
note, Bob Cooke and I created the IFUP as part of a project that we started in 2003. A section of this Rudan 
history covers the details of staff organization and hardware acquisitions, and catalogs major events during the 
very busy period that I was at Cornell. In this memoir I will only discuss the background of major events that 
moved computing at Cornell, sprinkled with some anecdotes designed to convey the issues faced by people 
involved in University computing at that time.
In 1981 Ira Fuchs at CUNY persuaded Grey Freeman at Yale to share the cost of connecting their computers 
via a 9600 baud leased line to create a store-and-forward email network that Ira hoped would one day connect 
every scholar in the world to every other scholar. The network protocol they used was developed at IBM and 
an IBM group had created a small email network using this protocol operating under the radar at IBM. Ira 
had a friend at IBM from the time that they both were employed at the Columbia Computer Center who in-
formed him of this development. Ira called this network Bitnet and as the network came up Ira began calling 
me regularly to find out when Cornell would connect. Because of a peculiarity in the telephone tariff rate for 
leased lines, it was cheaper to lease an interstate line than an intrastate line. When Penn State University con-
nected to Bitnet, Cornell connected to Penn State becoming the 6th University to connect to Bitnet. Shortly 
thereafter, the University of Toronto connected to Cornell becoming the first international member of Bitnet. 
About this time Ira reinterpreted the name to mean: “Because It’s Time” network. Soon California institutions 
connected to each other and to CUNY. The network began to grow rapidly. University College Dublin was the 
first European institution to connect. The Director of Computing at the College, Dennis Jennings, later became 
responsible in the NSF for networking Universities to the National Supercomputer Centers to create NSFnet, 
which evolved into the Internet. Bitnet spread across the US, South America, and Europe. There was even a 
connection in the Soviet Union. When the Tokyo Institute of Technology leased a line to CUNY, it spread to 
Asia. A networking history document in Japan displays the first message from a Professor at the University to 
the US. It was a message to me from a Professor that I helped when he computed at the Watson Laboratory in 
the 50s. The capability of Bitnet was soon augmented to support email lists and instant messaging. 
In 1987 people on Bitnet received a message from a student at Clausthal University of Technology in Germany 
asking them to execute an embedded program to print out a Christmas tree and receive a Christmas greeting. 
The program was able to retrieve your Bitnet address file and forward this message to everyone on your list. 
The resulting traffic created by this “worm” brought down Bitnet and all the commercial networks connected 
to Bitnet. In 1988 a Cornell computer science student distributed the first Internet worm. The student had re-
ceived his undergraduate degree at Harvard. People at Cornell observed that students who got their training in 
ethics at Harvard and their training in Computer Science at Cornell could be very dangerous.
At Cornell, aside from the Cornell Computer staff, who benefited from connections with their technical coun-
terparts at other Universities in order to share solutions to common problems, the early users of Bitnet were 
students who quickly discovered Bitnet and were used to hanging out in network-connected terminal rooms 
that were beginning to spread across campus. Faculty members soon discovered that they could undertake col-
laborative research with faculty members at other Universities without having to play telephone tag or use snail 
mail to exchange papers. Long distance calls were expensive in those days. Bitnet was a free service. It cost the 
University $5K per year for the leased line to Penn State. Faculty members began to include their Bitnet address 
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on their business cards. When the campus was rewired to bring a network connection to every desk, a major 
incentive for getting a microcomputer on their desk was that it enabled email connections to their colleagues 
at Cornell and around the world using Bitnet. A study conducted in the late 80s showed a large increase in the 
number of papers authored in Journals by people from more than one University. This increase was attributed 
to Bitnet.
An early effort involved finding ways for faculty members without access to computing funds to compute. We 
created a program called “Windfall”, which enabled them to use weekend computing time on the mainframe 
that would otherwise be unused and wasted. Since all computing time had to be billed, we created a very low 
rate for this time and the Provost provided funds that were turned into “funny money” that was allocated to 
faculty to pay for this time. It was called “funny money” because it could only be used to buy computer time 
on weekends. After we started this program, a faculty member’s wife complained to me that she rarely saw her 
husband on weekends because he had become a wind-faller.
Cornell had a very creative Controller named Jack Ostram. In 1962 Jack was at Princeton and the person 
Columbia financial people worked with to get computer costs into the indirect cost pool for a few years. Jack 
reduced the cost of computing time by stripping out of the cost base, used to determine the hourly rate, every-
thing except the direct cost of providing cycles. All other costs were put into something he called “the glob”, 
and these costs went into the University’s indirect cost pool. 
In late 1983 Dan’l Lewin showed up on the Cornell campus with a small metal box handcuffed to his wrist. In 
the box was a Macintosh computer. He demonstrated the little jewel to me and I immediately knew that the 
computing world had changed forever. It had a graphical user interface with icons on a bit-mapped screen and a 
mouse as a pointing device. It came with only two applications, MacWrite and MacPaint, but Lewin explained 
that many more were under development. It introduced a new word into the computing vocabulary, WYSI-
WYG, “what you see is what you get”. Lewin, who was a Cornell graduate, told me that Apple was organizing 
a group called the “Apple University Consortium”, which would consist of 24 of the country’s most prestigious 
Colleges and Universities. The group would be advisory to the company and enjoy a special discount on Macs. 
He invited Cornell to join and without hesitation I accepted. Later that evening I called Ira Fuchs and told him 
that he should try to get CUNY into the Consortium. The next day he called me to report that he had talked 
his way in.
Shortly thereafter, a complimentary Macintosh was delivered to Cornell. I decided to demonstrate it to faculty 
and computer staff people present at our 5 PM Friday Wassail. People played with it and were able to navigate 
without any instruction. There was high excitement and glee among everyone who watched. At some point I 
decided to show them the 3.5-inch floppy that contained its operating system. An attempt to eject the disk from 
the Mac failed. I picked up my phone and dialed Steve Jobs’s telephone number. This number had been provid-
ed to Consortium members. To my surprise and delight Steve answered the phone. I explained the problem. 
He told me that there was a small hole under the disk and that I should insert a paper clip wire into that hole 
and the disk should come out. He said that he would stay on the phone until I reported success. I inserted the 
wire and the disk popped out. The people there cheered. I got back on the phone and told Steve that it worked 
just like magic and thanked him. At that moment I recalled the IBM hardware designer who left the Columbia 
Computer Center without waiting to see that his advice had solved a problem that had kept the 360/91 in the 
center down for 3 days.
I started the Friday wassail tradition while I was at Columbia in an effort to gather data that might be useful in 
a stress management component in a Life Science course. The wassail was presided over by a non-management 
employee called the “Chief Degenerate”. On Friday at 5 PM I set a modest amount of booze out on a table in my 
office and when this was done it was the Chief Degenerate’s responsibility to stand at my office door and blow a 
loud whistle called the wassail whistle. Anyone hearing the whistle was welcome to come and have a drink. On 
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one occasion at CUNY, a person from Brooklyn College arrived a little late. He explained that he was on a sub-
way platform in Brooklyn waiting for a train to Coney Island when he heard the whistle and decided to cross 
the platform and catch a train to Manhattan instead. The Chief Degenerate had life tenure unless promoted to 
management and had sole authority to throw someone out of wassail or even ban someone from wassail. It was 
his responsibility to enforce my only rule: everyone had to make his or her own drink. No one was permitted 
to make a drink for someone else. I only remember one incident in which the Chief Degenerate exercised his 
awesome power. Someone on the Center staff started to bad mouth a staff member who wasn’t there and the 
Chief Degenerate told the person that he would be ejected unless he changed the subject. I suspect that that 
person would not have evoked this reaction if he had been badmouthing a member of the administration in-
stead of a member of the staff. I learned a lot from the wide range of people who attended Wassail. It was an 
event at which every level in the organization could meet. On one occasion at CUNY, I had both the Chancellor 
and the building janitor at Wassail. The Chancellor asked the janitor how many keys he had on his belt. On an-
other occasion a fellow Vice Chancellor arrived with a distinguished poet. The poet asked me who my favorite 
poet was? I replied: “Robert Service”. He replied: “that’s not poetry, its doggerel”, and set down his drink and 
left. I wondered what his response would have been if I had replied: “Robert Frost, Dylan Thomas, or Omar 
Khayyam, among my other favorite poets. But it’s hard to beat an opening line like: ‘A bunch of the boys were 
whooping it up in the Malamute saloon’ ”.
Over time we populated a lot of rooms across the campus with Macintoshes. One of the sites was in the Under-
graduate Library. We persuaded the Undergraduate Librarian to make a small room in the Library available for 
Macs. We installed about 15 of them one evening and the next morning I got a call from a Librarian. She said: 
“You better get over here in a hurry. There’s a serious problem in the Mac room”. When I got there I discovered 
15 students working on Macs and another group sitting on every free space on the floor waiting for access to a 
Mac. The Librarian thought that they were occupying the floor space as part of a protest movement. After that, 
every time I saw her we started to laugh. 
During the years that I was at Cornell we had a lot of small renovation projects as we acquired space for com-
puters. One very big effort involved renovating an old building on campus and moving the computers and staff 
from the airport to campus. John Rudan managed these projects in addition to managing the Systems and 
Operations staff. One day a fellow Vice Provost told me that she had been waiting in a queue for 6 months to 
get her office painted and wondered how I managed to repeatedly jump everyone in the queue. She suspected 
skullduggery. On an occasion somewhat later I decided to accompany John on a visit to an office to reinforce 
the urgency of their providing a critical service for us promptly. John entered the office and greeted the 3 people 
in the office by name. He not only knew their names but the names of their wives and children. He asked every 
one of them for a family update. He then got around to discussing the reason we were there. They promised to 
start the next day. I never had to open my mouth.
Cornell had discovered that most students arriving at the University had poor writing skills, so every freshman 
was required to take a writing course. As students started to use word processors, someone raised the issue of 
whether or not a word processor improved or diminished a student’s writing quality, so an experiment was 
initiated. A randomly selected group of students were allowed to use a word processor while another randomly 
selected group was required to use a conventional typewriter. It was discovered that papers from the conven-
tional typewriter group were clearly superior to those of students using word processors. In looking into the 
issue, it was discovered that students using a typewriter spent a lot more time on their papers than the word 
processor group. Because their papers required many retyping’s, they typically started work on their papers on 
Monday if the paper was due on Friday. The word-processing group had adopted a “just in time” model and of-
ten started work on the paper late on Thursday. The typewriter group thought about their paper as they walked 
across campus. After lots of discussion, it was decided that it was futile to ban the use of word processors. In-
stead the course was modified to require revision of papers that were less than perfect. A paper was marked up 
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and returned to the student for correction. Students were required to submit their papers electronically rather 
than on paper to facilitate the instructor’s revision process.
One of my first tasks at Cornell was to rebuild the Administrative Data Processing Group and to undertake an 
effort to put all of its important shared data online and accessible from terminals. To manage this effort I hired 
an extraordinarily good person named Russ Vaught who at the time was Director of the State University of 
New York at Binghamton’s Computer Center. Building information systems at a University is very hard. While 
working in the Office of Operations in New York City, we started at the bottom of an organization and worked 
our way up with the goal of saving money by automating procedures and streamlining the management struc-
ture. At Universities, collegiality required starting with the Vice President responsible for an administrative 
service and working your way down. It seemed almost never possible to acquire a commercially available 
system, even if good ones were available, because they made the paper flow in the office different. From the 
perspective of office managers, the goal was to add new services that enhanced the value of their office to the 
University. These new services almost always required adding staff in the office. A new system was always 
expensive to build and the end product usually improved service but cost more to operate than the system it 
replaced. That was true at most major Universities.
A major long-term controversy at Universities was the question of whether or not both academic and admin-
istrative computing should report to a University Chief Information Officer (CIO). In the 70s, as computing 
became more important to Universities, Computer Center Directors began to be appointed above the level of 
buildings and grounds, and there was a strong trend to merge academic and administrative computing under 
a CIO. My own view was that if they shared a large campus mainframe there were advantages to a unified 
management structure. However, like research faculty, administrative offices always seemed happier if they 
controlled their own hardware. 
I learned a few things from Russ. He was constantly working on staff development. He explained to me that it 
was important to send his staff to opportunities for training and education. He would say: “We’ve got to invest 
in our seed corn.” He quickly developed a very talented staff. In the early 80s, mainframe computers had far 
less CPU power, memory, and storage than a desktop PC today and the whole university shared that computer. 
Thus it was easy to undertake projects beyond the capability of the hardware. There were examples of large 
administrative systems started at a University by someone who could be characterized as possessing infinite 
optimism bounded only by unlimited self-confidence. These projects always ended badly. Russ carefully ana-
lyzed the requirements of every system that he was asked to implement before he committed to develop it. Russ 
tested new technologies in something called his sandbox. One of the technologies in his sandbox was object- 
oriented computing. This technology later became very important to supporting the software maintenance of 
microcomputers on campus. Academic computing was always a lot more fun than administrative computing 
and when Russ left Cornell it was to become Director of Academic Computing at Penn State.
An exception to the usual decision to build our own was the acquisition of a commercially available online Li-
brary Catalog access system. A committee was created, co-chaired by Jan Olsen, Director of the Mann Library 
at Cornell, and me to select a system. We visited a number of Universities that had installed a system or were 
in the process of installing a system. At one University that we visited, academic computing reported to the 
Director of the Libraries. I asked the Director when she thought the library system they were implementing 
would be up and running. She replied: “When it’s ready. It’s taken 200 years for this library to get where it is, 
and if it takes another 200 years to implement this system, that’s how long it will take”.
As we started our work, I was asked to explain the goals of the effort to a faculty Library Advisory Committee. 
I decided to start my presentation with a bit of humor. I quoted a Harvard Librarian who said: “The goal of a 
library automation system is to keep the faculty out of the Library”. No one laughed. I got that “what planet is 
this guy from” look. As this memoir is being written, Cornell has recently closed libraries in the Physics and 
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Chemistry Departments and the School of Engineering because of lack of use. Paul Ginsparg, who created 
the arXiv system making preprints of papers available in mathematics and the sciences on the Internet, was 
recently quoted as saying: “today, its Google or forget it”. ArXiv has catalyzed advances in Physics by making 
preprints of papers available months before they appear in Journals. Access to information on the Internet 
from the comfort of their offices and home is apparently now keeping the faculty out of the library.
In 1984 the IBM President visited a number of Universities and was shocked to discover that their student com-
puter rooms were predominantly stocked with Macintoshes rather than PCs. So that same year IBM started 
an Advanced Education Project (AEP) with major grants to 19 Universities including Cornell. With this grant 
Cornell acquired more than 500 PCs over the next three years. Under the terms of the grant, most of these 
computers were given to faculty members in return for a commitment to develop instructional material for 
one of their courses that used a PC. We named this project “Project Ezra” after Ezra Cornell, the founder of 
the University, and Cecilia Cowles managed it. We always included the Cornell Medical School in programs 
directed toward faculty, and they were recipients of some of these PCs. We quickly succeeded in establishing 
excellent relations with the Medical School. Faculty members developing software were mostly quite senior 
with tenure. It was generally discovered that it was a big mistake for junior faculty members to interrupt their 
research careers by spending time writing instructional software. The Ezra staff members at Cornell were fierce 
competitors and Cornell always had more projects selected for presentation at AEP meetings than other AEP 
Universities. I was fond of quoting the first law of the Yukon to staff members: “The scenery changes only for 
the lead dog; if you’re second or third the view can be fairly monotonous”. 
As Cornell faculty members began developing software for microcomputers a controversy developed about 
who owned the software. In the mainframe days, commercially marketable software produced by University 
employees was treated as “work-for-hire” and copyrighted in the name of the University. Historically, software 
that had the biggest impact was “open source” software that was freely distributed and collaboratively devel-
oped by its users. Berkeley Unix was a prime example. As faculty members at Cornell began to develop soft-
ware for microcomputers, the Cornell Trustees insisted that that software be copyrighted in the name of the 
University. Faculty members argued that software for microcomputers should follow the paradigm of faculty 
produced books, which were copyrighted in the name of the author. As the controversy raged, faculty-mem-
bers took their efforts off campus and a number of privately incorporated companies were created to develop 
and market their software efforts. After I left Cornell the Trustees realized that the effort to own microcomput-
er software was hopeless and gave up. 
One of the super techs on the Cornell staff when I arrived was Steve Worona. I offered him a management 
position but he said that he did not want to manage people so he reported to me. Steve had written the campus 
email system some years earlier and he maintained it and extended it. While I was at Cornell, Steve created two 
new systems called CUINFO and “Dear Uncle Ezra,” both of which still survive. CUINFO contained general 
information about Cornell of interest to faculty and students. “Dear Uncle Ezra” was a section in CUINFO that 
allowed students to submit questions to an anonymous Assistant Dean of students. Stripped of names, some of 
these questions and their answers were published in “Dear Uncle Ezra”. Sometimes the questions indicated that 
the student submitting the question was deeply depressed and possibly suicidal. In that case the Assistant Dean 
took immediate action to help the student. In other cases the answer to the question required some research 
and consultation with experts before an answer was published. One such question was: Where’s the best place 
in Ithaca to get “soul food”.
In the middle 80s we created a project called “Broad Jump”. The notion was that every “knowledge worker” 
needed a computer on his or her desk. The goal of the project was to put a computing device on the desk of every 
high-level administrative officer at the University. Steve Worona and Cecilia Cowles were assigned the task of 
interviewing University Officers to determine their computing requirements. They started with the President, 
Frank Rhodes. They began their presentation to Frank by saying: “Every knowledge worker needs a computing 
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device on their desk”. Frank stopped them right there. He said: “I’m not a knowledge worker, I’m a wisdom 
worker”. Undeterred, they next interviewed the Provost. Shortly after their visit to Keith Kennedy, the Provost 
called me somewhat upset. He reported that after talking to him Steve turned to Cecelia and said: “I think that 
he just needs a dumb terminal, don’t you?” They had better luck lower in the administrative hierarchy.
Cornell Becomes a National Supercomputer Center
In 1982 Ken Wilson won the Nobel Prize in Physics. He had long been part of an effort to convince the gov-
ernment to support supercomputing. With the Nobel Prize he became a leader of that effort. In 1985 the NSF 
announced a competition to create 5 National Supercomputing Centers at Universities. In the middle of the 
competition period I was asked to talk at an IBM-sponsored conference in New Haven about the AEP-funded 
“Project Ezra” at Cornell. As the conference ended I was approached by Carl Ledbetter who asked if I had time 
to discuss something that he had been musing about. My flight back to Ithaca had been delayed by weather 
and I had plenty of time. I had met Carl earlier when Columbia University acquired a 360/91. Carl had been 
involved in IBM’s entry into the supercomputer market with the 360/90 series. After selling only 18 machines, 
IBM had abandoned the supercomputer market. 
Carl wondered if Cornell and IBM could partner in creating an application to be one of the National Super-
computer Centers. The notion was to channel-connect a number of FPS (Floating Point Systems) array pro-
cessors to the largest IBM mainframe to create a computer in the supercomputer range. A chemist at IBM had 
already shown that this was possible. In the 50s at the Watson Lab, I had written a paper that showed that if 
you numerically solved partial differential equations using finite difference elements, and if you selected the 
right coordinate system, almost all of the partial differential equations of classical physics were amenable to 
massively parallel computation. In fact the only hope for solving problems like understanding weather was ef-
fectively using a massively parallel computer. The problems that Ken Wilson was interested in solving were also 
amenable to massively parallel computation. Wilson was an ardent fan of parallel computing. At the time Cor-
nell had two FPS array processors attached to its mainframe, so we knew how to do that. Carl and I agreed on 
an equitable distribution of labor. He would try to convince IBM to donate all of the IBM equipment required 
to create this supercomputer, and I would try to convince Cornell to submit a proposal to the NSF employing 
this architecture. Parallel computing was the wave of the future and this proposal would be the only parallel 
computer in the competition. Carl’s parting words were: “When I bring this proposal to IBM management they 
will probably say: “Carl, how long have you worked for IBM, not counting the rest of today?” The next morning 
I brought this proposal to Ken Wilson and the Provost, Bob Barker, and they were both enthusiastic. I reported 
to Carl that half our work was done.
We quickly developed an NSF proposal that included the donation of IBM’s latest and greatest and sent it to 
IBM. As the deadline for proposal submission approached all we could learn was that IBM had not yet made a 
decision. Three days from the deadline we informed IBM that we needed to know one way or the other imme-
diately. Shortly thereafter, we received notification that if we were prepared to meet with Ralph Gomory, IBM 
Director of Research, at their Yorktown Laboratory that afternoon, we would get a decision. Barker chartered a 
flight to Yorktown and he, Wilson and I set off. On the flight I prepared some flip charts using a magic marker 
on overhead projector foil. Fortunately the flight was smooth so the result was legible. The foils extolled the 
virtues of parallel computing as the wave of the future and pointed out that our collaboration would be the only 
parallel computer in the competition. I finished with a statement that the benefit to IBM was that they would 
have a seat at the table where supercomputer applications and the technology necessary to solve “big important 
problems” were discussed.
I made my presentation to a group of about 12 people in a conference room. It quickly became apparent that 
aside from Gomory, none of the other IBMers present had heard of this proposal. They were all high-level man-
agers at the laboratory. Carl Ledbetter stood in the back of the room not looking too confident. After I finished 
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my presentation, Ralph asked the people sitting around the table what they thought. One person stated that 
IBM had gotten out of the supercomputer business and he couldn’t understand why IBM was interested. Other 
people around the table thought it might be an idea worth trying, with a few having no opinion. One person 
observed that participation could result in serious embarrassment for the company. Perhaps he was referring 
to an incident a short time earlier. In response to a comment from some IBM executive that IBM was not in-
terested in supercomputers because the market was too thin, Wilson had told a joke that got national coverage. 
The story in the joke was that serious traffic congestion had developed on the only bridge crossing the Hudson 
River at Poughkeepsie. This problem precipitated serious discussion on the question of whether or not a bigger 
bridge was needed and consultants from IBM were hired to produce a recommendation. They reported that a 
bigger bridge was not needed because after careful watching, they had not detected a single person swimming 
across the Hudson at the bridge site. At the time of the joke’s appearance in the press it was reported to me that 
some people at IBM were not amused. After everyone sitting around the table had voiced his opinion, Ralph 
looked up and said: “Alright, we’ll do it; you will have a letter of commitment from IBM tomorrow morning”. 
In anticipation of running a supercomputer at Cornell, Ken Wilson had created a Theory Center. The next 
afternoon a member of the Theory Center staff flew to Washington to hand deliver our proposal to the NSF.
Our next problem was to prepare for the NSF’s site visit committee. We had a dry run. It was immediately 
apparent to me that no one, including Wilson, had prepared. After a presentation by an astronomer on the 
faculty, I asked: “Would you rather have a Cray?” He immediately replied: “Yes”. I thought that it was all up 
the smokestack. On the day the site visit committee arrived every presenter was eloquent, particularly Wilson. 
Wilson had invited a parallel-computing expert to testify. He informed the committee that failure to advance 
parallel computing could set back the evolution of computers and result in a tragically wasted opportunity. 
The committee asked very few questions. Their smiling faces told me that we had won. The other winners were 
from Princeton, Illinois, Pittsburgh, and the University of California at San Diego. 
The last-minute decision by IBM to support the joint proposal had made it impossible for them to create a con-
tract with Cornell specifying what Cornell would do for them in return for their investment. They now won-
dered what I meant in Yorktown when I said that they would have a seat at the table. They proposed a contract 
specifying a number of deliverables. Most of the deliverables involved access to faculty members, but it was not 
possible for Cornell to impose any requirements on the faculty using the supercomputer. When stripped away 
there was very little left. On the signing of an agreement by Cornell and IBM’s top corporate attorney, he said 
to Wilson, Barker, and I: “Gentlemen, you have given us the sleeves to your vest”.
The multiprocessor system initially provided by IBM to the Cornell Center was quickly upgraded with a “vec-
tor” processing capability that significantly enhanced performance. The leader of the group at IBM that devel-
oped this capability was Carl Ledbetter. I now began to understand why Carl was musing in New Haven. Over 
time, IBM contributed equipment with a list value of many millions of dollars to the Cornell Center. Some 
years later an IBM president told me that the addition of vectors had enabled them to sell a lot of computers 
that they otherwise would have been unable to sell, and that their investment in supercomputing had been 
profitable to the company.
NSFnet is Created
The first issue faced by the 5 winners of the National Supercomputer Center competition was how to connect 
supercomputer users who were distributed at Universities all over the country to the Centers. The NSF hired 
Dennis Jennings, the Director of Computing at University College Dublin, and the first European College to 
connect to Bitnet, to manage that effort. Fortunately, Dennis had been born in England and had an English 
passport, which made him eligible to serve. Dennis was thoroughly Irish with a big smile and had he been born 
in Ireland he would not have been eligible. 
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A major issue in creating this network was the communication protocol to be used by the network. There 
were 3 possibilities. There was an International standard called OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) that was 
working its way through a committee dominated by hardware vendors at the pace of a pig through a python 
with, in my view, the same final output. There was DECnet, a proprietary protocol developed by the Digital 
Equipment Corporation and used by a large number of physicists connected to ESnet (Energy Sciences Net-
work). ESnet was funded by the Department of Energy and connected Universities to National Laboratories, 
and other research organizations. Physicists were likely to be big early users of the Supercomputer Centers. 
Finally there was TCP/IP (Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), a protocol developed for ARPANET. 
TCP/IP broke messages into packets and the messages were reassembled at the destination computer. Packets 
in the same message could take a different path from origin to destination. This design reflected the fact that 
computers and routers were unreliable and could become unavailable in the network at random times. In this 
case each message packet could find an alternative route if one was available. By 1985 ARPANET was no lon-
ger operational but the protocol had survived. As a graduate student at the University of California Berkeley, 
Bill Joy had incorporated TCP/IP into the BSD (Berkeley Standard Distribution) version of Unix. This version 
of Unix, called Berkeley Unix, was widely used by Computer Science Departments. In 1982 Bill Joy was a 
co-founder of the Sun Computer Systems Company. TCP/IP was an “open standard” whose future evolution 
could be controlled by its users. Ever mindful of Lenin’s advice: “influence is good, control is better”, the Uni-
versity community strongly favored TCP/IP.
Ken Wilson’s wife was manager of the UNIX Support Group in Computer Services and an ardent supporter 
of TCP/IP, so I had no doubt where Wilson stood on this issue. I wondered if Wilson would be willing to go to 
the wall with the physics community if they organized in support of DECnet. I quickly got my answer. Dennis 
Jennings reported that at an NSF Science Advisory Committee meeting, Wilson had taken off his shoe and 
banging it on the table shouted: “TCP/IP, TCP/IP, TCP/IP”! Dennis reported that, aside from him, no one else 
at the meeting had the foggiest idea of what he was talking about. This story got broad currency and we never 
heard a peep from the physics community about DECnet. Some years later, at an anniversary of the start of 
NSFnet, Wilson, Jennings, and I were on a panel of pioneers to talk about the early days. Jennings brought up 
the shoe-banging episode and Wilson confessed that at the time he didn’t have the foggiest idea either. 
In the fall of 1985 Jennings convened a meeting of the Directors of the supercomputer centers at the National 
Center for Atmospheric research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado, to discuss the creation of a network. Sitting 
around an outdoors table we architected a 3-tier network. At the first level was a multi-connected network 
connecting the Supercomputer Centers to each other. This was called the “backbone network”. At the next level 
were regional networks connecting Universities in a region to one of the supercomputer centers on the back-
bone. At the highest level was a local campus network connecting users at a University to a regional network. 
When we finished the design of this network, Dennis asked: “and the protocol?” Wilson and I shouted: “TCP/
IP”, and with a broad Irish grin Dennis said: “Done!” Dennis then told us that he was allocating $250K to the 
funding of the backbone. He stated that he had not gotten permission to allocate that amount but that at the 
NSF it was often easier to get forgiveness than permission. The next day Cornell ordered 56 kilobit-per-second 
lines to form the backbone, and the University of Illinois took responsibility for acquiring the routers for the 
network. Thus NSFnet was born. It began to be referred to as the NRN, the National Research Network.
The next day I invited the Directors of Computing Centers at Research Universities in New York to a meeting at 
Cornell scheduled for two weeks later to discuss the formation of a New York State Regional Network. At this 
meeting Richard Mandelbaum from the University of Rochester and I agreed to seek Federal and State funds 
to support the creation of New York State Education and Research Network (NYSERnet). We quickly secured 
State and Federal support to launch it. The next problem was to secure continuing funds. At the same time, 
Regional Networks were being formed across the country with many of the major movers and shakers coming 
from the Bitnet community. Doug Gale who had been Director of the Decentralized Computer Support Group 
at Cornell had moved to the University of Nebraska as Director of Computing. He organized the creation of 
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MIDnet serving Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. Building NSFnet 
was going to cost a lot of money, and we needed the Federal Government to step up to that challenge. 
EDUCOM was an academic computing organization that had been involved in pushing networking since its 
founding in 1964. In 1984, Ira Fuchs got a grant from IBM to create a Bitnet Information Center. Among other 
activities this Center managed the creation of routing tables, which needed to be continuously updated as the 
network grew. He decided to locate this center at EDUCOM in Princeton. As a result of its previous history 
and the association with Bitnet, EDUCOM meetings were the principal forum at which networking issues were 
discussed. 
At an EDUCOM meeting in 1986, Doug Van Houweling approached me with an idea. Doug had been Director 
of Academic Computing when I came to Cornell in 1980. In 1981 Doug was appointed CIO at Carnegie Mel-
lon. Doug was a unique talent and his departure was a great loss to Cornell. Doug, who had a Ph.D. in Political 
Science, told me that we needed to organize an effort to convince Congress to fund the expansion of NSFnet 
to every College and University in the country. To accomplish this we needed to have an active program of 
educating Congressmen on the importance of this effort. Not-for-Profit organizations like EDUCOM could 
not “lobby,” but they could “educate”. He suggested that he and I jointly convene a group of CIOs with the hope 
that we could create a group of Universities that would fund this effort. We were jointly able to put together 
a meeting of about 12 CIOs. At this meeting we were able to convince 5 Universities to pony up $25,000 each 
to hire someone to lead this effort. There were a few more Universities whose CIOs said they would probably 
join this effort but they needed to check with their University before committing. By 1988 this group had 40 
members and the annual dues were set at $5000. We decided to name the group The Networking and Telecom-
munications Task Force (NTTF). It was chaired by Douglas Van Houweling. With the money we had raised at 
that meeting we could start recruiting someone to lead this effort. Ed Shaw from Stanford told us that the per-
fect person to lead this effort was Mike Roberts, who was Stanford’s telecommunications guru. We authorized 
Ed to try to convince Mike to take the job. He shortly reported that he had accomplished this mission. We got 
agreement from EDUCOM to embed Mike in their organization, and Mike reported to EDUCOM’s Princeton 
office. As he arrived the President of EDUCOM resigned and Mike was appointed Acting President, setting 
back our effort until EDUCOM could recruit a new President. 
In the middle 80s, developments at MIT and Carnegie Mellon had the promise of changing the world. “Project 
Andrew” at Carnegie Mellon and the “Athena Project” at MIT were developing Distributed Computing Sys-
tems that were designed to support an integrated computing environment across the campus. People began 
talking about 3M workstations on every desk. A “3M workstation” could execute a million instructions per 
second, had a million-byte memory and a million-pixel display. The expectation was that in the near future 
most people would personally control all of the computing support they required.
Over the period that I was at Cornell the most important thing that changed was the attitude of people on 
campus toward computing. After the middle 80s when I had lunch in the faculty club, it was not unusual to 
hear fragments of conversations at tables around me about computing. Students were buying large numbers of 
computers and it became common to see computers on faculty members’ desks. The Computer Services staff 
felt needed and appreciated. This was in stark contrast to the mood on campus when I arrived in 1980. 
Bill Arms chaired a search committee to select a new EDUCOM President. In the summer of 1987 he told 
me that the EDUCOM Board had decided to offer the job to me. I was happy at Cornell, high above Cayuga’s 
Waters. However, the challenge of advancing networking to connect every scholar in the world to every other 
scholar was irresistible. A few years earlier I had seen a lady on the beach at Cape Cod. She wore a tee shirt 
and on the back of the tee shirt it said: “If we can put a man on the moon, why don’t we put all of them there?” 
Unlike that grand technological challenge, connecting all the scholars in the world might just be attainable. I 
decided to accept the offer. 
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Chapter 5
EDUCOM Activities from 1987 to 1992
In 1987 EDUCOM was a hand-to-mouth organization. It had been living rent-free in space at the Educational 
Testing Service (ETS) provided by Henry Chauncy, one of the founders of EDUCOM. Henry, also the founder 
of ETS, had retired and under new leadership ETS needed the space that EDUCOM occupied. As I arrived 
Mike Roberts, the Acting President, was in the process of moving EDUCOM to rented space in Princeton. 
EDUCOM had virtually no surplus and had a small line of credit at a local bank. However, membership was 
on the rise and it was enjoying some overhead from the IBM grant supporting the Bitnet Information Center. 
At the next Board meeting it was decided to relocate EDUCOM to Washington, DC, when our one-year lease 
expired.
We found space in a building at 16th and L in DC and were now positioned to let Mike Roberts and the NTTF 
educate Congressmen. The NTTF became highly influential as the only organized networking group on the 
ground in DC representing Higher Education. On L Street we were one block from K Street where all of the 
lobbyists hung out. Far enough away to avoid the stigma of being confused with people who were lobbyists 
rather than educators, but perhaps close enough to learn a few tricks. Actually the only thing I learned from 
them is that the Barbecue Industry was responsible for moving daylight saving time up a month. 
EDUCOM membership and EDUCOM conference attendance began to grow rapidly. In 1988 EDUCOM cre-
ated an annual Net Conference in Washington, DC. If you were interested in networking, or the development 
of instructional software for microcomputers, the EDUCOM conferences, were where the action was. Higher 
education had become a big market for microcomputers and software. Vendors jostled each other for prime 
space in the vendor product display area at the EDUCOM conferences, and IBM and Apple tried to outdo each 
other in hosting EDUCOM attendees. For a period it became possible to attend an EDUCOM meeting without 
paying for a meal if you were adept at getting invited to vendor presentations. By the end of 1988 EDUCOM 
was no longer a hand-to-mouth organization.
The EDUCOM/NCRIPTAL Outstanding Software 
Awards
EDUCOM began pursuing two major thrusts in support of academic computing. One 
thrust, led by Steve Gilbert, mobilized the talents of Directors of Academic Computing 
at Universities in order to identify and promote quality software developed at their insti-
tution that improved education. In 1987 EDUCOM collaborated with the National Cen-
ter for Research to Improve Post Secondary Education (NCRIPTAL) at the University of 
Michigan to create the EDUCOM/NCRIPTAL outstanding software awards program. A 
national review panel judged software submissions on their importance to the undergrad-
uate curriculum, factual accuracy, and comprehensiveness. This effort was supported by 
the Annenberg CPB project, NeXT, Apple, and IBM. In 1987 there were 139 submissions 
and 27 awards for outstanding software. The number of submissions grew as the annual 
EDUCOM/NCRIPTAL 1989 Trophy for Best Engineering Software
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awards program continued. One winner from Cornell was Bob Cooke and his team for a finite elements pro-
gram. This program allowed faculty to assign students a homework problem that would have generated a PhD 
a few years earlier. In 1991 Joe Wyatt, the Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, challenged EDUCOM members 
to produce and identify 100 outstanding software success stories. Judith Boettcher from Penn State chaired this 
national effort. In 1993 she edited a book titled: 101 Success Stories. 
In 1991 IBM started an annual awards program recognizing an individual for outstanding contributions to 
advancing computer-related education. This program was managed by EDUCOM and called the “Lou Robin-
son Award”, named to honor a long-time IBM Director of Education who had been a tireless and inspirational 
speaker at Colleges and Universities on the subject of computer education. Along with a cash award came 
responsibility to speak at the EDUCOM conference in the year of the award. The first award winner was John 
Kemeny, the President at Dartmouth, who with Tom Kurtz developed the Basic computer language and start-
ed one of the first time-sharing efforts at a College. Kemeny was determined to see that wherever computing 
education was going, Dartmouth would get there first.
Kemeny was a chain smoker and airline regulations that prohibited smoking made it impossible for him to 
take a long flight to the next EDUCOM Conference to speak, so I went to Dartmouth and we taped a video 
interview. An edited version of several hours of interview was shown at the EDUCOM conference and was a 
real winner. Kemeny explained to me that cigarette companies had provided free cigarettes to soldiers during 
World War II, as their contribution to the war effort, and he returned from the war with a severe addiction 
problem. We talked about a lot of things unrelated to computing in education. He had been chairman of a 
commission investigating the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in 1979 and we talked about that. 
You can watch this video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HHi3VFOL-AI
The next year’s winner was Seymour Papert. Seymour, from the MIT Media Laboratory, had developed the 
programming language Logo that enabled very young children to start programming by controlling a robot 
called a turtle.
In 1990, the Association of Research Libraries (ARL), EDUCOM, and CAUSE joined together to form The Co-
alition for Networked Information (CNI) in order to create a collaborative project focused on networking that 
would integrate the interests of academic and research libraries (ARL) and computing in higher education. The 
first Executive Director was Paul Peters. The three sponsoring organizations sought to broaden their respective 
community’s thinking to encompass digital content and advanced applications to create, share, disseminate, 
and analyze such content in the service of research and education. CNI holds an annual conference in Wash-
ington and is still going strong under the leadership of Clifford Lynch who succeeded Paul Evans as Executive 
Director.
EDUCOM had a consulting service that provided consulting on computing issues to Colleges and Universities 
by members from similar institutions that enjoyed high-quality computing. I joined a number of these groups. 
I learned that leadership at the top level of the University was a key element in creating a quality computing 
environment. At one College we ended our visit by interviewing the President. He said that he thought com-
puting was a distraction to learning and was planning to create computer free zones on campus.
The NREN Becomes the Internet
The second major effort at EDUCOM was building a worldwide scholarly network. Mike Roberts and the 
NTTF led this effort. Over a period of time the NTTF developed 4 goals:
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1. Connect every scholar in the world to every other scholar, surmounting the barriers of space and time to 
scholarly collaboration. (This goal came out of Bitnet.)
2. Enable access from the network to all scholarly information worth sharing.
3. Build a knowledge-management system on the network that enables scholars to surf through this sea of 
knowledge in a simple and intuitive way.
4. Enable building knowledge on a new, dynamic, multimedia foundation in addition to building it on static 
information in print format.
There was a fifth goal that never got any traction: To enable enable students to find instruction any time, any 
place, on any subject. Some people found this goal threatening to the future of Universities that still employ 
batch-processing systems to educate students. 
When EDUCOM moved to Washington we discovered two staunch allies in Congress, Al Gore in the Senate 
and George Brown Jr. in the house. While Al Gore’s father was in the Senate, he had sponsored the bill creating 
the National Highway System, and Al was eager to create a National Information Superhighway based on the 
NREN. As early as 1986 Al Gore began to extol the importance of high-speed networking to the future of the 
country. I believe that he has gotten nowhere near the credit he deserves for creating the Internet. NSFnet was 
now referred to as “The National Research and Education Network” (NREN). The NTTF had easily persuaded 
Stephen Wolff, who succeeded Dennis Jennings as the NSF person responsible for networking, to allow educa-
tion as an acceptable use on NSFnet and the NRN became the NREN. 
The goal of the NTTF was to create a network connecting scholars. Al Gore’s goal was to create a network 
connecting everyone. That worried me until I remembered what Mae West had once said: “too much of a good 
thing can be simply wonderful!” and suddenly connecting everyone seemed like a good thing. But the NREN 
was our sandbox and letting everyone play in that box was frightening. The NTTF threw in with Al, and Al 
created a bill called “The High Performance Computing Act of 1991”. There were three things that we could do 
to help Al: we could provide technical help with the bill’s contents; we could provide experts to testify before 
congressional committees; and we could mobilize University Presidents to call their Senators and Congress-
men to tell them how important the NREN was to their University. Our primary interface in Gore’s office was 
Mike Nelson. Mike was a geologist by background, and we were fond of saying that Mike had come to Wash-
ington to learn the difference between a rock and a hard place.
The bill was enacted on December 9, 1991. In signing the bill, President George H. W. Bush predicted that the 
Act would help “...unlock the secrets of DNA, open up foreign markets to free trade, and [establish] a promise 
The Gore bill passes: 1991
2.37
of cooperation between government, academia, and industry”. All those things certainly happened, probably 
on a scale far greater than he could have imagined. On the afternoon of the passage of the bill, I was invited to 
a small celebration in Gore’s office and I have a picture of Al at that party with an unindicted co-conspirator. 
In 1993 Al Gore became the Vice President, and in April the NSF announced that the NREN would become 
privatized in April 1995 to become the “Internet”. On hearing that news, it struck me like a bolt out of the blue: 
This could lead to the end of “civilization” as we knew it!
I talked to Glenn Ricart about creating a small group that would contain some CIOs and networking super-
stars to try to create a virtual academic network on top of the Internet. We created a group of 25 people plus 
a representative each from EDUCOM, Internet II, CNI, and Cause. Glenn suggested calling this group the 
“Stone Soup Group” after an old folk story. It subsequently evolved into the Common Solutions Group (CSG) 
and is still going strong. Its email list provides me with my current window into networking and academic 
computing issues at Universities.
In the late 80s the international standard OSI protocol began to emerge and some European institutions, 
particularly in Germany, began to employ it rather than TCP/IP. This required a protocol conversion gateway 
between TCP/IP and OSI networks. TCP/IP was a lighter, more nimble protocol and had by this time devel-
oped huge momentum. In the United States there was only one TCP/IP holdout and that was the Library of 
Congress. The person running computing at the Library was Henriette Avram. Henriette had developed the 
MARC card catalog format, the international standard for bibliographic and holdings information that was 
the format used at most libraries. She was a legend in the library community and a staunch believer in Interna-
tional Standards since she had developed one. In order to put the Library of Congress catalog on the Internet, 
the University of Maryland created a PC-based gateway between the NREN and the library’s internal network.
I talked to Henriette a number of times, trying to persuade her to convert to TCP/IP but she seemed unmov-
able. It was always fun to talk to Henriette, particularly about the halcyon days when she was a 701 program-
mer. One day someone from Berkeley told me that students there had developed a highly successful persuasion 
technique. It was called: “talking a person to death”. You would mobilize students to massively attempt to per-
suade the person by any means at hand. I started sending people to talk to Henriette but not many could spare 
the time. I informed Henriette of my strategy and she was amused. She said that she always enjoyed talking 
to computer people. In a conversation one day with the NSF Director of CISE, the Directorate for Computing, 
Information Science and Engineering, he mentioned that he was visiting the Library of Congress the following 
day. I suggested that he drop in for a conversation with Henriette if he had time. The next day, Henriette called 
me in a highly agitated state. She asked: “Who was that man?” I asked: “What man?” She said that a man had 
barged into her office and shouted: “Who the hell do you think you are?” He then ordered her to convert to 
TCP/IP and stalked out. I told Henriette that I would “call off the dogs”. In 1992 an IBM Vice President was the 
keynote speaker at the Net 92 conference in Washington. He announced that IBM was abandoning support of 
the OSI protocol in favor of TCP/IP. At the end of his talk Henriette walked up to me and said: “I give up. He’s 
bigger than me.” I replied: “Henriette, can I buy you a drink?”
In 1992 Bob Kahn, Juergen Harms, and I signed papers of incorporation creating the Internet Society as a 
non-profit organization, and we appointed a founding Board of Trustees with international representation.
The Internet Society was created to support the growth and technical evolution of the Internet as a worldwide 
educational and research infrastructure. The Society internationalized the Internet evolution effort. On the 
following page is a picture of the founding board holding a copy of the Society’s charter.
You can learn about the contributions of these Internet pioneers by going to Google. The Society is still going 
strong.
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The Internet Society was started in 1992
The Founding Board: In the front row from left to right are Ira Fuchs, Ken King, Bob Kahn, Juergen Harms, and An-
thony Rutkowski. In the second row are Lawrence Landweber, Hideo Aiso, Lyman Chapin, Kees Neggers, Tomaz Kalin, 
Vinton Cerf, Froda Greisen, Geoff Huston, and Michael Roberts
The University and Research communities created new Internet applications in the early 90s. Among the most 
significant were web browsers at CERN and the University of Illinois, arXiv at Los Alamos, the Internet Go-
pher at the University of Minnesota, CU-SeeMe at Cornell, and the handle system for digital library objects at 
CNRI. In particular, web browsers caused an explosive growth in Internet users.
I believe that Universities have never been given proper credit for their role in creating the Internet. By the 
time NSFnet was started in 1985, networking was already a global University phenomenon. It was the zeal of 
the University computing community fired by academic goals that fueled the explosive growth of networking. 
Universities were the laboratory in which Internet technology and applications were built and scaled up to 
work with millions of interconnected people. University people provided most of the creative energy and did 
almost all of the work in creating the NREN that evolved into the Internet. Universities trained the people that 
brought the Internet into the commercial world. The role of ARPANET has been well documented but the role 
of Universities has not. It is my hope that the Memoirs in this incremental book will redress that problem1.
1 An oral presentation of portions of this Memoir were presented in a lecture on February 17, 2011, for 
the Cornell Association of Professors Emeriti: “The Origin and History of the Internet, a lecture by Ken King” 
at http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/handle/1813/22368
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Chapter 6
Looking back
A lot of progress has been made on The NTTF goals: 
1. Connect every scholar in the world to every other scholar, surmounting the barriers of space and time to 
scholarly collaboration. (This goal came out of Bitnet.)
2. Enable access from the network to all scholarly information worth sharing.
3. Build a knowledge-management system on the network that enables scholars to surf through this sea of 
knowledge in a simple and intuitive way.
4. Enable building knowledge on a new, dynamic, multimedia foundation in addition to building it on static 
information in print format. 
I think that we can check goal 1 off as having been accomplished. In the 80s the challenge was to connect every 
scholar in the world to every other scholar. Today the challenge is to connect every person in the world to every 
other person. 
Progress has been made on goal 2, but a lot of work remains. Some breakthroughs have been achieved toward 
open publication: major milestones include the preprint archive ArXiv maintained by the Cornell Library 
and PLOS (The Public Library of Science) that distributes open-access peer-reviewed articles on the Internet. 
Clearly information “wants to be free”. It is the only non-depletable commodity. The more it is used, the more 
valuable it becomes. 
In the early 2000s Bob Cooke and I began talking about problems associated with expanding the amount of in-
formation available on the Internet. Bob was concerned because libraries were beginning to drop journal sub-
scriptions because of their rapidly increasing cost. The journal publication system involved the Government 
and Universities paying for research, but the scholars were publishing in journals that required the scholar to 
assign the copyright to the journal. The journals then sold their content back to libraries at ever-rising (greater 
than CPI) cost. University Presses were unable to publish scholarly work in some disciplines because the mar-
ket for books in the discipline was too thin. Electronic publication of books was now feasible, but Universities 
were continuing to buy miles of books every year. Finding a mechanism to distribute and pay for electronic 
versions of books consistent with copyright laws was and still is a major hurdle to their replacing physical 
books. Electronic books are content-separate from a physical object that restricts usage to one person at a time. 
One copy of an eBook on the Internet or in the cloud could serve every University in the world. An eBook can 
contain multimedia material and is closer to software, videos, and music than a physical book. A site licensing 
mechanism could solve this problem. Just keeping physical books on a shelf in a library costs something like 
$6 per year. Something like 90% of the books acquired by a research library are never circulated. The paradigm 
for book acquisition is “just in case”, rather than “just in time”. Just freeing the money spent on shelving and 
processing miles of physical books every year could pay for a lot of pay-per-view access to electronic content. 
There seemed to us to be something very wrong with the current system. I was additionally concerned because 
I hoped to check off NTTF Goal 2 in my lifetime.
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Bob was Dean of the University Faculty at Cornell at the time. We concluded that the solution to a lot of these 
problems was promoting Internet publishing of all scholarly work as a first choice if it were economically feasi-
ble. Bob believed that if every University assumed responsibility for the publication of the scholarly work of its 
own faculty, and published it in open-access mode on the Internet, they could save money.
In addition, Internet publication would vastly increase exposure to scholarly ideas produced at their institution.
We succeeded in getting a 3-year grant from the Atlantic Philanthropies Foundation to pursue the economics 
of Internet publication in the hope of finding a solution that would result in the Internet providing access to 
all scholarly information worth sharing. With funds from the grant we joined the DSpace Consortium that 
was supporting the development of software at MIT enabling Universities to archive information on a server 
whose content could be distributed on the Internet. We also acquired a server managed by the Cornell Li-
brary that DSpace required to hold its archive. At the same time we created the Internet-First University Press 
(IFUP) as the vehicle enabling us to experiment with Internet publication. With excellent support from the 
Cornell Library we discovered that lots of valuable scholarly information could be published at very low cost. 
We published a number of out-of-print books. One by Jack Oliver, entitled The Incomplete Guide to the Art 
of Discovery has had more than 100,000 downloads. We’ve published books that couldn’t be published by a 
commercial press because the market was too thin. We’ve video taped Symposia and lectures by distinguished 
faculty members and published them on the Internet. We’ve put online all issues of the Cornell Alumni maga-
zine, faculty memorial statements, and the minutes of the Faculty Senate. We have put Departmental histories 
online and are in the process of trying to videotape an interview with every emeritus faculty member covering 
their career. We have succeeded in getting most of Cornell theses and dissertations online. The DSpace archive 
has become the Cornell eCommons, and DSpace has merged with a Cornell-produced archive system called 
Fedora to create DuraSpace. You can find material published by the IFUP2 at: http://ecommons.library.cornell.
edu/handle/1813/62
From this project we have learned that it is very inexpensive to scan and OCR (optical character recognition) 
printed documents and to videotape lectures, interviews, and other events. The University and faculty own the 
copyright to lots of material of scholarly value and this material can be put on the Internet with a modest effort. 
Publishers are often willing to return the copyright of an out-of-print book to a faculty member. This was the 
case with Jack Oliver’s books. If every University undertook responsibility for publishing the scholarly material 
in its archives that it or its faculty owns, the result would be of enormous value to the world.
Search engines like Google have enabled progress on goal 3. Artificial intelligence based systems like the IBM 
Watson program promise significant progress in the future. A lot of progress has been made on goal 4, enabled 
by inexpensive video-cams and editing and other image and sound processing software. Words like “visualiza-
tion”, animation, and “virtual reality” are used to describe progress. When I taught an introductory Computer 
Science course, I would tell my students: if you can see it and it’s there, it’s real; if you can see it and it’s not 
there, it’s virtual; if you can’t see it and it’s there, it’s transparent; and if you can’t see it and it’s not there, it’s 
gone. So much progress on electronic display of information has been made that the future of hard cover books 
and print documents like newspapers are now threatened.
Attaining “computer literacy” and infusing computing into the curriculum were huge challenges from the 50s 
to the 90s. Today many students graduate from high school with the skills that we struggled to impart and 
support during that period. Enrollments in introductory computer science courses have dropped as a conse-
2 See also: “Compressed version of the Final Project Report to Atlantic Philanthropies” at  
http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/handle/1813/3459 and  
“The First Ten Years of the Internet-First University Press and CAPE’s Histories and Biographies Project” at  
http://ecommons.library.cornell.edu/handle/1813/36253 
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quence. Nearly every student shows up at college with a computer, frequently more than one, and they carry it 
around with them. The computer in their pocket is as fast as the fastest supercomputer in the mid-80s and it 
has a larger memory and more random access storage. It connects them to friends around the world via instant 
messaging and email. With Skype they can even see and talk to people around the world. It connects them to 
vastly more information on the Internet than they could have found in all the libraries in the world in the 90s, 
and almost every document is accessible with a full text index.
Research in almost all disciplines has become computer-dependent even in the Humanities. Faculty members 
in most disciplines control all the computing power they require. In the sciences, social sciences, and engi-
neering the curriculum has been transformed by access to “application packages”. Progress in the structure 
and methodology of instruction has been slower to change. In the 90s people were fond of pointing out that if 
a physician slept for a hundred years, and if when he woke up he visited a hospital, he would feel like he had 
been dropped into a planet in some other galaxy. If a professor slept for 100 years and walked into a classroom 
he would still find a blackboard and chalk and feel right at home. Today a screen often replaces the chalkboard 
and a PowerPoint presentation replaces chalk on blackboard but not a lot more has changed in many disci-
plines. Video-taping a lecture to a class with a large number of students and putting it online probably has 
more value to students than requiring them to sit in a classroom with little or no opportunity to ask questions. 
Long ago, educators discovered that interactive education is more effective than passive education, but most of 
education is still based on a sage on a stage.
Today’s supercomputers are massively parallel with more than 3 million computing cores. They are more than 
10-million-times faster than a supercomputer in the 80s. In signing the Gore bill in 1991 President George H. 
W. Bush opined that computers would one day be able to decode DNA, which was at the time one of the grand 
challenges of science. Today DNA decoding has opened up many new fields of research. Recently I read that 
falcons were genetically similar to parrots and woodpeckers, and the apple is a member of the rose family. De-
velopment of software has become a cottage industry with new apps proliferating at a rapid rate. Universities 
are no longer the source of most educational software.
Computer service organizations have gotten smaller and are again largely enterprise units. Their heads are now 
in the “Cloud”. If a University can find a computer service like email in the Cloud, it is cheaper to contract for 
it than to support a locally developed system. CIOs at Universities no longer have the financial wiggle room to 
invest in new ideas. The only large-scale computing project designed to change the world that Universities are 
currently involved in is Internet II. This attempt to create the next generation Internet is a collaborative effort 
involving industry and many Universities.
In the 90s Universities were measured by the number of books in their library and big Universities added miles 
of books every year. Today JStor provides network access to back issues of more than 2000 journals with full 
text search. Miles of library bookshelves are no longer needed. Electronic books are cheaper than hard cover 
books and come with full-text search capability, and sometimes with multimedia elements, but using them 
presents copyright problems that have not yet been solved. Since Gutenberg invented the movable type printing 
press in 1450, great Universities were built around great libraries. Today the Internet provides access to infor-
mation found via full-text searches that vastly exceeds the locally stored information in any University library; 
but University libraries still largely measure themselves by the number of books on their shelves. 
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Chapter 7
The Future Lies Ahead
Super computers 1000 times faster than today’s fastest computer are on the drawing board using current chip 
technology. Far faster quantum computers are a gleam in computer designers’ eyes. The consequences of this 
increase in capability on everything boggles the imagination. Technology allowing people to talk to their com-
puter with artificial intelligence assistance in locating information is just around the corner. Artificial intelli-
gence assistance in many areas, even in grading and editing papers, is being developed. Networks connecting 
homes will be supported by fiber optics cables capable of delivering data at rates more than 1000 times faster 
than current home data rates. 
The impact of emerging technology on Universities is likely to be profound. Current education delivery systems 
are labor intensive and consequently increase in cost faster than the inflation rate. Tuition increases are often 
at twice the rate of inflation. Nothing can continue to grow exponentially without a day of reckoning. At many 
Colleges, adjunct faculty members that earn small salaries without a benefits package are now teaching cours-
es. A recent development is the emergence of Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). MOOCs frequently 
enjoy enrollments in the thousands. A Faculty member teaching one of these courses gets more feedback from 
students in one semester than he or she would get in a lifetime of teaching in a classroom. This feedback enables 
the course and its delivery system to improve over time. The MOOC courses are available anytime, any place, 
to any student. This is the goal that I failed to get included in the NTTF list in the 80s. If great Universities 
can cooperate to create great courses, why shouldn’t they all use those courses? Colleges are beginning to give 
credit to students taking these courses. I expect this trend to grow rapidly.
Current educational systems are largely batch-processing systems. When they become distributed systems, 
students will have courses available to them wherever they are that far outnumber the courses available in a 
College today, as well as access to the Internet library. Virtual Laboratories will replace real ones. If you have a 
question in the middle of a lecture, you will pause the lecture and ask Professor Siri for an answer. You won’t 
even have to raise your hand. It doesn’t get any better than that. However, this can lead to reducing the social 
interactions between students and the mentoring relationship of students with faculty members that is import-
ant in education. Someone has pointed out that the invention of the printing press freed the monks from their 
transcriptional responsibilities and they went off and created the wine industry. Freeing many faculty members 
from their teaching responsibilities will have unpredictable consequences for Universities and the world. When 
the NREN was privatized to form the Internet, I worried that this could lead to the end of “civilization” as we 
knew it. It has certainly changed almost everything.
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C. Memoir by Douglas S. Gale
Preface and Introduction
Bill Arms and Ken King have chronicled much of the early history of academic computing.  Accordingly, I 
have tried to focus my contribution to The Early Years of Academic Computing on topics less covered by King 
and Arms.  My contribution is organized into four chronological periods, roughly spanning the last 50 years of 
the 20th century, and each has an organizational theme: career transitions, the microcomputer revolution, the 
networking revolution, and the changing role of academic computing and networking. 
The theme of the first period -- career transitions -- will consider where the early practitioners of academic 
computing came from.  Computer Science was first recognized as an academic discipline in 1962, and the early 
years of academic computing were led by people who had received their academic training in other disciplines. 
Many, if not most, came from the community of computer users and early adopters.  The first period was char-
acterized by the emergence of computing, both academic and administrative, as something of importance in 
higher education.  Computing centers were created and awareness of their importance began moving up the 
administrative hierarchy.
The second period will focus on the emergence of decentralized computing driven by the advent of small, in-
expensive, and powerful microcomputers.  This paradigm shift involved more than hardware and software.  It 
was a paradigm shift in how the technology was managed, organized, and supported.  Higher education played 
a key, and largely unrecognized, roll in this transition. 
The third period will focus on the contributions of higher education to the evolution and widespread use of 
computer networks.  Much as the “printing” revolution was based on the technology of movable type and 
mass-produced paper, future generations will probably not differentiate between the technologies of comput-
ing and networking.  
The fourth period will focus on how the relative roles of academic computing, administrative computing, and 
networking changed in the final decade of the century in response to the microcomputer, distributed comput-
ing, and the Internet.  In particular, this period marks the relative decrease in the role of centralized academic 
computing and an increase in the importance of administrative computing.
The third and fourth periods were also characterized by the growing recognition that computing and network-
ing were strategic to the role and mission of higher education.  
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Chapter 1
Career Transitions
Mille viae ducunt homines per saecula Romam (A thousand roads lead men forever to 
Rome)
Although computer science was identified as an academic discipline in 1962, at Purdue University, in the early 
years the ranks of academic computing practitioners were largely filled by individuals who received their for-
mal training in other disciplines.  What disciplines?  What was their background? Why were they drawn to 
computing?  How did the transition occur? 
This section will follow the author’s transition from a student, to a scientist and user of computer technology, 
and to an information technologist.  My experience in conducting oral history interviews for the Internet 
Legacy Institute (www.internetlegacyinstitute.org) indicates that my experience, from user to practitioner, was 
typical of the career transitions of many of the early academic computing leaders.  Hopefully, it will provide 
some perspective on why and how so many educators and researchers were drawn to this new discipline.
Computing for a Kid in the Fifties
For kids with technical interests, growing up in the 1950s was much different than for one growing up in 
the 21st century. Computers were outside our range of experiences. If we had heard of them at all, they were 
regarded as something used by businesses to sort punch cards or by research laboratories to calculate new 
artillery tables. But they had little relevance to what we did on a day-to-day basis. Our heroes, Buzz Cory 
(Space Patrol: http://users.bestweb.net/~foosie/spacepat.htm), and Tom Corbett (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Tom_Corbett,_Space_Cadet), as well as older heroes such as the Lone Ranger and Superman, didn’t need or 
use computers to explore the universe and bring evildoers to justice.  Computers weren’t referenced in either 
our textbooks or our comic books.
Mechanical calculators, which relied on ingenious combinations of gears to perform simple arithmetic calcu-
lations, were developed as early as the 17th century  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanical_calculator).  But 
the complexity of their construction and resulting cost limited their use. If a family had a computer at all, it 
was likely a cheap slide rule or simple mechanical adder/subtracter.
So what did a technically oriented kid do growing up in the ‘50s? 
We experimented with things, such as disassembling fireworks 
to gather the gunpowder in order to make skyrockets and small 
cannons. My friends and I built a rocket ship, which was basical-
ly a collection of old junk and anything that had a switch, and 
reenacted our heroes’ adventures.  As we got older, the switches 
started to become functional and many of us became ham radio 
operators. My call letters were K0HKY.  We made things.  I spent 
many hours as a kid pouring over a copy to the “Boy Mechanic” 
that my father gave me for Christmas in 1953. 
The Boy Mechanic   Photograph by Doug Gale
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It covered everything from building a boat or a working telephone to equipping a home chemistry lab, com-
plete with dangerous and unstable items.  
This hands-on, hardware-oriented approach to technology influenced many of our later careers in computing. 
Computing for a Student in the Early Sixties
As a physic’s major at the University of Kansas in the early 
‘60s I, like all my classmates, did computations either by hand 
or with a slide rule.  In my case, it was a cheap bamboo slide 
rule that my uncle won in a poker game.  It wasn’t until I went 
to graduate school that I could afford a Pickett, all metal slide 
rule. 
The two indispensible tools of a science or engineering stu-
dent were a slide rule and the CRC Standard Mathematical 
Tables, which contained tables of logarithmic and trigono-
metric functions, as well as other useful data. 
Slide Rule and CRC Tables
Photograph by Doug Gale
I was introduced to computers in 1963 when my roommate, an Electrical Engineering major, was taking a 
computer-programming course using the university’s General Electric mainframe.  It was a perfect match.  He 
was looking for real problems to program, and I was trying to find a way to dress up a mundane compound 
pendulum laboratory assignment.  Using numerical techniques to eliminate the small-angle approximation 
was just the ticket.  I did the experiment and the mathematics, and he wrote the computer code.  One of the key 
observations I made was that my roommate spent a great deal of time writing computer programs; so much so 
that he added an extra semester to his undergraduate career.
Although most students using computers came from the physical sciences, mathematics, or engineering, 
there were a small number from the liberal arts as well.  One older friend was completing his dissertation 
in English — a concordance of the works of George Bernard Shaw.  He had a rented keypunch on this front 
porch because it wouldn’t fit through the front door.  This was ground breaking stuff in the 1960s. 
In the fall of 1964, I began work on my master’s degree in physics at the University of Minnesota.  Towards the 
end of my first year, my research professor had me begin doing elastic-scattering calculations in preparation for 
my thesis research.  The process was laborious and required a series of calculations on a mechanical calculator. 
The Marchant Calculating Machine Company was founded in 
1911 and acquired by the Smith Corona typewriter company in 
1958.  Within a few years, electronic calculators eliminated the 
market for such machines, and a few years later personal com-
puters eliminated the typewriter business as well. 
SCM Marchant Calculator
Photograph from Wikipedia
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The results of those calculations were then used to look up scattering 
parameters on tables not too unlike the old artillery range tables or the 
trigonometric tables in the CRC Handbook.  I spent a great deal of time 
over the first summer completing the calculations that would be needed 
for my research.  When I returned to school in the fall, my advisor said, 
“Now that you understand how elastic scattering works, let me show 
you an easier way to do it,” and instructed me to buy a copy of Daniel 
McCracken’s “A Guide to Fortran Programming” and to write a com-
puter program to do the calculations that I had previously been doing by 
hand.   That was how you learned to program a computer in those days. 
I still have my copy of McCracken’s brief guide on my bookshelf.  
A Guide to Fortran Programming
Photograph by Doug Gale
McCracken’s Guide to Fortran Programming: For two decades McCracken’s guides to programming in the Fortran (FO-
Rumla TRANslation) programming language were the standard Fortran textbooks and were translated into fourteen 
languages.
In the fall of 1965, I decided to take a three-quarter course in numerical analysis in the mathematics depart-
ment to give some formal structure to what I was doing on an ad hoc basis.  One assignment in particular 
made a lasting impression.  We were asked to calculate the value of a 4x4 determinant both by hand and by 
using the University’s CDC-6600 mainframe.  Control Data Corporation’s 6600 was arguably the world’s first 
supercomputer and was designed to solve large scientific problems.  Its 60-bit word length in single precision 
and 120-bits in double precision set the performance standard for many years.  
Calculating the determinant exactly by hand was tedious and took the better part of a day, as the 16 elements 
were all fractions and the lowest common denominator was extremely large.  The results of numerical calcu-
lations on the 6600, however, ranged from plus infinity to minus infinity!  We students were baffled until our 
instructor demonstrated that the matrix was so ill conditioned that our numerical techniques were useless.  I’ve 
never forgotten the point he made so dramatically, particularly as I observed the increased reliance on canned 
numerical analysis programs.  
The process of running a computer program consisted of writing the necessary code, usually in Fortran.  You 
would then enter the code onto punched cards on a cardpunch machine.  In addition to the code itself, you 
had to include header and footer cards that contained additional information.  These “JCL or Job Control Lan-
guage” instructions would tell the computer what you wanted done with the program.  You would then turn 
in the punched cards to the computer center; sometime later your deck would reappear, along with the output, 
on the shelves adjacent to the input window.  
It was about this time that I learned the importance of marking the sequence of the punched cards in the 
deck upon proving the unstated rule, “An unsequenced deck will be dropped and shuffled.”  Although the 
last eight columns of the 80 columns of data on a card were reserved for a sequence number, I found it faster 
to decorate the top of the deck with geometrical drawings done in various colors with felt tipped markers.  It 
also helped in finding my deck on a shelf filled with dozens of other decks.
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My thesis work involved nuclear scattering done on a univer-
sity’s Van de Graaff accelerator. My interest in Van de Graaff 
accelerators began when I was in high school and made one for 
the Kansas City Science Fair.  I naively thought that I could get 
higher voltages by simply making a bigger machine.  I solved 
the problem of finding a large metal sphere that I could afford 
by covering a large (3-foot diameter) weather balloon with pa-
per mache painted with conductive carbon paint.  The crowned 
drive pulleys were turned on a homemade lathe, and the belt 
was driven by a motor liberated from my mother’s vacuum 
cleaner.  The whole thing was more than 7-feet tall with the 
accelerating column made from a large cardboard tube.  
Van de Graaff Generator
Illustration from Wikipedia
A metal sphere, atop an insulating column, can be raised to a high voltage by carrying a static charge to the 
“terminal” on a moving belt.  The generator may be used as a particle accelerator by adding a second evacuated 
insulating column to allow charges to be accelerated from the terminal to the base.  
It didn’t work very well.  The surface of the sphere didn’t have a high enough conductance, the accelerating 
column didn’t have a high enough resistance, and there wasn’t any mechanism to equalize the potential drop 
down the column.  This was another early lesson that first-order approximations are often inadequate.
The construction of the accelerator at Minnesota begun in 1937 had 
followed, albeit with far better implementation, the idea that bigger 
would be better. The accelerator was enclosed in a steel tank filled 
with compressed air to allow for higher terminal voltages and was 
three stories tall.  The danger was that a spark from the high-voltage 
terminal would cause a fire inside the tank and raise the air pressure 
above what the tank could withstand.  The external tank remains a 
fixture on the Minnesota campus.  I was the next-to-last student to do 
their research on the machine, as it was phased out of service shortly 
after I graduated for a newer accelerator. I found the “hands on” as-
pect of my research particularly appealing.
University of Minnesota Van de Graaff
Photograph by Doug Gale
The author standing in front of the compressed air shell of the original Minnesota Van de Graaff in 2014, for-
ty-five years after it was decommissioned.  It was just too big to move and remains a monument on campus. 
Each Christmas when it was operational the graduate students would adorn the top of the tank with a brightly 
lit Christmas tree.
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My research made extensive use of a form of computing no longer in fashion --analog computation.  Particles 
were identified by using an electrical analog multiplier to generate a signal proportional to (E-∂E)0.6∂E, where 
∂E was the energy lost by the particle in traversing a gas-filled proportional counter, and E was the energy as 
it was stopped in a solid-state detector.  The magnitude of that signal provided a unique signature for identify-
ing different particles.  That information was used in analog circuitry to filter out unwanted interactions.  The 
whole process is now done by recording all “events” and doing a post-analysis on a digital computer.
The Late 1960s:  
Computing Spreads to Smaller Institutions
After completing my master’s degree in 1966 I took a break from my education, partially to give my spouse a 
chance to work on her master’s degree and partially to earn some money, and accepted a position as a physics 
instructor at St. Cloud State College, which was located about an hour from Minneapolis.  
While at St. Cloud, I decided that I needed some formal training in computer programming, so when I saw that 
the University of Minnesota was offering a graduate course in computer programming that was to be offered 
for three hours one night a week, I immediately signed up.  The first class was a bit of a surprise.  I was the 
youngest person in the class.  Everyone else was in their 30s or 40s and working for CDC.  And the course was 
CDC machine language programming, not a high-level language such as Fortran.  Each week we were given an 
assignment that was due at class time the next week.  Since I was located an hour away and did not have local 
access to a CDC supercomputer, I would spend the week writing and very carefully reviewing my program. 
On class day, I would drive to Minneapolis early enough to submit my stack of punch cards in time to get the 
output before class.  The discipline of being meticulously careful not to make mistakes and getting it right the 
first time were invaluable lessons.  Although I didn’t know it at the time, the experience of working in machine 
language would have a profound impact on my later career.
In the mid-60s, using computers in general education courses was relatively uncommon outside a few elite 
institutions.  Programming was considered the specialized province of engineers, scientists, and accountants. 
I decided, however, to include it in my general education physics classes and prepared a two-page hand out, 
“Super Simple Fortran.”  I would cover the material in a single lab period and give each student a personalized 
assignment due the next day.  After much moaning and groaning, the students would always successfully com-
plete the assignment.  What I overlooked, unfortunately, was the impact a horde of panicked students would 
have on the college’s limited public keypunch machines. 
While I was teaching, my spouse, who had a bachelor’s degree in physical education, was taking courses to-
wards her master’s degree.  Since she had done some keypunching for me the previous year when I was working 
on my thesis, she decided on a lark to take a programming course.  The only one offered was a one-quarter 
course that covered machine language, assembly language, and Fortran.  The instructor was Jack Steingraber, 
who went on to publish a number of books on computer programming.  That course changed her life, as the 
next quarter she took a part-time job as a computer operator in the college’s computer center.
The college only had two computers, an IBM 409 and an IBM 1620. 
Both were used almost entirely for administrative computing, 
although the 1620 saw limited academic use.  There was no central-
ized academic computing support organization.  The 409, which 
was introduced in 1959, was an accounting machine that read 
punched cards, made simple decisions, and printed the results.
IBM 409 Programming Board  Photograph from Wikipedia
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The 409 was “programmed” by moving jumper wires around on a removable panel.  To speed changing pro-
grams, there were multiple panels, all pre-configured for a particular task.
In contrast to the 409, the university’s IBM-1620, which 
was introduced in 1959 and marketed as an inexpensive 
“scientific computer,” was programmed via a console 
typewriter or punched cards. 
The 1620 was so widely used by scientists and mathema-
ticians that the textbook, Numerical Methods and Com-
puters by Shan Kuo, included an appendix of operating 
instructions for the IBM-1620 that included flipping 
electrical switches on the console front panel.
IBM 1620 Computer
In 1967 my spouse and I attended a conference in Chicago on the then avant-garde topic of “Computer Assisted 
Instruction” or CAI.   I returned to campus determined to make more use of computers in physics instruction. 
In one course, I asked the students to write a program to simulate putting a rocket into earth orbit.  (Rocket Tra-
jectory Simulation, D.S. Gale, Amer. Journal of Physics, 38, 1475, 1970.)  The objective was to find, by trial and 
error, successful launch parameters.  While the students learned a great deal, they were unsuccessful in finding 
a stable orbit.  Once again I was reminded of the limitations of numerical approximations.  I had one student 
contact me 30 years later to tell me how that assignment changed his future career to information technology.
My spouse decided to do her master’s thesis in education using CAI.  Specifically, she wrote a 1620 assembly 
language program for golf instruction in physical education.  The objectives were for players to learn which 
club to use in different situations and also to learn rules and proper etiquette.  The course was then used for a 
small class of 10 students, who would individually sit at the console responding to queries from the computer. 
That, of course, required that the university dedicate the entire 1620 to that one application and behind the 
curtain there was an operator desperately feeding punched cards into the card reader trying to stay ahead of 
the student.  The course was successful and popular with the students.  
“Professional educators,” however, did not in general embrace computing in the ‘60s.  When my spouse sub-
mitted a paper based on her thesis to one of the education journals, it was rejected, because “it is common 
knowledge that computers are of little importance in education.”  She was so disgusted that she dropped out of 
the education community and joined the computing community.  This “late adopter” pattern within the K-12 
education community would be repeated in the early ‘80s when microcomputers were introduced.
The Early 1970s: 
Computing Becomes Ubiquitous for Research at Research 
Universities
In 1969 I decided to return to graduate school and complete a PhD in Physics.  I selected Kansas State Univer-
sity (KSU) because they were installing a new tandem Van de Graaff accelerator, and I would be on the ground 
floor of building a new machine. One of the attractive aspects of the program was that graduate students ran 
the accelerator.  We were the operators as well as the researchers.  If something broke while we were using the 
machine, it was up to us to fix it.
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Data acquisition was done largely with analog electronics much like what I used at Minnesota.  The output, 
however, was punched tape, which we quickly converted to punched cards for further analysis on a digital 
computer.  
KSU Tandem Van de Graaff
Photograph by Doug Gale
A small group of graduate students purchased army 
surplus cots that we used when we had multiple days of 
beam time.  We lived on pizza and coffee.  The tandem 
was painted purple, one of the school colors.
The late 1960s and early 1970s were a period of political and social unrest in the United States, much of it led by 
students.  In December of 1968 a fire, believed to be set by an arsonist protesting the Vietnam War, had gutted 
Nichols Hall only a few hundred yards from the KSU physics building and computer center.  In April of 1970 
the computing facility at the University of Kansas, only 81 miles from Kansas State University, was bombed. 
(http://kuhistory.com/articles/this-is-no-joke/) The explosion and subsequent fire injured three students and 
caused extensive damage.  Several months later, a science building at the University of Wisconsin was bombed 
and resulted in the death of a physics researcher.  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sterling_Hall_bombing) 
Since Kansas State’s accelerator was located beneath the computer center, the graduate students working on 
the accelerator were concerned for their safety.  The faculty felt that the radiation warning sign and locked 
door leading down to the accelerator were sufficient protection.  We graduate students were less sanguine and 
prepared an evacuation route via a metal ladder that led to a hatch above the accelerator vault.  We also had a 
stash of iron pipes for personal defense, if needed.
The theoretical portion of my dissertation required running two very different computer programs. The first 
was to determine the optical model parameters that best described the scattering of the colliding particles to 
first approximation. While the calculation was straightforward, it had to be done many times because the pro-
cess basically consisted of guessing two variables, calculating the results, and then comparing the results with 
the experimental data. The difficulty was that there were multiple variable pairs that provided an acceptable fit. 
The challenge was to find the best pair.  The process was much like finding the deepest valley in hilly terrain 
on foot.  Running the program during the day on the university’s IBM 360-50 was not an option because of the 
associated computing charges.  However, the computer center made time available at night when the machine 
was idle. For over six months, I always had several programs waiting to be run overnight.  It helped that my 
office was across the hall from the computing center, and my wife was manager of user services.  
The IBM 360-50 was widely used at colleges and universities during the late ‘60s and ‘70s.  The IBM System 
360 “family” of computers used a consistent architecture for computers with different price points, and was 
very successful as it allowed customers to purchase a smaller system and migrate to a larger one as needed. The 
architect of the 360 family, Gene Amdahl, later founded the Amdahl Corporation, which directly competed 
with IBM.  The development of the System 360 was a “bet the company” decision, as the development costs 
were twice IBM’s annual revenue at the time.  
The project manager, Fred Brooks, became famous for his book, The Mythical Man-Month: Essays on Software 
Engineering, that became required reading for new technology managers.  The book is most remembered for 
Brook’s Law, which states “adding manpower to a late software project makes it later.”
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The 360-50 could perform up to 48 kiloflops (floating point op-
erations per second).  This contrasts to Apple’s 2015 MacPro, 
which peaked at 6 teraflops—more than a hundred-million 
times faster.  
IBM 360-50
IBM Archives
The second program required in my dissertation research was 
much more computationally intensive.  It involved solving cou-
pled partial differential equations.  The program could not be 
run on the university’s IBM mainframe, even if they had been 
willing to give me the required time.  The 360 had a 32-bit word length and researchers had found from hard 
experience that 48 bits were the absolute minimum to solve the equations numerically.  (One researcher spent 
the better part of two years unsuccessfully trying to get the program to run on the System 360 architecture.) 
Since the program was running successfully on a CDC 3600 computer at Argonne National Laboratory, the 
decision was made to send me there to complete the calculations.  When I left I was given $30,000 in comput-
ing funds—which I burned through quickly—and was given another $20,000.  That too went quickly, and I 
requested the University send more money.  They did, $10,000, but said that if that didn’t get results to not come 
back.  Fortunately, I was able to reach closure.  The whole experience illustrates how researchers at the time 
were challenged to do the necessary calculations on the available computers. 
Shortly before I graduated, the nuclear laboratory got a mini-computer, a Digital Equipment Corporation or 
“DEC” PDP-11, to replace its obsolete paper-tape system and much of the analog electronics.  I made a deliber-
ate decision not to get involved with the new computer and graduated on schedule.  
The Mid 1970s:  
Computing Becomes Ubiquitous at Smaller Institutions
In 1972 I accepted a position as Assistant Professor of Physics at East Texas State University (now Texas 
A&M-Commerce).  While there I quickly became the “user from hell,” consuming around 30% of the cycles on 
the University’s IBM 360-50 mainframe, as I continued to analyze data I had compiled at Kansas State.  While 
the university had a computer center, its primary focus was supporting administrative computing.  Academic 
users were pretty much on their own.  The center had in place a structure for supporting research computing 
without real dollar charges for times when the computer was not running administrative jobs. Other than my-
self, there was little research computing being done on the University mainframe.  
The output from my calculations on the university’s 360-50 were sent to a CDC computer somewhere in Mary-
land via satellite link, where more numerically intensive, coupled-channel calculations were done.  I don’t re-
call what the funding mechanism was to pay for those cycles.  As a researcher, I didn’t care where the computer 
was located or how it was paid for; all I was interested in was the results.  This cavalier attitude later helped me 
understand researchers’ attitudes when I became a computer center manager.
I spent the summers of 1973 and 1974 at Argonne National Laboratory as part of a visiting research program. 
They had a tandem Van de Graaff and my research was based on bombarding various exotic isotopes of urani-
um with lithium ions.  Some of the uranium isotopes were quite rare in nature, and required “cooking” more 
common isotopes in a nuclear reactor for as long as two years.  
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The Argonne accelerator had a home-built computer system for a much more sophisticated form of data col-
lection than I had used earlier.  Rather than using analog circuitry to filter out signals from interactions that 
were not being studied, all signals for all reactions were recorded on the computer and the unwanted reactions 
filtered out in post-analysis on the computer.  This “event recording” strategy meant that the stored data could 
be reanalyzed for other studies.  
The primary memory was built from a surplus magnetic-core unit 
that was physically bigger than I was.  Magnetic-core memory 
was the predominant form of memory at the time and consisted 
of a matrix of very small toroids (doughnuts), called cores, which 
could be magnetized either clockwise or counterclockwise by an 
electric current through wires in the center of the cores. 
Core Memory Wiring Scheme
Illustration from Wikipedia
This diagram shows a simple scheme for magnetizing and sub-
sequently reading the magnetic state of individual cores.  Even 
though magnetic cores are no longer in common use, we still use 
the term “core memory.”
After the event data was analyzed for the particular reaction being studied, the information was transferred to 
magnetic tape for further analysis. 
The summer stays at Argonne were augmented by trips to Argonne during the school year.  Typically, I would 
travel with a suitcase of magnetic tapes and the clothes on my back.  It was during one of my stays at Argonne 
that I purchased my first pocket calculator for $100 (a bargain price at the time) at Marshall Field’s Department 
Store.  It could add, subtract, multiply, divide, and calculate square roots.  
After the two summer appointments at Argonne, I continued to get beam time on their accelerator.  Utilizing 
that time, however, was exhausting.  Along with one or two students, I would drive straight through from Tex-
as to Chicago, and then spend the next 24 to 48 hours at the accelerator.  That would be followed by spending 
another 24 to 48 hours analyzing the event data and reducing it to a format that could be transferred to mag-
netic tape.  Unfortunately, that could only be done on the home-brew computer at the lab.  Thus, after three to 
five sleepless days, we would drive straight through to Texas and try to catch up on missed classes.  
Upon return to campus, I would transfer data from magnetic tape to punched cards for easier use in running 
analysis programs on the local mainframe.  As I recall, at one point I had over a million cards neatly stored in 
filing cabinets.  Unfortunately, East Texas is humid and I had a serious problem with cards absorbing moisture 
and jamming in the card reader.  At one point I had tables set up outside in the sun with thousands of cards 
drying out.
The grueling routine ultimately resulted in changing my research focus to something that could be done local-
ly, and ultimately led to a career switch.  If the Internet had existed, allowing data to be easily transferred and 
the experiments to be run remotely—and local campuses had access to high-performance computing resources 
remotely—I would probably have finished out my career as a nuclear physicist.  
In the 1970s there were six U.S. mainframe computer companies: IBM, which had most of the market, and five 
others called the BUNCH, which was the nickname given to Burroughs, Univac, NCR (National Cash Reg-
ister), CDC (Control Data Corporation), and Honeywell.  In the 1960s, RCA and General Electric also made 
computers, and the group was characterized as “IBM and the Seven Dwarfs.”  Increasingly through this period, 
IBM dominated the market.
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The early 1970s also saw the emergence of the minicomputer as a computing alternative for small companies or 
research groups.   An early definition of a minicomputer was a machine whose cost was in the five-digit range. 
They had their own architectures and operating systems, and were commonly used for device-control and in-
strumentation.  Digital Equipment Corporation, or DEC, was particularly prominent in higher education and 
research.  The term “VAXinated” became a common joke in the research community.
The physics department at ETSU took advantage of my somewhat eclectic background and assigned me to 
develop an observationally based, introductory astronomy course, and a musical acoustics course targeting 
music majors.  The department’s budget was tied to credit-hour enrollment and such courses were essential 
to maintaining a viable and rigorous physics program.  Both courses were very popular, even though I had a 
reputation as a tough grader.  
I was also assigned to teach the undergraduate “electronics for scientists” course that was routinely taken by 
undergraduate physics majors.  The focus of the course was instrumentation of experimental science using 
transistors and integrated circuits.  When I began teaching the course, there was a shortage of textbooks on the 
subject, so I taught largely from my own notes.  
When I took the corresponding course as an undergraduate a decade earlier, 
the applied portion focused almost entirely on vacuum tube electronics, even 
though the transition from vacuum tubes to transistors was well under way.  By 
the time I taught the course a decade later, vacuum tubes had almost entirely 
been replaced by transistors and integrated circuits.
RCA Vacuum Tube Manual
Photograph by Doug Gale
During this period I attended a “Chautauqua” Workshop developed by Rob-
ert (Bob) Tinker, of the Technical Education Research Center and the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science, and funded by the National 
Science Foundation.  The workshop targeted scientists and engineers, and fo-
cused on using integrated circuits and digital logic for device control and data 
recording.  Tinker and I shared a return airplane flight and spent the time 
talking about hardware modifications needed to convert an analog color TV to 
a digital color monitor -- something that was a rarity 
at the time.
Tinker’s Chautauqua workshop was taught from 
mimeographed loose-leaf handouts and reflected the 
lack of commercial textbooks.  
Tinker’s Toys
Photograph by Doug Gale
By 1974 I had begun introducing simple digital elec-
tronics into the undergraduate “electronics for sci-
entists” course, and shortly afterwards began teach-
ing a one-semester “digital electronics” course organized around the newly released Hewlett-Packard Model 
5035T Logic Lab. The course was popular with computer science students as well as science students.  
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HP had the challenge (and opportunity) of teaching an army of ana-
log-trained electrical engineers about digital electronics.  They developed a 
training course complete with lab hardware and instruction manuals.  Stu-
dents would construct various digital circuits on a plug-in board.  The lab 
included an assortment of digital measurement and probe tools.  The objec-
tive, of course, was to sell HP test gear.
HP Model 5035T Logic Lab
Hewlett-Packard Archives
The decade also marked the emergence of the microprocessor, in which 
an entire central processing unit (CPU) was implemented on a single chip. 
That, combined with the increasingly less expensive 7400 series logic chips 
led to the development of the microcomputer, a term used in the 1950s by 
the science fiction writer Isaac Asimov.  The marketplace was crowded with 
companies developing new microprocessors and support chips.  The Zilog Z-80, MOS 6502 Motorola 6800, 
and Intel 8080 chips in particular led to the development of a wide range of consumer computers, including the 
Altair 8800, Radio Shack TRS-80, and Apple I. 
Hewlett-Packard wasn’t the only company to market 
training materials for their digital technology.  Other 
chip vendors introduced educational “training kits.”  
Intel sold a number of heavily subsidized “kits” to 
encourage users to adopt their new products.  This 
picture shows their bubble memory prototype kit, 
which showcased their 1-megabit bubble memory 
module.  The kit included a printed circuit board 
and a bag of parts.
Bubble Memory Prototype Kit
Photograph by Doug Gale
Intel provided a System Development Kit (SDK) 
when they launched a new microprocessor.  It was a 
natural follow up to the digital logic course to begin 
teaching a microcomputer-based course on the SDK-
85 in 1976.
The SDK-85 was a single board microcomputer sys-
tem using the Intel 8085 chip, which was based on 
the popular 8080.  It came as a kit and the completed 
circuit board included a 6-digit LED display, a simple 
IO bus, a 24-key keyboard for direct insertion, ex-
amination, and execution of a user’s program, and a 
large space for wire wrap components. 
SDK-85 1Single Board Computer
Photograph from Wikipedia
The course was organized as a “hands on” graduate 
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workshop that met for 3 hours once a week in the evening, to allow local professional engineers to attend. 
The students would assemble the single board computer the first evening and were given assignments of in-
creasing complexity as the course progressed.  The computer could be programmed directly from the keypad 
or through a serial port.  As the students progressed, the programs became more sophisticated and included 
attaching various input and output devices.  
When I first offered the course, there weren’t any suitable text-
books so teaching was done from manufacturers’ technical lit-
erature and handwritten lecture notes, such as the ones shown 
here.  Typical labs included the construction of a digital ther-
mometer and the control of a model radar tower made from 
Erector Set parts borrowed from my son.  More sophisticated 
labs employed analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog conver-
sion circuits.  By the end of the decade textbooks began to be-
come available, but having written a Laboratory Manual while 
at St. Cloud, I had no desire to undertake converting my notes 
to a textbook.
Teaching Materials
Photograph by Doug Gale
The course proved to be popular not only with physics and 
engineering students, but with computer science students as 
well.  So much so that the course credit could be taken either 
in physics or computer science, and led to a joint-degree pro-
gram offered by the two departments with courses in micro-
electronics and microcomputers.  A student could major either in physics or computer science and minor in 
the other discipline. (Integrating Microcomputers and Microelectronics into the Physics Curriculum, D.S. Gale, 
Amer. Journal of Physics 48, 498, 1980.)  One thing led to another, and I began teaching a graduate Telecom-
munications course in the Computer Science Department —something that would prove useful later in my 
career. 
“Amateurs” and “hobbyists” played a vital role in microcomputing during the mid- and late 1970s.  Some were 
young entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs and Bill Gates, who went on to found major corporations.  Others were 
working engineers and scientists who wanted to exploit the opportunities presented by the new technolo-
gy.  This period could be viewed as a precursor to the early 21st-century 
“maker movement,” which enjoyed engineering–oriented pursuits such 
as electronics, robotics, and 3-D printing, in addition to more tradition-
al arts and crafts.  Many of today’s computer science luminaries gained 
their experience at places like Bell Labs and the Rand Corporation rath-
er than at academic institutions.  
The microcomputing culture had its own “do-it-yourself ” magazines 
and paperback books.  
Byte Magazine
Photograph by Doug Gale
Byte magazine was a monthly publication dedicated to microcomputers. 
It was widely read by both computer hobbyists and professionals, and its 
articles covered both hardware (complete with wiring schematics) and 
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software (usually machine or assembly language).  Interface Age was another popular magazine that targeted 
the “home computerist.”
This period also marked the publication of a 
wide range of “cookbooks” that stressed prac-
tical electrical circuits to supplement the large 
amount of similar “how to” manuals being 
provided by the chip vendors.  Again, these 
“cookbooks” were an eerie precursor to the 
cut-and-paste approach favored by the 2010’s 
maker culture.
Cookbooks
Photograph by Doug Gale
Although having fun playing with digital elec-
tronics, I had not abandoned physics research. 
In 1975 I began the design and construction of 
a 300-kilovolt heavy ion accelerator.  The sci-
entific objective was to study atomic reactions 
on the surface of material by bombarding 
them with heavy ions; the personal objective 
was to move my research closer to home.  The 
design of the accelerator, particularly the ion 
optics of the accelerating column, involved extensive numerical modeling and was the focus of one of my grad-
uate student’s research.   
The accelerator had several unique features at the time. 
The first was the use of then state-of-the-art, ultra-high 
vacuum techniques that totally avoided the use of any or-
ganic materials.  The second was the use of fiber optics 
to transmit signals to and from the high-voltage termi-
nal.  The fiber optic connectors that became common in 
the 1990s were not available.  Fiber optic strands were 
hand polished and then epoxied onto LED transmitters 
and detectors.  The third was the extensive use of digital 
electronics and microcomputers for telemetry and volt-
age control.  
300 kV Heavy Ion Accelerator Telemetry
Scientific & Industrial Applications of Small Accelerators, 
4th Conference, 1976
When I ran out of grant money to purchase a needed 
piece of data acquisition electronics for the 300 kV heavy 
ion accelerator that was halfway to completion, one of 
my students, who was also a teaching assistant in the mi-
crocomputer course, suggested that we build a computer 
system and I/O electronics that would replicate the func-
tions of the dedicated electronics we could not afford.  In 
an act that can only be viewed as hubris, I agreed.
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We used the astronomy dark room to make printed circuit boards.  We added stepper motors to the milling 
machine in the physics shop to drill holes in the boards.  We cannibalized military-surplus disk drives for 
memory.  We knew enough to be dangerous -- and very creative.  At the time, I jokingly said I didn’t know 
what an operating system was until I wrote one.  
In the summer of 1979 I was offered the position of Director of Decentralized Academic Computing Services 
at Cornell University.  Because of teaching commitments, I was not able to move to Ithaca until December of 
that year.  Although I had illusions at the time of continuing my physics research, in fact it marked the end of 
my career as a research scientist and the beginning of my career as an information technologist and research 
administrator. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Early ‘80s and the Microcomputer Revolution
By the 1980s computing was well established in higher education.  Leading institutions were spending approx-
imately 5% of their budget, exclusive of ancillary operations such as dormitories and athletics, on computing. 
Expenditures were more or less evenly split between academic and administrative applications.  Administra-
tive computing was done almost entirely at a central computing facility; most academic computing was done 
there as well.  Faculty and students were still learning about the technology, but applying it in new and novel 
ways.  However, change was on the horizon.  
The Cornell Years: Distributed Academic Computing Services (DACS)
The early 1980s marked the beginning of a fundamental shift in computing.  The introduction of the minicom-
puter a few years earlier made it possible for a small department to own its own computer, separate from the 
centrally managed corporate mainframe.  Similarly, the introduction of microcomputers made it possible for 
individuals to own a personal computer.  
The fundamental paradigm shift was not one of hardware but of management control: from centralized to 
decentralized.  The term “microcomputer” fell out of favor in the mid-80s and was replaced with “personal 
computer or PC” reflecting that the fundamental shift was not based on computing power but on management 
control.  
Cornell was one of the first universities to recognize that a paradigm shift was underway and decided in early 
1979, under the leadership of Douglas VanHouweling, Director of Academic Computing, and J. Robert Cooke, 
Chair of the Faculty Computing Committee, to recommend the creation of a separate division within Cornell’s 
computer services unit to support decentralized computing.  Provost Kennedy issued a policy directive in July 
of that year creating DACS, for Distributed Academic Computing Services, within the Academic Computing 
unit. The unit was charged with providing consultation and support for those units owning or planning acqui-
sition of computers. 
The first director of the DACS was Alison Brown, who quickly decided she would rather not be burdened with 
administrative responsibilities, and recruited me in the fall of 1979 to be her replacement and boss.  My wife, 
kids, and I arrived in Ithaca two days before Christmas in 1979.  
When Ken King became Vice Provost for Computing at Cornell in late 1980, DACS was moved from the ac-
ademic computing unit to directly reporting to the Vice Provost, and the name was changed to Decentralized 
Computing Services, or DCS, because administrative users were following the same trends towards decentral-
ization.  King cites Cornell’s recognition of this paradigm shift as one of the reasons he accepted the position 
at Cornell.  At the time, computing centers typically had four branches: academic computing, administrative 
computing, systems, and operations, and had a centralized management culture.  
A Rude Awakening
Shortly after arriving at Cornell I was asked to participate in the selection of a new minicomputer for the Busi-
ness School.  They were considering two architectures, both from Digital Equipment Corporation, a DECSYS-
TEM-20 and a VAX.  I quickly realized that, while I knew a lot about microcomputers, I was a real neophyte 
when it came to minicomputers.  The decision boiled down to choosing between an established architecture 
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that had a large body of mature software, and a newer architecture with relatively little application software 
—the kind of decision that required experience I didn’t have.  
My response was to attend a two-day workshop on minicomputers and microcomputers in Washington, DC, 
to spend a lot of time talking to facility managers, operations staff, and minicomputer owners, and then to 
develop a one- to two-day workshop syllabus of my own: Guidelines for the Selection and Operation of Mini-
computers and Microcomputers. I subsequently gave presentations and workshops of various lengths targeting 
different audiences at a variety of venues, both local to Cornell and nationally, for meetings such as the Nation-
al Educational Computing Conference and the American Association of Physics Teachers, using a subset of the 
complete syllabus.  The syllabus had seven sections:1. Introduction: A Brief History of Small Computers and an Explanation of Some Common Elements in 
“Computer Talk”2. The Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Micro/Mini/Midi/ and Maxicomputers3. How to Determine What Kind of Computer is Best for You4. A Brief Survey of Hardware and Software5. How to Select and Acquire a Small Computer System6. Warranty, Maintenance, and Operating Costs7. Future Trends
It is important to remember that most of the attendees at these presentations had little experience with com-
puting, and for those that did, it was usually restricted to using a mainframe or a home computer.  Few un-
derstood the tradeoffs between mainframes, minicomputers, and microcomputers, and virtually none had an 
understanding of the total cost of ownership or maintenance and support costs and issues.  
The first two sections covered basic definitions and the rel-
ative advantages and disadvantages of Micro/Mini/Midi/ 
and Maxi computers.  Topics included cost, hardware and 
software capability, and the number of users that could be 
supported.
The objective of the next three sections was to assist the 
attendee in selecting the appropriate kind of computer. 
Included was a brief survey of then-current hardware and 
software, costs for hardware and software, as well as how 
to prepare and evaluate an RFP or RFQ.  Benchmarks for 
various CPU processors and operating systems were pre-
sented in detail.
The fifth section was an attempt to introduce to attendees 
a sense of how much it really cost to operate a computer 
and/or a computer facility.  This section included compar-
isons of the costs of running typical student facilities, such 
as a baby VAX (VAX-750), a cluster of 20 Teraks, and a 
cluster of 20 Apple IIs.  I spent a considerable amount of 
time in this section, because I had quickly discovered that 
many faculty attendees thought they could avoid “exces-
sive” mainframe charges by purchasing a bunch of micro-
computers from the local computer store, without giving 
thought to things like software, maintenance, power, cool-
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ing, site preparation, and printers.  And they rarely included funding for staff support.  I’m not sure how suc-
cessful I was in convincing attendees that there was no such thing as a free lunch.
Benchmarks
But users wanted more than theoretical background; they wanted concrete advice, such as “buy product A.” 
In the early 1980s the microcomputer market was in a state of flux.  There was a wide array of CPU chips from 
multiple vendors.  There were few, if any, operating system or software standards.  In DACS we spent a great 
deal of time benchmarking various systems in an attempt to provide our users with the best advice possible. 
This is a benchmark summary document I prepared in the fall of 1980; the subjective opinions were mine.  For 
obvious reasons, it was always presented “in-person.”
The list includes neither the Apple MacIntosh nor the IBM-PC, as they had yet to be introduced.  
Personal Computers (PCs)
Complete microcomputer systems began being mass marketed in 1977 with the advent of the Apple II, Ra-
dio Shack’s TRS-80, and the Commodore PET.  These “home computers” usually ran the BASIC computer 
language and used a cassette tape recorder for external memory.  Although the Apple II was popular in the 
educational community, most universities and almost all businesses turned up their respective noses at these 
machines.  They weren’t “serious computers.”  Two events changed this mindset.  The first was the release of 
VisiCalc, the first spreadsheet computer program for microcomputers, in 1979.  Overnight, it changed the 
Apple II from a hobbyist “toy” to a serious business tool.  I recall wanting an accounting system to parallel 
the university’s official accounting system.  I was seeking a way to project anticipated events into a long-range 
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financial planning model.  I was told the system would take 6 months to develop on the university’s mainframe 
database.  Instead, I checked out an Apple II with a copy of VisiCalc.  That evening I learned VisiCalc and wrote 
the planning model.  
The second event was IBM’s introduction of the IBM Personal Computer, or PC, in August of 1991.  The in-
troduction gave microcomputers instantaneous credibility.  In fact, the term “microcomputer” dropped from 
users vocabulary almost overnight and was replaced by the term “personal computer.”  Big Blue had spoken.
One of the most enjoyable aspects of the job was the opportunity to play with all the new stuff. 
Introduced in 1981, the Osborne I was one of the first “portable” com-
puters.  The front hinged down to reveal a 5-inch screen, keyboard and 
dual, single-sided floppy disk drives.  I can still recall walking across 
campus with this 23-pound brute.
Osborne I
Photograph from Wikipedia
Nibbles
Initially DACS was quite small: myself, Alison Brown (a systems’ guru), Karen Friedman (a software guru), and 
Joe Nazar (a hardware technician).  The challenge was dealing with an overwhelming number of faculty and 
staff interested in using microcomputers, but without any experience in personal computing.  At one point, in 
desperation, we resorted to waiting until noon to open the office because of the numbers of faculty and staff 
waiting to talk to someone in person.  To leverage our 
limited resources, we created a one-page folksy newslet-
ter called “nibbles,” which covered the issues that people 
were concerned about at that time. 
The Great Debate
Shortly after I arrived at Cornell I was asked to par-
ticipate in a traveling debate sponsored by the busi-
ness-oriented Data Processing Management Association 
(DPMA), which changed its name to the Association of 
Information Technology Professionals in the 1990s.  The 
debate was between decentralized computing, using 
minicomputers and microcomputers, and centralized 
computing using mainframes.  I would argue for a de-
centralized computing environment, while a member of 
the hosting DPMA chapter would champion centralized 
computing.  The discussions were “lively” and under-
scored that the fundamental shift was centralized versus 
decentralized and not mainframe versus minicomputer 
or microcomputer.
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Word Processing
Word-processing in the late 1970s and early 1980s was done on dedicated and expensive stand-alone machines, 
such as the Wang 1200 and Xerox 860, because the hardware and software capabilities of available microcom-
puters, such as the Apple II, were very limited.  My wife, who was part of the administrative computing unit 
at Cornell, provided Xerox 860 technical support to the College of Arts and Sciences, before moving on to 
implementing a student information system.  
The Xerox 860 was a high-end word processing sys-
tem that cost around $14,000 and was popular in the 
early 1980s.  It featured “WSIWYG” or “What You 
See Is What You Get” software and could display 70 
lines of 102 characters on the monitor.  
Xerox 860 Word Processor
Photograph from Wikipedia
By the mid-1980s there were dozens of WSIWYG 
word processing packages, such as “WordStar” that 
ran on personal computers like the IBM-PC, and the 
market for stand-alone word processors collapsed.
The Apple Lisa
The Apple Lisa is little remembered but played an important role 
in the evolution of microcomputers.  Steve Jobs had visited Xerox’s 
Palo Alto Research Center in 1979 and was very impressed with 
the mouse-driven graphical user interface (GUI) that they had de-
veloped.  When he returned to Apple, they began development of a 
Motorola 68000-based computer to transform PARC’s research into 
a marketable product.  The result, the Lisa, was introduced in Janu-
ary of 1983.  The unique feature of Lisa was the integrated package 
of software applications: LisaWrite, LisaCalc, LisaDraw, LisaGraph, 
LisaProject, LisaList, and LisaTerminal—and an integrated package 
that was not available elsewhere.  A Lisa was on my desktop at Cor-
nell.
The Apple Lisa
Photograph from Wikipedia
Priced at $10,000, the Lisa was considered by the market place as “too expensive.”  Ironically, an equivalently 
equipped IBM-PC XT (introduced in March of 1983) was also about $10,000, and the software applications 
were not integrated.  Relatively few Lisa computers were sold, although at Cornell they were adopted by the 
Cornell School of Hotel Administration as part of a pioneering system for hotel administration.
Microcomputers in Instruction: The Terak Story
Cornell was one of the first universities to embrace microcomputers in undergraduate instruction.  The Com-
puter Science faculty were strong advocates of structured programming and foreswore languages such as Basic, 
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that were used in most microcomputers at the time.  Tim Teitelbaum, in the Computer Science Department, 
had developed a PL-1 synthesizer that ran on the university’s IBM 360-168 mainframe and was used in a course 
required of all engineering and most science freshman.  The synthesizer created a “padded cell” environment 
that simply did not allow the student to write unstructured code.  
See: An Oral History Conversation: The Paradigm Shift from Centralized to Decentralized Computing at 
Cornell. King, Kenneth M.; Cooke, J. Robert; Teitelbaum, Tim; Gale, Doug. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/41195
In the late 1970s, to alleviate strain on the university’s mainframe facilities, Tim developed a version that could 
run on the Terak  8510, a microcomputer. The Terak was considerably more powerful than contemporary mi-
crocomputers based on Intel, Zilog, and Motorola CPUs.  One downside was that they cost around $5500, as I 
recall.  Another was the 40+ pound weight of the base-processing unit alone.
Cornell made a major investment in Terak computer rooms to service the introductory programming course 
that Tim taught and was required of all engineering students.  DACS was charged with running the facilities. 
The problem was that there were never enough Teraks.  The days before an assignment was due were chaos.  The 
undergraduates hired to run the facilities and ration 
use were faced with students concerned about passing 
a required course.  We could measure how crowded 
the facilities were by counting the number of fights 
that broke out as students vied for machines.  My 
efforts to get the various Deans to commit funds to 
expand the facilities were generally unsuccessful.  It 
was always someone else’s students who were using 
the facilities.
Terak 8510/a
Photograph from Wikipedia
This was a new variant of the old problem of how do you pay for computing.  The new twist was that we didn’t 
have an accounting mechanism that would allow us to use the somewhat-effective mechanisms that we devel-
oped in the ’60s and ’70s.  Other than paper sign-in sheets maintained by the computer room assistants, we 
didn’t know who was using a Terak.  And once the student was on a machine, we didn’t have a clue as to what 
he or she was doing.  We did try to manually limit each student to an hour of machine time.  Before committing 
additional funding, the Deans wanted evidence that it was their students who were using the machines and 
how much they were using them.
The Teraks were built with a DEC LSI-11 processor and could run a basic version of UNIX, as well as UCSD 
Pascal.  It had a graphic’s processor and could display both text and graphics in monochrome. 
The Apple Logon Machine Fiasco
Our attempts to use the older paradigm of “charging by the drink,” by adding an accounting function to mi-
crocomputers that duplicated time-sharing’s logon procedure, was a complete flop.  Next to each Terak in our 
labs we placed a small box with three lights: red, yellow, and green.  Each box was hardwired to its associated 
Terak’s interrupt line, and to a central Apple II microcomputer that was similarly connected to each Terak in 
the room.  We developed software for the Apple, using an obscure structured language developed in Europe, 
to provide authentication, data recording, and most importantly rationing functions. When a student wanted 
to use a Terak, they would logon to the Apple II logon machine by entering their name and password.  Since 
the memory capacity of the Apple II was limited, the password was not verified against a database.  Rather the 
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student’s password was an encrypted version of the student’s name.  The encryption algorithm was our secret. 
When a machine was available, the student’s name was flashed on a monitor, the associated Terak was enabled, 
a 60-minute timer was started, and the box beside the Terak showed green.  When a student had 5 minutes 
left the light turned yellow, and when his or her time was up, the light turned red and the machine disabled. 
Brutal, but effective.
It actually worked—as long as the load on the system was light to moderate.  For reasons we could never dis-
cover, the Apple software we had developed would crash when the load was high—typically the evening before 
an assignment was due.  We succeeded in making the problem worse.
The solution to the problem was the gradual migration away from a “pay by the drink” funding model, the 
adoption of less expensive Apple MacIntoshes for the introductory computer science course in 1984, and the 
widespread ownership of personal computers.
Maintenance
In the 1980s computer maintenance was a major expense.  The yearly maintenance cost for a mainframe typi-
cally was in the six digits.  Maintenance was also a major expense for microcomputers, particularly in the early 
1980s.  Because of the mild summers in Ithaca, many of the buildings at Cornell were not air-conditioned, and 
temperature was simply regulated by opening or closing windows.  Unfortunately, a Terak and a person each 
put out around 150 watts of heat, so a 30-student lab generated approximately 9,000 watts of heat.  One lab in 
the engineering building was particularly troublesome.  It only had a few windows and on a calm day it would 
become uncomfortably warm, and the Teraks would start failing as their integrated circuit chips overheated. 
Tom Everhardt, the Dean of Engineering and all around fine fellow, and I went ’round and ’round on the need 
to air-condition the room.  I went so far as installing thermistors on the surface of the CPU chips to monitor 
and document the fact that chips were failing because of the heat.   In 1980, a room filled with microcomputers 
and students was something of a novelty.
At $10,000 a pop, the Teraks were not a consumer item that you could buy at the local computer store.  The 
company was small and did not have a network of national service centers.  To repair one, you had to box it 
up and send it back to the factory in Arizona.  (Remember, the base unit weighed more than 40 pounds.)  That 
was expensive and had a turnaround time measured in weeks.  We quickly decided that it would be cheaper to 
send one of the DACS technicians to Arizona to work at the factory for several weeks and learn how to repair 
them, and then maintain a local inventory of parts.  Upon the technician’s return from Arizona, we borrowed 
a VHS video recorder and on a Saturday afternoon, fueled with takeout sandwiches and a six pack of beer, put 
together a cheesy “How to Fix a Terak” video.  Although it was originally intended for our own internal use, as 
other universities learned of its existence it became widely requested.  
Email, The Killer App 
Although email was being widely used by the small ARPAnet (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) 
community, and within a few companies such as IBM, it was just emerging in the academic community in the 
early 1980s.  There were two technical challenges.  First, how do you exchange information between two com-
puters, and second, how do you present that information to an end user on a computer terminal.
Cornell’s primary computing system in the early 1980s was an IBM 360/168 running the “Virtual Machine” 
or VM operating system, which allowed the machine to run multiple guest operating systems, such as CMS 
(Conversational Monitor System) or MVS (Multiple Virtual Storage), each within its own virtual machine. 
One such system was RSCS (Remote Spooling Communications Subsystem) that was designed to exchange 
files between remote systems and users.  
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Using RSCS as the interconnecting mechanism, Ira Fuchs at the City University of New York and Greydon 
Freeman at Yale University created BITNET, which originally stood for “Because Its There,” in 1981.  (http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BITNET) BITNET was a point-to-point “store and forward” network.  Files were tem-
porarily stored on one computer and then transmitted to another computer at a later time over a leased tele-
phone line.  A handful of other universities, including Cornell and the University of Pennsylvania, quickly 
joined the new network.  
The business model was simplicity itself.  If a university or college wanted to join BITNET, they paid for a 
9.6 kbps (thousand bits per second) leased telephone line from their institution to a BITNET institution, and 
agreed to let two or more other institutions connect to them.
The second challenge was to present the information to a person on a terminal in a useful way.  Typically, each 
campus wrote its own email editor, and at Cornell it was Steve Worona who wrote the Cornell editor.  It was 
only sometime later that email editors became standardized.  
At the time, there were no vendor-independent, communications protocols for exchanging files between com-
puters.  SMTP or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol for an IP-based system wasn’t developed until 1982.  BITNET 
was, initially at least, limited to IBM mainframes running RSCS.  Even with that restriction, BITNET grew 
rapidly, and at its peak connected almost 500 organizations throughout the world.  Throughout most of the 
1980s, it was the lingua franca of the higher-education community.  
BITNET, and higher education’s role in its growth, was more important than simply being a part of email’s 
evolution.   It introduced the utility of email to hundreds of thousands of students, who spread out to other uni-
versities and industry, and created marketing demand for what was to become the Internet.  With the passage 
of time, BITNET came to mean “Because Its Time.” 
The new technology was not without its growing pains.  One day some system programmers from the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania sent Bob Cowles, who was an ace VM system programmer at Cornell, what seemed to be 
a routine email.  The next day when Bob logged onto Cornell’s mainframe, everything seemed to be normal 
until the screen froze and a small PacMan icon begin traveling back and forth across his terminal screen eating 
the characters displayed.  (PacMan was a popular computer game in the early 1980s.)  Bob’s attempts to enter 
commands into the system were ignored.  After his screen was completely devoured, the bold letters “LOOF,” 
which spelled “fool” backwards, began flashing in his face.   
The innocuous email he had received the day before had contained unprintable system commands between 
the characters of the message.  Since those commands were not recognized as characters, they did not display 
on his terminal screen.  They did, however, allow the Penn programmers to gain control of Bob’s VM session. 
They then created a virtual session that initially mirrored a real session, but later switched to the PacMan rou-
tine.  The joke identified an early crack in our cyber infrastructure.
The Apple Macintosh and the Apple Consortium
In 1983 Stacy Bressler, Apple’s regional sales representative, and Dan’l Lewin, Director of Apple’s Macintosh 
Division, brought a prototype Apple Macintosh to Cornell.  The machine resembled the computer that would 
be introduced to the world in January of 1984, but with a lot of parts and wires hanging outside the box.  Lewin 
didn’t want to let it out of his sight and carried it with him in a large box.  He even went so far as to purchase 
an extra seat on the airplane for Apple’s new entry into the consumer marketplace.  
DCS had arranged for Bressler and Lewin to demonstrate the machine to a select group of faculty under a 
non-disclosure agreement.  Dan’l was horrified when he entered the secluded classroom and found almost 
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two-dozen faculty waiting to see the rumored computer, and stood at the door checking names against the 
non-disclosure list.  Apple took product security very seriously.  
The demonstration was successful and the faculty were impressed, particularly with the graphical user interface 
and mouse.  Apple wanted Cornell to commit to being an early adopter of the new computer, in large numbers, 
in exchange for a significant price break.  For the faculty, however, the lack of a programming language more 
structured than BASIC was a deal breaker.  Steve Jobs felt that BASIC was good enough, but finally relented 
and added Pascal as a programming language when Apple received similar pushback from other universities. 
The Macintosh was introduced to the world in January of 1984.  It had 128 K of RAM, a 512 x 342 pixel mono-
chrome display, and a single 400 KB 3.5-inch disk drive in a single self-contained plastic cube.  The keyboard 
and mouse were separate.  It utilized a Motorola 68000 CPU chip, which was arguably slightly more advanced 
than the Intel 8086 (actually the slightly variant 8088) CPU used in the IBM-PC.  The “Mac” was built in Cal-
ifornia in one of the industry’s first automated factories.  They were very proud of their factory and featured it 
in our visits to corporate headquarters.  
The Macintosh “Bundle” made available to students in the spring 
of 1984 included a Macintosh, as well as writing and drawing soft-
ware for the then-unheard of price of $1,000.  The recommended 
retail prices were $2,495 for the Mac, $495 for the printer, and 
$195 for MacWrite/MacPaint.
The Student MacIntosh Bundle
Photograph by Doug Gale
As part of the early adopter arrangement, Cornell became a mem-
ber of the Apple University Consortium.  Originally envisioned as 
being a half-dozen or so universities, it quickly grew to two dozen 
at the time of the Macintosh rollout in January of 1984.  William 
Arms’ contribution to this incremental book captures some of the 
excitement at the student rollout.
Apple Consortium, January 1984Stanford University Boston College University of RochesterHarvard University Princeton University University of PennsylvaniaYale University Brown University Northwestern UniversityCarnegie Mellon University University of Chicago University of Notre DameUniversity of Michigan University of Texas Rice UniversityCornell University University of Washington City University of New YorkDartmouth College Reed College Drexel UniversityBrigham Young University University of Utah Columbia University
The Consortium had regular meetings that were very upbeat, and reflected a mood that we were part of a fun-
damental change in the way computers were interacting with people.  The famous 1984 Superbowl ad captured 
that mood perfectly.  (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtvjbmoDx-I) 
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I remember two consortium meetings in particular.  At one, in Pittsburgh as I recall, I happened to sit at the 
same dinner table as John Scully and his teenage son, and could not help observing how Scully was grooming 
his son on how to be a business leader.  Coming from a family where I was the first to go to college, I found that 
quite instructive.
The second was in San Francisco.  The reception after the day’s events was held in a converted warehouse in 
which multiple floors, each with multiple rock bands and light shows, opened to a central atrium; the effect was 
psychedelic.  As a long-time fan of classical music, I confess that the atmosphere pulsed with energy.
While the utility of the Mac’s graphical user interface seems obvious in retrospect, it was not universally 
accepted at the time of its introduction.  I recall having a lengthy and somewhat acrimonious debate with a 
colleague at Cornell who felt the interface was a passing fad.  We decided to settle the argument by each of 
us purchasing Apple stock; myself at the going price and he short selling.  (I must also disclose that he totally 
disagrees with my recollection of this event.)  Fortunately for him, the price of the stock didn’t change much 
in the months following the introduction.  Unfortunately for me, I sold mine months later before it took off.  
Institutional Leaders
Who were the institutional leaders during this period?  Obviously, the Apple Consortium members were 
considered leaders by at least one vendor.  My personal list, however, would include: Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity for their work with Project Andrew; Stanford and the University of California-Berkeley for their work in 
computer networking; Dartmouth for their pioneering work teaching programming and developing BASIC; 
the University of Michigan as an early leader in creating a state network; CUNY and Yale for their work in 
developing BITNET; MIT for their work with Project Athena; and of course Cornell.
Microcomputers and Elementary and Secondary Education
Introducing computing into elementary and secondary schools was a slower process, in part because they 
lacked centralized, information technology units organized to train and support faculty and student end users. 
In 1982 I was asked, on a consulting basis, to evaluate a draft proposal by the Ithaca Public Schools to their 
board requesting funding for the acquisition of a large number of Apple II computers.  The school system was 
very unhappy with my report, which faulted the proposal for requesting too much money for hardware and too 
little for teacher training and support.  My report was not included in the presentation that went to their board. 
The Downside of Distributed Computing
One unintended consequence of the widespread deployment of microcomputers was to destroy one of the 
most useful features of timesharing on a mainframe—the ability to exchange information between individual 
users.  We had created islands of isolated computers and users!  The only way to move information between 
microcomputers—assuming they were running the same operating system -- was the physical movement of 
diskettes, jokingly referred to as “sneakernet.”
Sometime in 1980, Fred Hiltz in the Cornell Veterinary School began working on a protocol to allow comput-
ers, including microcomputers, to communicate with each other over an asynchronous serial connection.  The 
protocol had the catchy name of “FITS” for FIle Transfer System.  The problem was widely recognized nation-
ally, and in February of 1981 EDUNET, an activity of EDUCOM, set up a Task Force to address and consider 
solutions to the problem.  Initially the task force was asked to look at two draft protocols, FITS and a similar 
protocol being developed at Wisconsin.  In the meantime, Alison Brown in DCS had begun working with Fred 
on actual implementations of the FITS protocol, which by this time was quite well-defined.  
3.26
I remember traveling to North Carolina to discuss their work with Lou Parker, Jr., the Director of the North 
Carolina Educational Computing Services, who was also on the task force, and discussing a possible collabora-
tion between Cornell and a similar effort in North Carolina.  One morning shortly after returning to Cornell 
I entered Alison’s office and asked her how work was coming on the FITS implementations that she had been 
working on for months.  She answered, “I’m not working on that anymore; I’m doing a KERMIT implemen-
tation.”
She had learned of a similar file transfer effort at Columbia University, which had been named after Kermit the 
frog from the Muppet television program; feeling that they were further along in their work than she was, Fred 
decided to join the Columbia effort.  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kermit_(protocol))  That egoless spirit of 
working towards a solution characterized the academic computing community in higher education.  For many 
years Kermit was the de facto standard for computer-to-computer file transfer.
The Emergence of Networking as Strategic
Even with the immediate success of Kermit, it was obvious that the underlying problem of allowing computers 
and peripherals to talk to each other—irrespective of different hardware and software—remained.  The net-
work had become strategic.
At the time, networking at Cornell was largely the responsibility of the Systems and Operations group.  Because 
they were doing an exemplary job, DCS decided to focus on the software needed to get devices on the network. 
In late 1982 or early 1983 DCS hosted a spaghetti dinner at Alison Brown and Ken Wilson’s house.  Our pitch to 
Ken King was that we needed a small VAX running Berkeley Unix both to better support the increasing num-
ber of small system users moving to Unix, and to begin exploring software networking protocols, particularly 
TCP/IP.  King’s quick agreement makes me suspect that it was the Bison Bridle Principle (“you can lead a bison 
anywhere you want to as long as it’s where he wants to go”) and not our spaghetti that led to a quick decision. 
Advanced Scientific Computing
The first half of the decade of the ’80s also marked a growing national concern that the United States was losing 
its competitive advantage in high-performance, scientific computing.  The 1982 “Report of the Panel on Large 
Scale Computing in Science and Engineering,” also known as the “Lax Report” (http://www.pnl.gov/scales/
docs/lax_report1982.pdf), concluded that without new resources “the primacy of U.S. science, engineering, 
and technology could be threatened relative to that of other countries…” Cornell’s Ken Wilson was a member 
of that panel.  
Under the leadership of Wilson and Alex Grimison, Cornell had already begun addressing some of the needs 
of large-scale computational users by attaching a Floating Point System (FPS) Model 164 array processor to 
the university’s IBM mainframe. Wilson envisioned a field house filled with thousands of array processors. 
The software challenges associated with mating the two dissimilar architectures and operating systems were 
formidable, and Wilson became a legend within the Cornell Computing Center’s systems group for his ability 
to overcome the challenges.  This effort ultimately led to the Cornell Theory Center, which will be discussed in 
the next section.
Cornell’s Strategy for the Microcomputing Revolution
In May of 1983 I was invited to join Edward Friedman, Stevens Institute of Technology, and James Penrod, 
Pepperdine University, in participating in a plenary session on Personal Computing Implementation at the 
September EDUCOM meeting.  That presentation encapsulates the changes that had occurred at Cornell and a 
few lead institutions and would shortly occur throughout higher education. (One slightly discouraging aspect 
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of the presentation was that I got more questions afterwards about how I had prepared my foils (on a Lisa), 
than about the content of my presentation.)  The presentation is illustrative in what we got right and what we 
got wrong.  
Foil “EDUCOM-3” showed the computing model of the 1970s, which was based on sharing centralized, com-
puting resources.  Terminals were connected to mainframes with proprietary networks.  SNA for IBM, DECnet 
for Digital Equipment, and XNS for Xerox were typical.  There was generally little interoperability between 
them.  
By 1983, as shown on “EDUCOM-4”, Cornell had begun making a transition to a single backbone supporting 
multiple systems.  Much of the work developing the interface code for these devices was done at universities in 
groups such as DCS.
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EDUCOM-5, The Microcomputer Revolution Assumptions, was basically an extrapolation of Moore’s Law. 
(The number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits will double every year.)  One consequence 
of this was that traditional economies of scale no longer existed.  Specifically, the cheapest computing was no 
longer necessarily the sharing of a big machine.  Because of Moore’s Law and the economies of mass produc-
tion, the cheapest computing might be multiple smaller machines.  Efficiency and keeping a computer running 
100% of the time were no longer as important as they once were.
The implications for Cornell, EDUCOM-6, were that microcomputers would be the dominant source of cycles 
for most users within 2 years and, surprisingly, the total cost of computing to the institution would increase 
because of a growing user population and more complex systems.  Cornell did not regard microcomputers as 
a silver bullet to decrease institutional computing costs.  And, of course, our support mechanisms would have 
to change radically.
The fifth foil, EDUCOM-7, shows we also clearly understood, earlier than most, that a campus broadband net-
work was going to be the core of a computing model for the 1980s.  Our objective and the strategy to achieve 
those objectives (EDUCOM-8) were fairly common among institutional computing leaders.
Cornell’s Strategy Redux: What We Got Right, What We Got Wrong, 
and What We Simply Didn’t Understand
The technical stuff we got right.  Microcomputers did quickly become the dominant source of computer cycles. 
And a network linking computing resources, from microcomputers to supercomputers, and from printers to 
scanners, both on campus and nationally, would become the integrating factor.  
What we didn’t get right was the most efficient organizational structure to support the new realities.  Nor 
did we understand the real role and mission of DCS.  We had taken the role of DCS to be “consultation and 
support for those units owning or planning acquisition of computers.”  Based on that assumption we created 
a four-branch organization (EDUCOM-9) consisting of Systems and Operations, Administrative Computing, 
Academic Computing, and Decentralized Computer Services.  What we didn’t realize was that the objectives 
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of DCS, shown in EDUCOM-10, were largely crosscutting and applicable to the other three organizational 
branches as well.
In 1980 I was told by Ken King, I believe, that “DACS has all of the gold and none of the bricks; it should have 
so much fun that everyone in the organization should want to work there.”  In short, DACS and later DCS, was 
a change agent whose purpose was to change the centralized mindset of the organization.  
The rotating door within academic computing reflected this interpretation.  In May of 1981 Alex Grimison 
stepped down from the position of Interim Director of Academic Computing to join DCS and to take charge 
of a scientific computing group. I assumed his role until we were able to recruit a new Director of Academic 
Computing, Gordon Gallaway.  In short, we were having fun in DCS and were functioning more as an internal 
“skunk works” than an operational unit, such as system and operations.  Our mistake was to envision DCS as 
a permanent organizational structure rather 
than a temporary change agent.
By the spring of 1983, DCS had grown to 12 
FTEs.  As shown below, the new functions 
within DCS were large-scale scientific com-
puting, Unix support (including networking 
interfaces), and managing small computer 
sales through external vendors.  While the 
first two would go on to become part of Cor-
nell’s “Theory Center” supercomputing ini-
tiative, computer sales and small computer 
support gradually devolved back into more 
traditional support structures.  The central-
ized culture of the Cornell Computer Center 
had been changed.  A similar organizational 
3.30
phenomenon occurred in the latter half of the 1990s, when internal “networking skunk works” sprang into 
existence to drive the networking revolution.
Institutional Collaboration
The early 1980s also marked the growing importance of national organizations facilitating the exchange of 
information between university and college computing center leaders.  It was also marked by a great deal of 
sharing of experience and knowledge.
In the summer of 1980 I attended a regional meeting, the New England Computing Conference.  It was at that 
meeting that an old hand from either Vermont or New Hampshire passed on to us newbie’s the three rules 
for a computing center director: 1) today is as good a day to die as any other; 2) a horrible end is preferable to 
horrors without end; and 3) you never control anything.  At the time I was amused, but didn’t fully appreciate 
the truth in his words.
The two largest higher-education computing organizations at the time were CAUSE and EDUCOM, but the 
meetings seldom exceeded several hundred attendees and everyone knew everyone else.  A history of both 
organizations can be found at http://www.educause.edu/about/mission-and-organization/roots-educause. 
While neither organization was wholly academic nor administrative, in the early years CAUSE seemed to have 
an administrative computing and “hands-on” feel, while EDUCOM had more of an academic and manage-
ment/policy feel.  In any case I became a regular EDUCOM attendee, although later in the decade I attended 
both and was on the CAUSE Board when the two organizations merged in 1998.  In general there was little 
overlap in attendees between the two organizations.
The most enjoyable and arguably most useful of the national meetings was the Annual Seminars on Academic 
Computing held in Snowmass, Colorado.  When I first attended in 1982 there were around a hundred attend-
ees.  We met in a single small resort hotel, the Mountain Chalet.  Attendees frequently brought their families, 
who would enjoy the Colorado mountains while we attended sessions.  Toward the latter part of the decade 
I would sometimes arrive a few days early and backpack from the Maroon Bells over Buckskin Pass and into 
Snowmass.
A fourth meeting that I routinely attended was the ACM (Association of Computing Machinery) SIGUCCS 
(Special Interest Group in University and College Computing Centers) meeting that was held each spring in St. 
Louis.  The meeting was small with a very practical “hands on” feel.
It is hard to describe the excitement and comradery of those early meetings, as compared to the same meetings 
one or two decades later.  In the 1980s I would typically know half or more of the attendees.  Computing was 
just emerging as a discipline, and there was a close bond of togetherness.
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Chapter 3: The Late 80s and the Networking Revolution (not written)
Chapter 4: The 1990s: The Changing Role of Academic Computing and Net-
working (not written)
3.32
Incremental Epilogue-1
Kenneth M. King
Douglas Shannon Gale died on October 26, 2015, at the age of 73, with his memoir half finished. He intended to 
write a chapter covering the networking and distributed-computing revolutions that occurred during the late 
1980s, and a chapter covering the impact of networking and personal computing on academic computing at 
universities from the 1990s up to the present. Doug was in the middle of the events that shaped the transforma-
tion of computing at universities during and after the 1980s, and he contributed to the evolution of computing 
and networking in a number of important ways. It is my hope that those who worked with Doug, as I did, will 
contribute to an effort to extend his memoir by describing his activities and contributions during the years 
that he would have covered had he been able to complete his memoir. Doug’s memoir is part of an incremental 
book started with the hope that people involved in the early years of academic computing at universities would 
add their own memoirs, so that that important history will not be lost. Contributions to an effort to complete 
Doug’s memoir will become part of an incremental Epilogue appended to his Memoir. 
I met Doug in 1980 at Cornell when he was Director of Decentralized Computing Support. At Cornell in the 
early ’80s, as at most universities, the primary source of computing cycles supporting research and instruction 
was centrally operated and controlled mainframes. Doug led the effort that resulted in faculty and students 
largely controlling their own computing devices. This transformation led to an enormous increase in facul-
ty and student productivity and an exponential growth in new computing applications. It also dramatically 
changed the role of people supporting academic computing at universities. His activities at Cornell are covered 
in Chapter 2 of his memoir and in a video interview of Doug done a few weeks before he died. This video can 
be seen at: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/41195 
When the formation of NSFNET as a three-tier network was announced in the fall of 1985, Doug was Director 
of Computing at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. NSFNET consisted of a backbone network that connect-
ed the National Supercomputing Centers; Regional Networks that connected universities to the backbone; and 
local area networks that connected faculty at universities to a Regional Network. Doug immediately began 
setting up a Regional Network called MIDnet. MIDnet connected universities in Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and Kansas to NSFNET. MIDnet received an NSF grant in 1986 and shortly later became one of the 
first Regional Networks to become fully operational. Also in 1986, EDUCOM formed a networking and tele-
communications taskforce (NTTF) to advance the connection to NSFNET of every college and university in 
the country, and later to the world. Doug was very active in this organization and in creating an organization 
of Regional Networks called FARNET. As NSFNET evolved into the Internet, Doug made major contributions 
to improving university connectivity at a number of institutions and also served a stint as a program officer at 
NSF, which was funding network expansion. Overall, Doug was a major player in advancing networking for 
more than three decades. 
Throughout his career Doug meticulously preserved records of meetings and papers devoted to computing and 
networking. He also had a collection of computers dating back to the earliest days of microcomputers. In 2010, 
Doug founded the Internet Legacy Institute to preserve and archive information and original source materials 
about the creation and evolution of the Internet. This organization continues and has made major contribu-
tions to the preservation of networking history. Doug travelled extensively with a camcorder to interview 
people involved with networking during its formative period. His historical record is in the process of being 
donated to organizations dedicated to preserving historical records. His records will be of enormous value to 
people seeking to understand events that changed the world. 
In May 2016, in recognition of Doug’s pioneering efforts in creating the Internet, he posthumously received an 
INTERNET2 leadership award. At the award ceremony, INTERNET2 President Dave Lambert said: “From the 
3.33
beginning, Doug was committed to the development of 
the network for the R&E community. Whether in rec-
ognizing the value of  ‘dark fiber’ when many of his col-
leagues did not yet appreciate its value, or in his tireless 
work to bring regional and later national groups to-
gether with a common purpose of creating a significant 
and transformative asset to benefit higher education re-
search and scholarship anywhere in the country, Doug 
made a difference. Doug was a friend and a mentor to 
many in our community. When he dedicated himself 
and his personal resources to the creation of the Inter-
net Legacy Institute it was just an extension of what he 
had been doing for all of us over the years – making sure 
the work of the IT R&E Community would stand as a 
testament of the contributions of thousands of IT pro-
fessionals who had shaped the global research, scholar-
ship and future of advanced Internet technology.”
 
Below is a picture of the award and a picture of Presi-
dent Dave Lambert presenting the award to Doug’s wife 
and children. From left to right in the family picture are 
sons Marc and Eric, Henrietta, and Dave Lambert.
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Incremental Epilogue-2
Glenn Ricart
I met Doug in the 1980s when he headed computing at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.  I was doing the 
same at the University of Maryland College Park. I shared with Doug the plans that were evolving for SURAnet 
to connect the Southeast.  I had picked the Southeast as a manageable size because I could fly engineers any-
where and back in the same day.  Doug asked who was going to connect the Midwest.  I said, “Maybe you will.” 
We agreed to share information, and SURAnet and MIDnet worked closely to mirror policies and methods to 
get more than one-third of the states connected to what became known as the Internet.  Gale’s MIDnet became 
the first fully operational regional network.
Doug continued to be a connector, paying the favor forward and helping many other regional networks get 
their own starts.  He was also instrumental in helping Richard Mandelbaum and me found FARNET, the Fed-
eration of American Research Networks.  Doug was always willing to share information, and he became a great 
enabler of many other state and regional networks around the country.
Doug continued to be an important promoter and connector as Program Director for the National Science 
Foundation’s program to support the National Research and Education Network (which is what we called the 
Internet at that time).  As Program Director, he oversaw a vast expansion of the network for science and edu-
cation, but without limiting the network to those particular uses.
In his later years, Doug became a chronicler of the early Internet, founding the Internet Legacy Institute.  The 
Internet Legacy Institute has perhaps the largest collection of early Internet papers, artifacts, and electronic 
records.  This alone is a major achievement.  Because Doug was always so friendly and helpful, other players 
were happy to share their materials with him.
Incremental Epilogue-3
Ann O’Beay
Doug Gale – from Cornell, to MIDnet, to NSF, to OARnet, to the Internet Legacy Institute (ILI) – was in-
strumental in the design and development of the Internet, with exceptional achievements that impacted the 
Internet’s advancement and evolution. Throughout his exemplary career he not only personally left an indelible 
mark on Internet history, but also assured its preservation.
Doug was a person of action. When he saw a need, he envisioned and created innovative solutions and champi-
oned others to optimize outcomes. I first met Doug during the NSFNET era while I was at MCI – and MIDnet 
was one of the very first regional networks to connect to the NSFNET. When my path led me to the CTO po-
sition at the Ohio Board of Regents in 2010, people in Ohio were still talking about his pioneering and inspira-
tional role in advancing the work of Ohio’s R&E network (OARnet.)
Through ILI, Doug tirelessly gathered and preserved over 100 personal accounts of Internet Pioneers through 
video and oral history recordings (including those of a number of esteemed Internet Hall of Fame inductees), 
as well as archiving an unparalleled collection of early Internet papers and artifacts, which he had meticulously 
collected and chronicled over the decades. 
I had the opportunity to sit in when Doug was conducting a number of audio and video recordings for ILI. 
He naturally knew how to draw out stories from those interviewed in the context of the remarkable journey 
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Internet pioneers collectively share. He gave tirelessly of his time and committed significant personal resources 
to the quest. The materials and recordings Doug collected are already being referenced for books and scholarly 
publications in ways that help us learn from the past to inform the future. ILI has among its treasures resources 
that, without Doug’s vision, initiative, and persistence, would have otherwise been lost to the world.
Incremental Epilogue-4
Jim Williams
Doug was an early and instrumental contributor to the evolution of the US NSFNET and its transition to the 
Internet we enjoy today. Moreover, Doug devoted his last decade to chronicling and preserving the contribu-
tions of others as the founder, leader, and primary collector for the Internet Legacy Institute (ILI).
I have known and had the pleasure of working with Doug from the mid-1980s until his death in 2015.  In the 
beginning, we were both actively leading efforts to connect regional institutions of higher education to the 
emerging NSFNET, in order to provide access and communication to and among resources primarily for the 
scientific community. Doug’s pioneering efforts as creator, principal investigator, and architect of MIDnet – 
one of the first three regional networks to link institutions to the NSFNET in 1987 – preceded my related ef-
forts in Nevada, and Doug was a valuable source of counsel and inspiration to me. This was a time when getting 
resources for these initiatives was not easy, as the world and our own constituents had little or no grasp of what 
it was we were trying to do, and how it might benefit them – let alone the globe.  The established communi-
cations providers thought of “packet switching” as an academic novelty that had little probability of success. 
Our paths continued to cross throughout the years – particularly when Doug provided leadership and vision 
at the NSF as Director of the NSFNET Program, while I was serving as Director of National Networking at 
Merit Network. We worked together again when he was engaged as an active and influential member of the 
Federation of American Research Networks (FARNET).  Our last collaboration began when he coerced me to 
contribute to the workings of the ILI, an effort that continues.
Throughout Doug’s career, he maintained a steady focus on influencing the development of what we now know 
as the Internet, in a way that would provide positive benefits to society. He foresaw the possibility of many of 
the applications we use today. He was an innovator in his own right, and an inspiration to others.  His constant 
positive attitude was contagious. In my view, his efforts throughout his career made substantial contributions 
to creating the Internet and to many fellow pioneers who participated in that effort.
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